

PART TWO

The First World War

CHAPTER X

Antwerp and the Dardanelles

Churchill's opportunity for a spectacular exploit came in the first few weeks of the war. The German army was sweeping through Belgium, but Antwerp was considered a strong fortress which might be saved, and it still protected the left flank of the Allies. The Kaiser had given imperative orders for its capture, and on September 28 the bombardment of the outer ring of fortifications had begun by the powerful German 17-inch howitzers. The panic-stricken Belgian Government sent out an SOS for help. The so-called impregnable fortifications were as strong as the Belgian army. No British soldiers were ready, but at a midnight conference at Kitchener's house it was agreed that Churchill should go to Antwerp to stiffen up the Belgian Prime Minister and that the Royal Naval Division should be sent.

Churchill made a dash to Antwerp and succeeded in persuading the Belgians to continue fighting until the promised reinforcements from Britain arrived. These reinforcements consisted of the Royal Naval Division of some 8,000 men, of whom only about 2,000 were fully trained and equipped. A British war correspondent, Hugh Martin, who was there, has written: "Churchill met the marines on the road between Antwerp and Malines, and addressed

them in stirring terms urging them to do or die in a desperate but glorious adventure; but there is no record of his having addressed the Reservists [and recruits] when they arrived two days later. That is perhaps excusable in one who was naturally prone to glory in the panoply and pomp of war. For the Reservists, as I myself encountered them, were indeed a lamentable spectacle of unpreparedness. They lacked almost every aid that a soldier in the field should possess. They carried their ammunition in their pockets and their bayonets stuck in their gaiters. They had next to no supply service and were clearly unfit for anything but garrison duty behind fortifications." "Churchill," wrote Sir Ian Hamilton, ironically, "handles them as though he were Napoleon and they the Old Guard. He flings them right into the enemy's open jaws."

After a day or two at Antwerp, Winston concluded that here was the decisive theatre of the war, and the way to eternal glory was to become the commander-in-chief on the spot. He telegraphed to the Prime Minister:

If it is thought by H. M. Government that I can be of service here, I am willing to resign my office and undertake command of relieving any defensive forces assigned to Antwerp in conjunction with Belgian Army, provided that I am given necessary military rank and authority, and full powers of a commander of a detached force in the field. I feel it my duty to offer my services, because I am sure this arrangement will afford the best prospects of a victorious result to an enterprise in which I am deeply involved. I should require complete staff proportionate to the force employed, as I have had to use all the officers now here in positions of urgency. I wait your reply. Runciman would do Admiralty well.

This was indeed an extraordinary telegram to receive from the First Lord of the Admiralty. If the role of the navy in the war was so important and he was the responsible minister for it, why should he so suddenly and impetuously decide to throw it up? Had the British navy suddenly become of secondary consideration? The Prime Minister recorded in his diary:

October 5th.—I find when I arrived here this morning a telegram from Winston who proposes to resign his office to take command in the Field of this great military force. Of course, without consulting anybody I at once telegraphed to him warm appreciation of his mis-

sion and his offer, with a most decided negative saying that we could not spare him at the Admiralty. I had not meant to read it at the Cabinet but, as everybody, including K., began to ask how soon he was going to return, I was at last obliged to do so. Winston is an ex-Lieutenant of Hussars and would, if his proposal had been accepted, have been in command of two distinguished Major-Generals not to mention Brigadiers, Colonels, etc., while the Navy are only contributing their light brigade.

October 6th.—Winston persists in remaining there, which leaves the Admiralty here without a head and I have had to tell them to submit decisions to me. I think that Winston ought to return now that a capable General is arriving. He has done good service.

On October 11 Asquith's son, Brigadier General Arthur Asquith, who was himself at Antwerp, visited his father, and the Prime Minister noted in his diary:

I had a long talk after midnight, in the course of which he gave me a full and vivid account of the expedition to Antwerp and the retirement. Marines, of course, are splendid troops and can go anywhere and do anything but Winston ought never to have sent the two Naval Brigades. I was assured that all the recruits were being left behind and that the main body at any rate consisted of seasoned naval reserve men. As a matter of fact, only about a quarter were Reservists, and the rest were a callow crowd of the most raw recruits, most of whom had never fired off a rifle while none of them had ever handled an entrenching tool.

Later in October, Churchill had an interview with Asquith, who recorded the following:

I have had a long call from Winston who, after dilating in great detail on the actual situation, became suddenly very confidential and implored me to take a conventional view of his future. Having, as he says, tasted blood these last few days he is beginning like a tiger to raven for more and begs that sooner or later, and the sooner the better, he may be relieved of his present office and put in some kind of military command. I told him that he could not be spared from the Admiralty. He scoffed at that, alleging that the naval part of the business is practically over as our superiority will grow greater and greater every month.

His mouth waters at the thought of Kitchener's Armies. Are these glittering commands to be entrusted to dug-out trash, bred on the obsolete tactics of twenty-five years ago, mediocrities who have led a sheltered life, mouldering in military routine?

For about an hour he poured forth a ceaseless invective and appeal and I much regretted that there was no shorthand writer within hearing as some of his unpremeditated phrases were quite priceless. He was, however, three parts serious and declared that a political career was nothing to him in comparison with military glory.

The Belgians, however, were not inspired by his theatricality. Hugh Martin, who had been promised the spectacle of "a bit of bayonet work," instead "saw the officers using the flats of their swords on the backs of their men in a desperate effort to rally them." The Belgian soldiers had no stomach for this glorious war.

Who were the men that Churchill was prepared to throw into the open jaws of the enemy? He boasts that the navy was ready; it certainly did not apply to them. A couple of Reservist battalions blundered over the Dutch frontier and were interned. Eight or nine hundred men were taken prisoner and 138 wounded. Fifty men and seven officers lost their lives.

The Antwerp expedition was justified on the grounds that the delay there held up the German advance on the Channel ports. But in case Antwerp was so important in the strategy of the war, it was asked, why was so little thought given to it beforehand? Was Antwerp not on the Admiralty maps, and how was it that the men who were thrown into the battle were so poorly equipped? Had the fact that men would not fight without equipment and supplies escaped the First Lord? Were these details not worthy of his attention in his obsession with the glamour and the glory?

One pauses to reflect on what might have happened if the Prime Minister had acceded to Churchill's request and allowed him to become supreme commander on the Antwerp Front. Kitchener had been in favor of making him a lieutenant general and letting him go ahead. In that event, he might have marched "into the jaws of the enemy" himself and fought to the last drop of blood with his back to the wall. Or he might have been interned or taken prisoner. That would have made even the Kaiser and von Tirpitz laugh. But the Government would have had to find another First Lord of the Admiralty and there might have been a different story to tell of the expedition to the Dardanelles.

"The best laid plans o' mice and men gang aft agley." That

was what happened in France and Flanders when the rival armies dug themselves in. The War Office had prepared for "a short, sharp war." In the memorandum that he had prepared in 1911, Churchill had forecast the possible development of a war between France and Germany and had got as far as outlining what was likely to happen in the first forty days. "Opportunities," he had concluded, "for the decisive trial of strengths may then occur."

But the forty days had gone and the war, far from having reached a dramatic climax, was, according to Lord Kitchener, likely to last three years; and the glorious victories had not arrived. The British press had been full of stories of the Russian advance on the Eastern Front and had held out hopes to the British public of the "great Russian steamroller" making for Berlin. But something had gone wrong in the eastern theatre, too.

The war did not go according to plan. Even at sea there had been no Trafalgars under the auspices and inspiration of Winston Churchill. The First Lord was indignant because the German fleet had not steamed into the North Sea. In a speech at Liverpool he had declared melodramatically that if the German ships did not come out and fight they would be "dug out like rats out of holes." In his *World Crisis* he describes this as "an unhappy phrase which had slipped from my weary tongue" and complains that "it was fastened upon and pilloried." It may have been the speech of a weary man, but it was also the boastful rant of a reckless man. Shortly afterwards, three cruisers were lost with 1,459 officers and men.

Hopes of a quick victory either on the Western Front or on the Russian Front, where the Tsar's conscript armies were being rolled back, receded, and Lord Kitchener was planning for a three years' war.

At the end of October, 1914, Turkey had come into the war on the side of Germany, and in January, 1915, a message came from the Grand Duke Nicholas that the Russians were being pressed in the Caucasus. The Russians, far from being an asset, were proving a liability. The Cabinet had already discussed the opening of a new front in southeast Europe. "The Allied strategy in France," writes Lloyd George in his *War Memoirs*, "had been

a sanguinary mistake which nearly brought irretrievable defeat. When it failed the High Commands had no rational alternative to propose. The Allied generals were completely baffled by the decision of the Germans to dig in. They could think of nothing better than the sacrifice of millions of men in hopeless effort to break through. The great struggles of 1914 had shattered every military dream and wrecked every military hope on both sides."

Winston Churchill advocated an attempt to break through the Dardanelles. He foresaw such a spectacular effort succeeding, the British fleet arriving before Constantinople, the defeat and surrender of the Turks, and the way opened out to send help to Russia. Kitchener had no troops to spare and Lord Fisher was reluctant to send his precious ships. What Churchill contemplated was, to quote his own words, "something in the nature of an organized rush."

The Admiralty sent a telegram to the vice-admiral at the Dardanelles, asking him if he considered forcing "by ships alone a practical operation. It is assumed older battleships fitted with mine-bumpers would be used, preceded by colliers or other merchant craft as mine-bumpers and sweepers. Importance of results would justify severe loss. Let me know your views."

Vice-Admiral Carden replied: "I do not consider the Dardanelles can be rushed. They might be forced by extended operations with large number of ships." Churchill continued to urge his Dardanelles plan. Lloyd George writes in his *War Memoirs*: "Mr. Winston Churchill had been in constant touch with Lord Kitchener and when the former has a scheme agitating his powerful mind, as everyone who is acquainted with his method knows, he is indefatigable in pressing it upon the acceptance of everyone who matters in the decision. . . . He was prepared to act without waiting for an immediate despatch of troops. His proposal was a purely naval operation in its initial stages."

The Cabinet, all with the exception of Lloyd George, came round to the Churchill plan. Lloyd George adds: "I stood alone in expressing a different and doubting view. Lord Fisher was dumb. I was not aware at the time that he and other Admirals were opposed to the venture as a purely naval operation unsupported by troops. Kitchener had been swung round to the support of the idea as long as he was not asked to supply soldiers, and Mr.

Churchill threw into the execution of his scheme all his impulse and ardent energy."

"So," wrote the official Australian historian of the war, "through a Churchill's excess of imagination, a layman's ignorance of artillery and the fatal power of a young enthusiasm to convince older and slower brains, the tragedy of Gallipoli was born."

In his *World Crisis*, Churchill has written an elaborate defense of his activities in relation to the Dardanelles. He argues that at the beginning, for the twenty days that the project had been under discussion, there was no voice raised and no argument advanced against his plans. In this contention he may, with justification, claim that his advisers and his colleagues could not escape their responsibility. They were either in agreement or were silent when they should have expressed their doubts. Later Lord Fisher was to exclaim, "I was always against the Dardanelles," but Churchill was of the opinion that in the first stages it had his approval.

By the end of January, however, Churchill tells us that after preliminary preparations had been made, "when many orders had been given and when many ships were moving with his full authority, Lord Fisher began to manifest an increasing dislike and opposition to the scheme." On January 28, 1915, at a meeting of the War Council, Fisher threatened to resign but was prevailed upon by Lord Kitchener to continue. "When I finally decided to go on," said Lord Fisher to the Dardanelles Commission later, "I went the whole hog." Churchill writes: "I am in no way concealing the great and continuous pressure which I put upon the old Admiral."

On February 19 the bombardment of the outer forts had begun, but it had become clear that the operation in the Dardanelles "was not going to turn out something in the nature of an organized rush." It was too big a job for the fleet alone and would involve a large-scale military attack. "Having begun the bombardment," Kitchener said, "the effect of a defeat in the Orient would be very serious. There could be no going back." He had hitherto been against sending troops which he thought were needed on the Western Front, but events had forced him to change his view. Churchill was now clamoring for more soldiers.

Then there were international complications. The Russian

Government had been secretly promised Constantinople by Sir Edward Grey on November 14, 1914, and now demanded a public declaration, which was given. "In the early days of March," wrote Churchill, "both Great Britain and France apprised the Russian Government that they would agree to the annexation of Constantinople as a part of a victorious peace, and this momentous fact was accordingly made public on the 12th."

The Allies were eager to bring Greece into the war and to use a Greek army at the Dardanelles. "The Greek King," reported the British Minister in Athens, "is in favour of the war," and the Greek general staff was prepared to send four or five Greek divisions to fight the Turks. But the Russian Foreign Minister informed the British ambassador in St. Petersburg on March 3: "The Russian Government could not consent to Greece participating in operation in the Dardanelles as it would be sure to lead to complications. The Emperor," M. Sazonov added, "had in an audience with him yesterday declared he could not in any circumstances consent to Greek co-operation in the Dardanelles."

One of the major aims of the attack on the Dardanelles had thus become to capture Constantinople for the Russian Tsar. But the Greeks were also interested in Constantinople. Churchill, eager to get the use of the Greek armies, records that in his distress he sent the following message to the Foreign Secretary, Sir Edward Grey:

I beseech you at this crisis not to make a mistake in falling below the level of events. Half-hearted measures will ruin all, and a million men will die through the prolongation of the war.

You must be bold and violent. You have a right to be. Our fleet is forcing the Dardanelles. No armies can reach Constantinople but those which we invite, yet we seek nothing here but the victory of the common cause. Tell the Russians that we will meet them in a generous and sympathetic spirit about Constantinople. But no impediment must be placed in the way of Greek co-operation. We must have Greece and Bulgaria if they will come. I am so afraid of your losing Greece, and yet paying all the future into Russian hands. If Russia prevents Greece helping, I will do my utmost to oppose her having Constantinople. She is a broken power but for our aid, and has no resource open but to turn traitor—and this she cannot do.

If you don't back up this Greece—the Greece of Venizelos—you will have another which will cleave to Germany.

Such was the diplomatic background of the Dardanelles.

Lord Fisher was now in open revolt against the whole strategy of the Dardanelles. The preliminary bombardment, the rush through, had become a major naval and military enterprise on which he did not wish to risk the big battleships. There was no element of surprise now. The Turks had fortified the peninsula, and their defenses had been reorganized under the capable German general, Liman von Sanders. The military attacks on Gallipoli were doomed to failure. There were episodes of frightful and futile slaughter as British, Australian and New Zealand troops were sent to their doom. The full story is to be found in official histories and in books by numerous unofficial writers as well.

By the end of the campaign, and when the evacuation was completed, says the official historian, nearly half a million men had been sent to the Dardanelles. "Of this total 43,000 British officers and men had been killed, taken prisoner or posted as missing, or died of disease. The British casualties, including those of evacuated sick, had amounted to 205,000, those of the French to 47,000."

Mr. Churchill's apologists have come to his defense in the Dardanelles campaign by alleging that, if it had been continued for some additional weeks, it might have turned from disaster into a glorious and decisive victory with a potent influence on the subsequent history of mankind. This may be true, though it can hardly be proved. It is just another one of those *ifs* of military history and fantasy. It is similar to the statement that, if Hasdrubal had been able to reach and effectively reinforce Hannibal, Hannibal might have overthrown Rome, or that, if Blucher had not arrived before nightfall or if the French cavalry had not charged into a blind gorge, Napoleon might have triumphed over Wellington at Waterloo.

In his speeches, Churchill had led the British public to believe that the capture of the Dardanelles was to be the prelude to overwhelming victory and a triumphant peace. Here is an extract from a characteristic speech delivered in Dundee on June 7, 1915:

You must expect losses both by land and sea, but the fleet you are employing is your surplus fleet after all your needs have been provided for. . . . Losses of ships, therefore, as long as the precious lives

of the officers and men are saved, as in nearly every case they have been—loss of that kind, I say, may easily be exaggerated in the minds of both friend and foe.

And military operations will also be costly, but those who suppose that Lord Kitchener [loud cheers] had embarked upon them without narrowly and carefully considering their requirements in relation to the paramount need of our Army in France and Flanders, such people are mistaken—and not only mistaken, they are presumptuous. In looking at your losses squarely and soberly, you must not forget at the same time the prize for which you are contending. The Army of Sir Ian Hamilton, the Fleet of Admiral de Robeck, are separated only by a few miles from a victory such as this war has not yet seen. When I speak of victory, I am not referring to those victories which crowd the placards of the newspapers.

I am speaking of victory in the sense of a brilliant and formidable fact, shaping the destinies of nations and shortening the duration of war.

Beyond those few miles of ridge and scrub on which our soldiers, our French comrades, our gallant Australians and our New Zealand fellow subjects are now battling, lie the downfall of a hostile Empire, the destruction of an enemy fleet and army, the fall of a world-famous capital and probably the accession of powerful allies. The struggle will be weary, the risks numerous, the losses cruel, but victory when it comes will make amends for all.

There never was a great subsidiary operation of war which a more complete harmony of strategic, political and economic advantages has combined, or which stood in truer relation to the main decision which is in the central theatre.

Through the narrows of the Dardanelles, and across the ridges of the Gallipoli peninsula, lies some of the shortest paths to triumphant peace.

This bombastic speech was not only read in Britain, it was read in Constantinople, too. Says the official *History of the War*: "General Liman von Sanders has admitted that this utterance helped him to realize that the British attacks would surely be resumed with increasing violence."

The German generals must have been as disconsolate as Winston Churchill himself when the political crisis following the resignation of Lord Fisher removed him from the Admiralty and from further control of the strategy of war. Fisher told Lloyd George, "I want to speak to you. I have resigned. I can stand it no longer. Our ships are being sunk, while we have a fleet in the

Dardanelles which is bigger than the German Navy. Both our Army and Navy are being bled for the benefit of the Dardanelles." The other Sea Lords backed Lord Fisher. They drew up a joint memorandum supporting him in his dissatisfaction at the method of directing the distribution of the fleet and the conduct of the war "by which orders for controlling movements and supplies appear largely taken out of the hands of the First Sea Lord."

The Cabinet wanted Lord Fisher to stay, but he resolutely declined. The first condition he laid down was "that Mr. Winston Churchill is not in the Cabinet to be always circumventing me."



Out of office

Punch

The Tories supported Fisher. They threatened that they would break the political truce and denounce developments at the Admiralty. They would no longer tolerate the presence of Churchill there. Letters passed between Asquith and Bonar Law. It was decided to form a Coalition Government. Churchill was removed from the Admiralty and became Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster.

Lord Riddell, calling at the Admiralty, found him almost brokenhearted. "This," he said, with a wave of his hand to the charts on the wall so plainly betokening the war, "this is what I live for. . . . Yes," he said, "I am finished in respect of all I care for—the waging of the war, the defeat of the Germans."

Churchill made one last desperate effort to retain his post at the Admiralty by writing a long appealing letter to the Tory leader, Bonar Law. But the Tories were having none of it. They were adamant. Churchill had to go.

For a few months he remained in his sinecure office excluded from the War Council. Then he decided to resign. "I am an officer," he wrote to the Prime Minister, "and I place myself unreservedly at the disposal of the military authorities, observing that my regiment is in France. I have a clear conscience, which enables me to bear my responsibility for past events with composure."

In the House of Commons, he made a histrionic farewell speech, defending his Dardanelles policy and replying to Lord Fisher. He was still enthusiastic about Constantinople. "In the East, take Constantinople. Take it by ships if you can. Take it by soldiers if you must. Take it by whichever plan, military or naval, commends itself to your military experts. But take it; take it soon; take it while time remains."

Winston became Major Churchill of the Grenadier Guards and went to France. A month later Gallipoli was evacuated and the evacuation was hailed in the British press as if there had been a major victory. But for a generation afterwards soldiers blinded, maimed, without legs and arms, cursed the Dardanelles. They had been the victims of the "legitimate war gamble" that had failed.

CHAPTER XI

To the Front and Back

"Churchill went to France," said Lord Beaverbrook in his reminiscences, "and was offered by General Sir John French, who was then nearly at his last gasp as Commander-in-Chief, an A.D.C.'s post at G.H.Q. or, as the alternative, a brigade. Churchill chose the brigade but insisted on first obtaining some practical experience of trench warfare. For this purpose, he served a month with the Grenadier Guards. After that Churchill was actually given a brigade in Bridges' Division. But the very first day after this was apparently settled, French happened to go home to London and told Asquith what he was doing. The Premier was apparently frightened, and urged French, who was in no position to insist on having his way, to give Churchill no more than a Battalion."

French was recalled a month later and Haig became commander-in-chief. Winston was not on terms of friendship with him and could not pull strings. "Never was he so disappointed and hurt as over the withdrawal of the offer of a brigade," says his biographer Lewis Broad. "His actual command had been nominated and he had spent his spare time evolving his plans, devising in his fertile brain new methods for encompassing the downfall of the Hun. His mortification was extreme, but it was forgotten when he took over

the battalion that was given him—the 6th Royal Scots Fusiliers." He became a lieutenant colonel. He had no opportunities to exercise his tactical or strategic abilities.

"He loved soldiering," wrote Captain X, who wrote an obsequious little volume called *With Winston Churchill at the Front*. "It lay very near his heart, and I think he could have made a very great soldier. How often have we heard him say by way of encouragement in difficult circumstances, 'War is a game to be played with a smiling face.' " But Churchill did not stay long at the front. In the autumn of 1916 he was back in the House of Commons. His command had disappeared. The military authorities had decided that the Sixth Royal Scots Fusiliers, considerably under strength, should be amalgamated with another battalion. "It had been represented to him," says Lewis Broad, "that a man of his brain and genius had no right to waste on the command of a tiny province abilities that were needed at home. Despite the high value which he placed on his work in the trenches, with its risk and honour, Winston was persuaded that he had not the right to remain."

Other men did not succeed in getting away from the front so easily. They, too, might have thought that they could use their brains and genius at home—but they were not Winston Churchills. "So," says his biographer, "Malbrouk picked up his kit and returned from the wars, at which we can indulge in a sigh of heartfelt relief. A chance bullet from a German rifle might have changed the course of history when Winston was in Plug Street."

Back in Parliament, he plunged into the political fray, eager to get back into the limelight and into the Cabinet. There was growing discontent with the Asquith Government, and intrigues took place behind the scenes. In December, 1916, Asquith resigned and Lloyd George became Prime Minister. Churchill and Lloyd George had been close friends, but Winston waited in vain for the call that never came. But it was not Lloyd George's fault. He wished to include Winston in his Government, but the Tories would not have him. Lloyd George explained why in his *Memoirs*:

Mr. Bonar Law had a profound distrust of him.

I did my best to persuade him to withdraw his objection and I urged the argument which is usually advanced on these occasions, that

Mr. Churchill would be more dangerous as a critic than as a Member of the Government. . . .

When I put it this way to Mr. Bonar Law his reply was, "I would rather have him against us every time."

I deeply regretted this attitude but I could not risk a break-up of the political combination which was an essential foundation of the Government for the sake of an immediate inclusion of Mr. Churchill in the Ministry. A few months later I was able to appoint him to the leadership of the Ministry of Munitions. Even then the Tory antipathy to him was so great that for a short while the very existence of the Government was in jeopardy.

One of the Tories wrote:

"May I again and for the last time urge you to think well before you make the appointment (W.Ch.) which we have more than once discussed? It will be an appointment intensely unpopular with many of your chief colleagues—in the opinion of some of whom it will lead to the disruption of the Government at an early date, even if it does not lead, as it may well do, to resignations now. X—who opened the subject to me of his own accord this evening and who has spoken to you—tells me that it will be intensely unpopular in the Army. I have every reason to believe the same of the Navy. . . .

"He is a potential danger in opposition. In the opinion of all of us he will, as a member of the Government, be an active danger in our midst."

Another Minister wrote at the same time: "Apart from every other consideration, is it wise for you to have as one of your Ministers, a dangerously ambitious man? . . ." And another important Conservative Minister wrote me in a similar strain: "As regards W. Churchill and the Government, I have made enquiries and from what Z tells me, I am satisfied it would bring about a very grave situation in our Party_____"

Why were they so bitter and implacable? His political record naturally exasperated his old party. He does something by halves, and when he left it he attacked his old associates and condemned his old principles with a vigour and a witty scorn which rankled. When war was declared, the national peril constrained all parties into a temporary truce, in which party ranks and party rancours were, for the time being, overlooked or ignored. But Conservatives could not forgive or forget Churchill's desertion to their enemies and their rout had begun. Had he remained a faithful son of the political household in which he was born and brought up, his share in the Dardanelles fiasco would have been passed over and another sacrifice would have been offered up to appease the popular anger. There was an abundant choice from which the altar could have been supplied. His mistakes gave resentful

Tories an irresistible opportunity for punishing rank treason to their party, and the lash which kept Churchill out of office, although knotted with the insults he had hurled at them, was wielded with an appearance of being applied not by vindictive partisans, but by dutiful patriots.

For days I discussed with one or other of my colleagues Churchill, his gifts, his shortcomings, his mistakes, especially the latter. Some of them were more excited about his appointment than about the war. It was a serious crisis. It is interesting to observe in a concentrated form every phrase of the distrust and trepidation with which mediocrity views genius at close quarters. Unfortunately, genius always provides its critics with material for censure—it always has and always will. Churchill is certainly no exception to this rule.

They admitted he was a man of dazzling talents, that he possessed a forceful and a fascinating personality. They recognised his courage and that he was an indefatigable worker. But they asked why, in spite of that, although he had more admirers, he had fewer followers than any prominent public man in Britain? They pointed to the fact that at the lowest ebb of their fortunes, Joseph Chamberlain in Birmingham, and Campbell-Bannerman in Scotland, could count on a territorial loyalty which was unshakable in its devotion. On the other hand, Churchill had never attracted—he had certainly never retained—the affection of any section, province or town. His changes of party were not entirely responsible for this. Some of the greatest figures in British political life had ended in a different party from that in which they commenced their political career. That was therefore not an adequate explanation of his position in public confidence. They asked: What then was the reason?

Here was their explanation. His mind was a powerful machine, but there lay hidden in its material or its make-up some obscure defect which prevented it from always running true. They could not tell what it was. When the mechanism went wrong, its very power made the action disastrous, not only to himself but to the causes in which he was engaged and the men with whom he was co-operating. That was why the latter were nervous in his partnership. He had, in their opinion, revealed some tragic flaw in the metal. This was urged by Churchill's critics as a reason for not utilising his great abilities at this juncture.

They thought of him not as a contribution to the common stock of activities and ideas in the hour of danger, but as a further danger to be guarded against.

I knew something of the feeling against him amongst his old Conservative friends, and that I would run great risks in promoting Churchill to any position in the Ministry; but the insensate fury they

displayed when later on the rumour of my intention reached their ears surpassed all my apprehensions, and for some days it swelled to the dimensions of a grave ministerial crisis which threatened the life of the Government. I took the risk, and although I had occasionally some reason to regret my trust, I am convinced I was right to overrule the misgivings of my colleagues, for Churchill rendered conspicuous service in further increasing the output of munitions when an overwhelming supply was essential to victory. As to Churchill's future, it will depend on whether he can establish a reputation for prudence without losing audacity.

Lloyd George believed that in the War Cabinet Churchill's "erratic impulses could have been kept under control, and his judgment supervised and checked before plunging into action. Men of his ardent temperament and powerful mentality need exceptionally strong brakes. Unfortunately, the Tory Ministers, with the exception of Mr. Balfour and Sir Edward Carson, were unanimous in their resolve that he should not be a member of the Ministry, and most of them made it a condition precedent to their entry into the Government that he should be excluded."

Churchill was, therefore, out of office for twenty months. When he returned it was to the Ministry of Munitions, where he was not allowed to move armies or direct fleets. There he remained until the end of the war.

It is easy to understand why the Tories were indignant and vindictive with respect to Churchill on account of his desertion of the Tory Party and his violent denunciation of Tory principles. But it is not easy to comprehend how they could have recognized in him any traits of genius, thought his mind was a "powerful machine," or believed that he had great organizing and administrative ability.

Churchill's political posts and responsibilities had been relatively trivial from 1900 to 1911. He had not personally accomplished anything of note as First Lord of the Admiralty before war broke out. His ventures at Antwerp and the Dardanelles were complete fiascoes, humiliating and, in the case of the Dardanelles, vastly expensive in men, munitions and money. His achievements as a land commander on the Continent were little more than a minor burlesque. About all that could honestly be said for Churchill down to 1918 was that he exhibited boundless

energy and ambition, had unlimited self-confidence, and talked a great deal about his genius.

As in the case of the Second World War, Britain was saved from defeat in 1914-18 by German folly and by the intervention of the United States. To these factors might also be added the prestige, patience and skill of General Petain in quelling the mutiny in the French army in the spring of 1917.

Churchill made a strong effort to influence his friends in the United States in favor of the Allied cause, but it is doubtful that he exerted any considerable influence in bringing the United States into the war—certainly nothing like the tremendous power he exercised in producing American intervention in 1941. The primary success here must be assigned to the clever propaganda of Sir Edward Grey and the activities of the War Propaganda Bureau organized in September, 1914, by Charles Masterman. Sir Gilbert Parker was entrusted with the all-important task of handling the propaganda needed to affect American opinion favorably. They were all aided by the strongly Anglophile sentiments of the American ambassador in London, Walter Hines Page, whom President Wilson, in a moment of exasperation, once described not inaccurately as "more British than the British."

Powerful economic factors also promoted American entry into the war, such as the prospects that munition orders would avert a threatened depression and the vast interest of Wall Street in protecting the extensive loans to the Allies by American intervention. Stories of alleged German atrocities in Belgium and elsewhere, given prestige and a sense of authenticity in the United States by being vouched for by no less a name than that of James Bryce, also helped to inflame American opinion against Germany, to make Americans feel that Grey was right in his insistence that Britain was fighting solely for civilization and humanity. German folly consisted mainly in the work of her submarines in the effort to counter the British blockade. This may have been as legal as, perhaps even more legal, technically, than the excesses of the British blockade, but it played a crucial role in bringing the United States into the war.

All these things were needed, for, unlike President Roosevelt a

generation later, Mr. Wilson at the outset made a genuine effort to maintain American neutrality and to keep his country out of the war. Occasionally he blurted out such phrases of annoyance at pressure as his statement that the United States was "too proud to fight," and that the only durable peace must be "a peace without victory." But, in the end, he was worn down by British propaganda, by the Anglophile pressure of his associates from Secretary of State Lansing down, and by the German indiscretions, especially the declaration of unrestricted submarine warfare early in 1917.

One of the incidents which did most to arouse the American people against Germany was the sinking of the great liner *Lusitania* by a German submarine off the Irish coast on May 7, 1915. This was an incident which took place while Churchill was still First Lord of the Admiralty. There are a number of interesting details about the sinking of this vessel which brought the United States and Germany to the verge of war two years before the actual American entry that have never been fully explained. It is well known that the *Lusitania* was listed as a naval auxiliary. It was carrying a heavy load of munitions and thus lost its status and immunities as a merchant vessel. American passengers had been warned against taking passage by both the German authorities and by the American Secretary of State, William Jennings Bryan. The question whether the *Lusitania* was also armed has never been settled, although an article in the *New York Tribune* stated that she had been armed.

Most baffling are the following facts. When the *Lusitania* sailed from New York the regular captain had been suddenly replaced by Captain William Thomas Turner. When the ship reached the danger zone it disregarded strict sailing orders. The formal sailing orders Turner had in New York instructed him to avoid the highly dangerous area where the vessel was actually sunk, to increase his speed in the danger zone, and to steam in a zigzag course so as to increase the difficulty of being hit by a torpedo. All these orders were violated. The *Lusitania* entered the tabooed zone; it slowed down its speed, and it failed to zigzag. Whether Captain Turner received any orders by wireless after leaving New York which altered his original instructions has never been determined. Captain

Turner also discouraged such emergency measures as getting the passengers into lifeboats. He may have believed that the vessel would remain afloat, for it is thought that the sinking was caused by a later explosion of the ammunition in the cargo.

The American public was greatly excited and many, including former President Theodore Roosevelt, wished immediate war. To intensify American bitterness against Germany, the British Government prematurely released the Bryce Report on German atrocities on May 12, 1915. All the facts about the *Lusitania* episode may never come to light. The best accounts to date are by American writers, Chapter V of H. C. Peterson's *Propaganda for War*, and Oswald Garrison Villard's article, "The True Story of the *Lusitania*" in the *American Mercury*, May, 1935. The lamentable hoax of the Bryce Report on German atrocities was fully exposed by a distinguished British publicist, Sir Arthur Ponsonby, in his book *Falsehood in Wartime*.

It is now an accepted fact of history that Britain, after winning the "knockout victory" that Lloyd George had demanded in 1916, lost the peace as thoroughly as Churchill lost it in the years 1943-45. It was just as much a case of "triumph and tragedy" for Lloyd George as it turned out to be for Churchill some twenty-five years later. For this, so far as Britain was concerned, Lloyd George was as much to blame as Churchill was in a later generation, although Churchill also contributed to tragedy in this early period by his violent anti-Bolshevik crusade. This had almost as serious results for later British relations with Russia as the Treaty of Versailles had for the German problem between the two world wars.

On January 8, 1918, President Wilson had issued the famous Fourteen Points, which embodied his views as to the issues of the war into which the United States had entered nine months earlier. They were much the same as the Atlantic Charter of 1941, except that they were somewhat more precise and specific as to the details of a postwar settlement and were really taken seriously by Mr. Wilson rather than being a delusive smoke screen for proposed aggressive action. The Germans signed the Armistice on November

11, 1918, on the understanding that the Fourteen Points would be the basis of the forthcoming peace treaty.

This was very unlikely for several reasons. The Fourteen Points were long before this belied by the secret treaties that the Allies had made early in the war. Moreover, soon after the Armistice, Lloyd George had held his "khaki election," which had as a main slogan "Hang the Kaiser" and was as full of hatred for all things German as Churchill's fulminations were a quarter of a century afterwards. The Allies, aside from Russia, which was not represented at Paris, demanded the fulfilment of the secret treaties; and after the British public had been worked up to a fever heat of hatred against Germany on the eve of the Peace Conference, Lloyd George did not have the courage to support sanity in any forthright manner at Paris, even after he had become convinced that a just peace must be provided if Europe was to be saved from another war.

That Lloyd George suffered a rude awakening at Paris has been proved by the ace and veteran English foreign correspondent, Sisley Huddleston, who tells the story in his book *In Our Time* (pp. 133 ff.). In his exasperation at Clemenceau and Orlando, Lloyd George granted an interview to Huddleston that was published in the *Westminster Gazette* March 31, 1919. The tenor of his sentiments then can be discerned from the following passage in the interview: "We want a sane peace. I repeat, a sane peace. Righteous passions have been aroused in all Allied countries. But we have to face realities and prepare a practical treaty which will be signed, and will not breed new wars, whether it disappoints Allied peoples or not. If we statesmen cannot face the situation we must clear out. Our duty is plain and our policy must not arouse implacable antagonisms."

Many realistic Englishmen hailed the interview with delight and hope, but Lloyd George feared the political repercussions. When he returned to London in mid-April he repudiated the interview and did little or nothing more to assure that a just peace treaty would be provided. President Wilson did little to support any such wise policy or drastic revision of the Treaty. He had been disillu-

sioned by the pressure for the fulfilment of the secret treaties and by Clemenceau's vindictiveness, although he had read the secret treaties before he left Washington to go to Paris. Instead of battling decisively against folly in the Peace Treaty, Wilson concentrated his attention mainly on getting the Covenant of the League of Nations embodied in the treaty and on inducing the United States to join the League. Hence, the Germans were forced, almost at the point of the gun, to sign the treaty, which they had no part in making, in the Hall of Mirrors at the Palace in Versailles on June 28, 1919. The results are now history, and the most tragic of these results was the rise of Adolf Hitler, the Second World War, and the ominous current aftermath of the second world conflict.

CHAPTER XII

Churchill's Anti-Bolshevik Crusade

The Lloyd George Coalition Government decided to cash in on victory in the khaki coupon election that followed victory in 1918. Churchill was elected by a majority of 15,365 in Dundee. The Labour M.P. who held the other seat was also elected. In the election the coalition had overwhelmed its opponents. The I.L.P. (Independent Labour Party) critics of the war, MacDonald, Snowden and others, were branded as pro-Germans and pacifists, and were defeated. So also was Arthur Henderson, who had left the Government. The electorate was drunk with victory, and Lloyd George, "the man who won the war," and his Tory-Liberal coalition, backed by the hard-faced profiteers who had done well out of the war, were triumphant.

At Dundee, Churchill was rampant, exploiting to the utmost the jingo frenzy and patriotic hysteria of the moment. The Dardanelles had receded in the memory of the electors, drunk as they were with the froth of victory. Churchill was one of the men of the hour, and this was not the time to listen to reason. Disillusionment was to come only later on.

Winston wanted to return to the Admiralty but was sent to the War Office instead. Much of the work was not to his liking. He

had to supervise the demobilization of an army, not to plan victories.

But there was still a war on hand. British soldiers were still in Russia. The Government of the Tsar, whom Churchill was so eager to keep in power, had collapsed. The Tsar's armies had dissolved and the Russian peasants and workers, who never had any enthusiasm for the war and had been thrown into action half-clad, badly fed, and without the guns to fight the German armies, had revolted. The war had been no glamorous, thrilling adventure for them. The corrupt tsarist autocracy, which the British Government had tried to save both with money and help (the casualties of Gallipoli were the price British, Australian and New Zealand soldiers had paid for the attempted break-through to Russia to help the Tsar's policy), had gone and the Bolsheviks had captured power.

Their slogan was "Peace and Socialism," and they represented the very opposite of what Winston Churchill stood for in politics. They had been against the "imperialist war." They had published the secret treaties from the tsarist archives, and they were denouncing imperialist adventurers in all countries. The Russian masses were being led in a way that Churchill had never dreamt of. A great social upheaval had come in Russia, led by men who were determined to make it a Socialist revolution and completely to change the old order of society that had broken up as a result of the war.

As a part of military operations against the Germans a British force had been sent during the war to Murmansk and Archangel. But the new Russian Government was not going on with the war. Its slogan had become "No Annexation and No Indemnities." Even if it had wished to carry on the war, the Russian soldiers had decided otherwise, as Lenin put it, "with their feet." But there were still remnants of the old tsarist armies led by General Denikin and Admiral Koltchak. Winston Churchill's sympathies were naturally with them. He was completely in favor of giving the counterrevolutionaries all the military help that he could. "The most formidable and irresponsible protagonist of an anti-Bolshevik war," writes Lloyd George in his *Truth About the Peace Treaties*, "was Mr. Winston Churchill. He had no doubt a genuine distaste for

Communism. . . . His ducal blood revolted against the wholesale elimination of Grand Dukes in Russia."

While Lloyd George was in Paris opposing French plans for an attack on the Bolshevik Government, Churchill was trying to persuade the Cabinet in London to agree to military intervention. Lloyd George writes:

There were powerful and exceedingly pertinacious influences in the Cabinet working for military intervention in Russia, and—I was not on the spot in London to exercise direct influence and control over the situation—for a while I was out-manoeuvred, and Mr. Bonar Law, who presided over the Ministers in my absence, was overridden. Mr. Winston Churchill, in particular, threw the whole of his dynamic energy and genius into organising an armed intervention against the Russian Bolshevik power.

When Lloyd George returned for a time to London, Mr. Churchill, according to Lloyd George, "very adroitly seized the opportunity created by the absence of President Wilson and myself to go over to Paris and urge his plans with regard to Russia upon the consideration of the French, the American, and the British delegations."

Lloyd George wished to invite representatives of the Russian Government to Paris to discuss the situation. "Personally," he explains, "I would have dealt with the Soviets as the *de facto* Government of Russia. So would President Wilson. But we both agreed that we could not carry to that extent our colleagues at the Congress." So the Soviet Government had no voice at all in the peace treaty that drew up the new frontiers of Europe, fixed the boundaries of Russia, established Poland and Czechoslovakia, and dictated the terms to Germany that did so much to bring Hitler to power and to create the conditions and the international situation which again led to war in 1939.

Had the Allied governments at Versailles recognized the Soviet Government and negotiated with it as the Government of a nation whose co-operation in Europe was essential if world peace were to be secured, the whole tragic history of international relations would have been changed, and the Second World War might have been averted.

The Soviet Government held out the hand of friendship, which

was rejected. On January 21, 1919, President Wilson reported that the representative of the United States of America had had confidential conversations with M. Litvinov in Copenhagen. Litvinov had stated that the Soviet Government was eager for permanent peace and was even "prepared to compromise on all points, including protection to existing foreign enterprises, the granting of new concessions in Russia, and the Russian foreign debt." Said the American representative: "The Soviet's conciliatory attitude is unquestionable. Litvinov showed me an open wireless message which he had just received from Tchitcherin, the Soviet Foreign Minister, affirming the willingness of the Government to be conciliatory with reference to the question of the foreign debt. Litvinov and his associates realize fully that Russia will need, for a long time, expert assistance and advice, particularly in financial and technical matters, and that she cannot get on without manufactured imports, including, especially, foreign machinery." But Litvinov was not allowed to come anywhere near Versailles.

If the Soviets were conciliatory at this time, the Allied governments were not. They labored under the delusion that the Bolsheviks could easily be destroyed. In Britain the anti-Bolshevik crusade was led, as we have noted, by Churchill, who was abysmally ignorant of what was actually happening in Russia, but who went up and down the country repeatedly chanting his hymn of hate. Speaking in London at a luncheon of the Aldwych Club (January 11, 1919) he declared:

Of all tyrannies in history the Bolshevik tyranny is the worst, the most destructive, the most degrading. It is sheer humbug to pretend that it is not far worse than German militarism. The miseries of the Russian people under the Bolsheviks far surpass anything they suffered even under the Tsar. The atrocities of Lenin and Trotsky are incomparably more hideous, on a larger scale and more numerous than any for which the Kaiser is responsible. The Germans at any rate have stuck to their allies. They misled them, they exploited them, but they did not desert or betray them. It may have been honour among thieves, but that is better than dishonour among murderers.

Much of Churchill's bitterness against the Bolsheviks appears to have been due to the fact that Lenin and Trotsky, after the October Revolution of 1917, opposed carrying on the war against

Germany. But, even if they had been in favor of doing so, such a policy would have been impossible in view of the mass desertions from the front, the hatred of the war, and the determination of the soldiers, the greater number of them conscript peasants, to return home. Lenin and Trotsky had not been responsible for this. They had been exiles abroad. From the beginning of the war Lenin had opposed it, and the governments of Britain and France were no more his allies than the governments of Germany and Austria. Both Lenin and Trotsky were exiles who had fled from the persecution of the tsarist Government, which had plunged Russia into the war. Lenin had written incessantly after 1914 of the "imperialist war" and had strongly denounced all the Socialists, of whatever country, who had supported it. Lenin was an anti-imperialist and a Marxist.

Nevertheless, it is hardly to be wondered that Churchill did not understand Lenin. Churchill had read Gibbon and Macaulay and Kipling, but not Marx, and he had not the slightest understanding of the political and social philosophy of the Russian Revolution, the miseries of the Russian people, the social collapse as a result of the war, had come not as a consequence of Bolshevism but as the aftermath of the collapse of the Russian armies and the chaos into which a European war had plunged a people whose incompetent government had broken down.

Churchill's hysteria about the atrocities of Lenin and Trotsky being "incomparably more hideous and more numerous than any for which the Kaiser was responsible" was, of course, nonsense, the Bolshevik leaders had not plunged Russia into war; they had tried to get Russia out of it, and they were eager for peace because the Russian soldiers demanded it. War is always an atrocity, and Mr. Churchill had played a far greater part in preparing for it than Lenin and Trotsky. They had not been responsible for the Dardanelles. They did not share the Tsar's ambitions for Constantinople, they repudiated it and published the secret treaties for the whole world to see what diplomatic duplicity and knavery had been going on behind the scenes. They could not be charged with defraying their Allies, for they had never recognized them.

What they had done was to substitute the dictatorship of the

proletariat for the dictatorship of the Tsar, and its aims were Socialism and peace. The atrocities to which Churchill was presumably referring were the casualties of the civil war. But the seizure of political power by the Bolsheviks had been a comparatively bloodless affair because the soldiers and sailors of Petrograd had supported them. Certainly the bloodshed that had occurred in the first stages of the Revolution was incomparably less than that of the war, when the badly armed Russian soldiers had been mowed down by the tens of thousands by the German machine guns.

The latter, from Churchill's point of view, had been glorious sacrifice. War on the Eastern Front had been as ghastly and hideous and as cruel as war could be. But Churchill had never denounced the Tsar or the grand dukes and the Russian generals; they were his Russian counterparts. And who was Churchill to denounce Lenin and Trotsky as murderers? They were not architects of the First World War.

In a speech at the Mansion House on February 19, 1919, Churchill denounced "the foul baboonery of Bolshevism" and urged that arms, equipment and technical assistance should be sent to those who were fighting the Soviet Government.

"Since the Armistice my policy would have been 'Peace with the German people, war on the Bolshevik tyranny,'" wrote Churchill in a memorandum to Lloyd George in March, 1920. "Willingly or unavoidably, you have followed something very near the reverse. . . . But we are now face to face with the results. They are terrible. We may well be within measurable distance of universal collapse and anarchy throughout Europe and Asia. Russia has gone into ruin. What is left of her is in the power of these deadly snakes."

He prophesied that the Bolshevik Government would be easily overthrown. Reporting his speech on the Army Estimates on June 29, 1919, *The Times* said: "In his speech in debate on the Army Estimates to-day Mr. Churchill presented a cheerful view of the situation in Russia. The military weakness of Bolshevism had become very apparent. Wherever they were faced with determination they had been driven back. . . . It was hoped that a juncture

would soon be formed between Koltchak's and the Archangel forces, and that before the summer was out the situation would be placed on a Russian basis."

In his *World Crisis*, Churchill boasted that we provided General Denikin alone "with the means of arming and equipping nearly a quarter of a million men." Civil war is nearly always ruthless, and the counterrevolutionary generals had nothing to learn in the way of massacre and terrorism. They burned down villages, shot revolutionaries, carried out mass executions in the traditional Russian way. Were these not atrocities? Churchill reserved his invective for the Soviets.

In his Order of the Day to the Red Army (October 24, 1919), Trotsky struck a note of dignity and balance which was absent in Churchill's vituperations:

Red warriors! On all the fronts you meet the hostile plots of the English. The counter-revolutionary troops shoot you with English guns. In the depots of Shendursk and Onega, on the Southern and Western fronts you find supplies of English manufacture. The prisoners you have captured are dressed in uniforms made in England. The women and children of Archangel and Astrakhan are maimed and killed by English airmen with the aid of English explosives. English ships bomb our shores. . . . But even to-day, when we are engaged in a bitter fight with Yudenich, the hireling of England, I demand that you never forget that there are two Englands. Beside the England of profits, of butchery, of violence and bloodthirstiness, there is the England of labour, of spiritual power, of high ideals, of international solidarity. It is the base and dishonest England of the Stock Exchange manipulators that is fighting us. The England of labour and the people are with us.

In his book *Memoirs of a British Agent*, Bruce Lockhart, who was sent by the British Government to study the situation in Russia, describes what a disastrous effect Churchill's intervention had upon Britain's relations with the Soviet Government. In the early days of the Revolution, he noted—

. . . the comparative tolerance of the Bolsheviks, because the *cruelties which followed later were the result* of the intensification of the Civil War. For the intensification of that bloody struggle Allied intervention with the false hopes it raised was largely responsible.

I do not say that a policy of abstention from interference in the

internal affairs of Russia would have altered the course of the Bolshevik Revolution. I do suggest that an intervention intensified the terror and increased the bloodshed.

Bruce Lockhart had some idea of what was happening in Russia, Churchill had not. According to Lockhart:

Churchill had been entirely captivated by Boris Savinkov, the Russian novelist, and saw in him a Russian Bonaparte. Boris Savinkov for some reason which I have never been able to understand has always been regarded by Englishmen as a man of action and therefore as a hero. More, even than most Russians, Savinkov was a schemer—a man who could sit up all night drinking brandy and discussing what he was going to do the next day. And when the morrow came he left the action to others. His talents cannot be denied. He wrote several excellent novels. He understood the revolutionary temperament better than almost anyone and knew how to play on it for his own ends. He had mingled so much with spies and *agents provocateurs* that, like the hero in his own novels, he hardly knew whether he was deceiving himself or those whom he meant to deceive. Like most Russians too, he was a forcible speaker who could impress his personality on his listeners.

Such was Churchill's Russian Napoleon. Bruce Lockhart was a witness of the Russian Revolution, had met the Bolshevik leaders and understood what Churchill did not. Churchill, in the House of Commons, has since sought to justify his policy of intervening on the side of the "Russian Whites" on the ground that he was right in his attempt to strangle Bolshevism at birth. But what was the situation in Russia in 1918? Bruce Lockhart sums it up clearly:

The Revolution took place because the patience of the Russian people broke down under a system of unparalleled inefficiency and corruption. No other nation would have stood the privations which Russia stood, for anything like the same length of time. As instances of the inefficiency, I give the disgraceful mishandling of food-supplies, the complete break-down of transport, and the senseless mobilisation of millions of unwanted and unemployable troops. As an example of the corruption, I quote the shameless profiteering of nearly everyone engaged in the giving and taking of war contracts. Obviously the Emperor himself, as a supreme autocrat, must bear the responsibility for a system which failed mainly because of the men (Sturmer, Protopoff, Rasputin) whom he appointed to control it. If he had acted differently, if he had been a different man . . . These arguments are childish.

What it is important to realise is that from the first the revolution was a revolution of the people. From the first moment neither the Duma nor the intelligentsia had any control of the situation. Secondly, the revolution was a revolution for land, bread, and peace—but, above all, for peace.

There was only one way to save Russia from going Bolshevik. That was to allow her to make peace. It was because he would not make peace that Kerensky went under. It was solely because he promised to stop the war that Lenin came to the top. It will be objected that Kerensky ought to have shot both Lenin and Trotsky. The soldiers, who argue in this way, always ignore the psychological premises. The old regime having broken down, the type of leader (i.e. a Kerensky) whom the first revolution threw up was bound to be a man who would not shoot his opponents. It was the first stage of a natural process. Secondly, even if Kerensky had shot Lenin and Trotsky, some other anti-war leader would have taken their place and would have won through on his anti-war programme.

The total cost of the military help given to the counterrevolutionary forces was estimated in a White Paper at £100,000,000. In his defense in his book, Churchill argued that this was "an absurd exaggeration." "The actual expense, *apart from munitions*, was not a tithe as great." Obviously no war would cost so much if munitions were left out of the calculation, for human life is cheap. Churchill did not think the cost of the munitions should be included, because "though they had been most costly to produce, they were only an unmarketable surplus of the Great War, to which no money value can be assigned. Had they been kept in our hands till they mouldered they would only have involved additional charges for storage, care and maintenance."

What an amazing defense! Since the guns would have become rusty in Great Britain, we were justified in sending them to Russia to be used against the Russian peasants and workers! When the British Government later proceeded to claim compensation for the British money which had been lost in Russia, M. Rakovsky put in a counterclaim on the grounds that the war of intervention had cost Russia £2,000,000,000!

But it was not only the monetary cost of Churchill's war that was important. It left behind in Russia a heritage of bitter memories, hatred and ill will that is impossible to estimate. Lloyd

George's Treaty of Versailles had assured that British relations with Germany and Italy would be strained and hazardous in the postwar period. Churchill's Russian foray guaranteed that British contacts with Russia would be equally or more difficult and suspicious.

Herbert Spencer was fond of pointing out that political acts very often produce precisely the opposite results from those intended by their authors. This was notably the case with the Allied effort to nip the Bolshevik experiment in the bud. Most historians now agree that if there had been no Allied intervention in Russia following 1918 it is quite possible, or even likely, that spontaneous civil war or general anarchy would have resulted and the new Soviet system would have perished. But the Allied intrusion greatly stimulated the national sentiment of the Russians and rallied to the Bolshevik cause many who would otherwise have been opposed to it or would have refused to support it. The foreign interference thus probably solidified the Russians, saved the Communist Revolution, and assured the permanence of the Bolshevik regime. As the man who spearheaded the movement for intervention, Churchill may fairly be set down as, perhaps next to Lenin and Trotsky themselves, the savior of the Bolshevik system that was later to plague or inspire him and to lead him into numerous political oscillations between the most venomous and articulate hatred and fulsome praise.