THE
For the interest of these treaties is not purely historical. They represent engagements undertaken by the Allied Governments in the earlier part of the war. Some of those engagements, such as the obligation to present Constantinople to the Tsar, have lapsed now that the nation chiefly interested has denounced the policy. Again, the plans in regard to Asiatic Turkey must be considered to be in process of modification after Mr. Lloyd Georges declaration that it will be for the World Congress to decide the fate of Syria and Mesopotamia. But from a recent reply of Lord Robert Cecil the Italian Treaty is still held to be binding by our Government. Thus it is that these treaties have a close bearing upon the fortunes of a democratic peace. They make it more difficult for the true standpoint of Western democracy to be appreciated. Our statesmen have given the world a steady flow of assurance that we have entered and sustained the war for unselfish aims, that we coveted no territory, and that we were not fighting for conquests or annexations. It would be well for our people to critically examine the following treaties as a commentary on these wise intentions.
object. For this reason, while openly offering to all the belligerent peoples and their Governments an immediate armistice, we publish simultaneously those treaties and agreements which have lost all their obligatory force for the Russian workmen, soldiers, and peasants, who have taken the Government into their hands.... From among the many important diplomatic documents published by M. Trotski, we have selected those which deal with actual treaties and arrangements made by the Allies since the beginning of the war. These comprise: * From the text printed in The New Europe, Dec. 20, 1917.
The present war, however, gave to the old Russian Government the opportunity of fulfilling the ambition cherished by the Tsars from the days of Peter the Great, and in the Spring of 1915 the British Government gave its consent in writing to the annexation by Russia of the Straits and Constantinople. Rumours of the existence of this understanding speedily became current, and various unavailing attempts were made in the House of Commons to ascertain from the British Government whether such an agreement had actually been concluded. The following is a typical example of the questions which were put to the Foreign Secretary on the point, and of the answers which were received:
May 30, 1916.
Sir Edward Grey: Professor Miliukoff is a distinguished member of the Duma,
but it is not necessary or desirable to make official comments on
unofficial statements.
Mr. Outhwaite: Did Professor Miliukoff correctly interpret the views of the
Russian Government; does it follow under the pact of London that this
country cannot consider terms of peace until Russia has secured
Constantinople?
Sir Edward Grey: The honourable member is asking for a statement which I do
not think it desirable to make.
Eventually, the existence of the agreement was officially made known, not through any statement of the British Government, but by an utterance of the then
Prime Minister of Russia, M. Trepoff, in the Duma, on December 2, 1916. M. Trepoff said: An agreement which we concluded in 1915 with Great Britain and France, and to which Italy has adhered, established in the most definite fashion the right of Russia to the Straits and Constantinople.... I repeat that absolute agreement on this point is firmly established among the Allies. Now, owing to the action of the Russian Revolutionary Government, we are able to give further details of this agreement. The following is the text of a confidential telegram (printed in the Manchester Guardian, December 12, 1917), from the Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs (M. Sazonoff) to the Russian Ambassador at Paris. It is dated March 5 (18),1 1915, and runs as follows: No. 1226. On February 23 (March 8) the French Ambassador, on behalf of his Government, announced to me that France was prepared to take up a most favourable attitude in the matter of realisation of our desires as set out in my telegram to you, No. 937, in respect of the Straits and Constantinople, for which I charged you to tender Delcassé my gratitude. 1 There is a difference of thirteen days between the Russian or Julian calendar and the Gregorian calendar used in the Western world. When two dates are given the first is that of the Old Style or Russian calendar.
tions, before he could give us a more definite assurance in the above sense. Now the British Government has given its complete consent in writing to the annexation by Russia of the Straits and Constantinople within the limits indicated by us, and only demanded security for its economic interests and a similar benevolent attitude on our part towards the political aspirations of England in other parts. THE LIMITS INDICATED BY RUSSIA. The reader will naturally ask two questions here: First, what were the limits indicated by Russia? Second, what were the political aspirations of England in other parts towards which a benevolent attitude was demanded?
The answers to these questions are to be found in a document first
published in the Pravda (the organ of the Bolsheviks), a translation of
which appeared in The New Europe of December 20,1917, and in the Manchester
Guardian of February 22, 1918. This document is apparently a memorandum of
various secret negotiations drawn up for the information of some Minister.
For purposes of reference, we will call it Document B. The
New Europe translation of this document runs as follows: MEMORANDUM OF THE RUSSIAN FOREIGN OFFICE. On February 19 (March 4), 1915, the Minister of Foreign Affairs handed to the French and British Ambassadors a Memorandum which set forth the desire to add the following territories to Russia as the result of the present war: 1 This arrangement would give to Russia the whole of Turkey in Europe, with the exception of a small piece of territory in the north around Adrianople and Kirk Kilisse, which was apparently reserved as a bait to induce Bulgaria to join the Allies. We were given to understand that in order to secure Balkan union, there were certain concessions that Bulgaria would require, especially in Thrace and Macedonia; and the Allies were ready to do all in their power to secure these things for Bulgaria, but. . . it was an essential preliminary that Bulgaria should take the side of the Allies against Turkey. (Sir Edward Grey, in the House of Commons, October 13, 1915). It would also give to Russia the Asiatic shores of the Bosphorus, the peninsula of Scutari, and about 80 miles of the Black Sea coast of Asia Minor. Tenedos and Imbros are islands in the Ægean, Iying off the entrance of the Dardanelles. The Asiatic shores of the Sea of Marmora and the Dardanelles do not appear to have been included.
their readiness to agree to our wishes, provided the war is won, and provided a number of claims made by France and England, both in the Ottoman Empire, and in other places, are satisfied. * See note on next page. 2 This agreement was subsequently made in the Spring of 1916. (See page 43.) 3 By the Anglo-Russian agreement of 1907 Persia was divided into three spheres, an extensive Russian sphere in the north, which included most of the principal Persian towns, a smaller British sphere in the south-east, and a central neutral zone. The Russian and British spheres were only spheres of commercial interest. Sir Edward Grey stated that they were not to be regarded as political partitions. These are only British and Russian spheres in a sense which is in no way derogatory to the independence and sovereignty of Persia.-(Sir Edward Grey, House of Commons, February 14, 1908).
In view of the formulation of our wishes with regard to the sacred Mahomedan places it must now be made clear whether these localities are to remain under the sovereignty of Turkey with the Sultan keeping the title of Caliph, or whether it is proposed to create new independent States. In our opinion it would be [undesirable*] to separate the Caliphate from Turkey. In any case freedom of pilgrimage must be guaranteed. Note: * The words in brackets are probably mistranslated. The following respective readings are given in the Manchester Guardian: (a) not proceeding from or; (b) desirable; (c) should be secured. This conforms to the sense of telegram No. 1,265 quoted on the next page.
in general, and in the East, in particular,4 and in the recognition by us for Italy within the territories ceded to us of the same rights as those enjoyed by France and England. The next document printed by the Manchester Guardian is the following confidential telegram from M. Sazonoff to the Russian Ambassador in London, dated March 7 (20),1915. No. 1265. Referring to the Memorandum of the British Government (? Embassy) here of March 12, will you please express to Grey the profound gratitude of the Imperial Government for the complete and final assent of Great Britain to the solution of the question of the Straits and Constantinople, in accordance with Russias desires. The Imperial Government fully appreciates the sentiments of the British Government and feels certain that a sincere recognition of mutual interests will secure for ever the firm friendship between Russia and Great Britain. 4 These claims are set out in the provisions of the Treaty of London signed on April 26, 1915, by representatives of the British, French, Russian, and Italian Governments. (See page 27.)
those States whose help is considered useful by Great Britain and France to join in the undertaking on reasonable terms.5 5 The date of the first naval attack in force on the Dardanelles was February 20, 1915. The military expedition commenced to land on April 25, 1915. Any step which may have been taken by Russia to induce other States to join in the undertaking evidently failed. 6 Two important Persian towns.
to the Imperial Government is the question of railway construction in the neutral zone, which will require further amicable discussion. 7 On September 4, 1907, Sir Cecil Spring Rice, British Minister at Teheran, sent a communication to the Persian Minister for Foreign Affairs, explaining the nature of the Anglo-Russian Convention, in which he said: The object of the two Powers in making this agreement is not in any way to attack, but rather to assure for ever, the independence of Persia. Not only do they not wish to have at hand any excuse for intervention, but their object in these friendly negotiations was not to allow one another to intervene on the pretext of safeguarding their interests. The two Powers hope that in the future Persia will be for ever delivered from the fear of foreign intervention, and will thus be perfectly free to manage her own affairs in her own way. Eight years later the arrangements recorded in M. Sazonoffs telegram were made. 8 According to an answer given by Lord Islington to Viscount Bryce in the House of Lords on January 9, 1918, this related to certain proposals for improving the irrigation of Russian territory adjoining Afghanistan, which had been made by the Russian Government before the war. These proposals never came to a head, and could not have been carried into effect without the Ameers
THE PRESENT POSITION. The Russian Revolutionary Government has now renounced all desire on the part of Russia to annex Constantinople and the Straits. And, as a result of this action, Mr. Lloyd George has at last stated, on behalf of the British Government (January 5, 1918) that: we do not challenge the maintenance of the Turkish Empire in the homelands of the Turkish race with its capital at Constantinople-the passage between the Mediterranean and the Black Sea being internationalised and neutralised.With regard to Persia the present rulers of Russia have repudiated the Anglo-Russian agreement of 1907, and have announced their intention of withdrawing all Russian troops from Persia so as to terminate with all speed the acts of violence which Tsarism and the bourgeois Governments of Russia have committed against the Persian people. On this, Lord Curzon has said (January 1, 1918) that:the great change in the situation produced by recent events in Russia has given to His Majestys Government a welcome opportunity of testifying their sincerity, in repudiating any hostile designs on the territorial integrity or political independence of the Persian kingdom. . . . We have informed the Persian Government that we regard the agreement as being henceforward in suspense. consent. No pruposal affecting the territorial integrity of Afghanistan has been made. Lord Islington also stated that an opportunity was subsequently taken in the course of correspondence with the Ameer of Afghanistan to give him a formal assurance that no proposal affecting the interests of his country would be made or agreed to at the Peace Conference.
II. SUMMARY.Italy to receive the Trentino, the Southern Tyrol, Trieste, the county of Corizia and Cradisca, Istria, Northern Dalmatia, numerous islands off the Dalmatian coast, Valona (in Albania), twelve islands off the coast of Asia Minor, a prospective share in the partition of Asiatic Turkey, a prospective addition to her colonial territory in Africa, and a share in the war indemnity. The remainder of the Austro-Hungarian coast is to be divided between Croatia, Serbia and Montenegro, thus cutting Austria-Hungary completely from the sea. Certain stretches of the Adriatic coast are to be neutralised. There is also a suggestion to partition the greater part of Albania between Serbia, Montenegro and Greece. To understand the provisions of the treaty with Italy, and their bearing upon the question of the Adriatic, it is necessary to consult an atlas. Open it and turn to the Adriatic. This is a narrow sea running up from the Mediterranean in a north-westerly direction and separating Italy from the Balkan peninsula and from Austria-Hungary. It is from 100 to 150 miles broad and about 600 miles long. It is entered by the Straits of Otranto, which are less than 50 miles wide and the key to these 27
Straits is the Albanian town of Valona, standing on a fine bay, the entrance to which is guarded by the island of Saseno. Now look at the two coasts. They present a striking contrast. The Italian coast is flat and unindented. There are few harbours of any importance, Italys chief ports being on her western and southern shores. But the Austrian ooast is deeply indented. Magnificent harbours, capable of accommodating the fleets of the world, run far inland in every direction. The water is deep, and the coast is protected all the way down by a chain of long, narrow islands forming an admirable cover for shipping. It is possible for a vessel to leave Fiume and to sail down the coast to Ragusa without -save for one stretch of 20 miles-ever coming out into the open sea. This coast line which, from Trieste in the north to Spizza in the south, is in the oocupation of Austria-Hungary, is, therefore, well adapted both for commercial ports and for naval bases. Pola (in Istria) is the chief naval station and other important towns, besides Trieste, are the Croatian port of Fiume, the Dalmatian ports of Zara, Sebenico and Spalato, Ragusa and Cattaro. THE SACRED EGOISM OF ITALY. Upon this magnificent coast-line-especially upon that of Dalmatia-Italian expansionists have for many years cast longing eyes. And in the present war these Italian Imperialists saw an opportunity of realising their cherished ambitions. The spirit in which they set to work can be judged from representative utterances of some of them. On October 18, 1914, Signor Salandra took over the Foreign Office for a time, and struck the key-note of the
policy he intended to pursue in the following words: What is needed is.... a freedom from all preconceptions and prejudices, and from every sentiment except that of sacred egoism (sacro egoismo) for Italy.Meanwhile a raging, tearing propaganda was started in support of Italian expansion. The Society Pro Dalmazia was founded to advocate Italys claim to the opposite shores of the Adriatic. The rights of nationality were brushed aside. The Giornale dltalia (whose chief proprietors are Baron Sonnino and Signor Salandra) announced (April 4, 1915) that: There are political and military considerations which are above any question of nationality whatever and Italys rulers entered into negotiations with the object of securing the territorial and other concessions they desired. Italys demands on the Allies at that time were summarised by a French writer, M. Charles Vellay, in his La Question de lAdriatique in the following words: Italy categorically-one might say brutally expressed a desire, which was not embarrassed by any consideration of justice or reason, and she plainly avowed her aim, viz., the destruction of all rivalry by sea, absolute ascendancy. *This view of Italys claims is quite frankly confessed by the Giornale dItalia (April 19, 1915): The principal objective of Italy in the Adriatic is the solution, once for all, of the politico-strategic question of a sea which is commanded in the military sense from the eastern shore, and such a problem can be solved only by one method- by eliminating from the Adriatic every other war fleet..... From the military point of view Italy ought not to make a compromise.... neither a fort, nor a gun, nor a submarine, that is not Italian, ought to be in the Adriatic. * Quoted in A Bulwark against Germany by Bogumil Vosnjak (George Allen and Unwin).
Eventually the concessions offered by the Allies were considered satisfactory and Italy decided to come into the war on the side of the champions of democracy and small nations. The terms of Italys entry into the conflict were settled by a secret convention, now known as the Treaty of London. TERMS OF THE TREATY. The Treaty of London was concluded between Britain, France, Russia and Italy, and signed on April 26,1915. The terms of the treaty appeared in Isvestia (the organ of the Soviet) on November 28, 1917, and a translation was printed in the Manchester Guardian on January 18,1918, and, in a slightly different form, in The New Europe on January 17, 1918. The document runs as follows: * The Italian Ambassador in London, Marchese Imperiali, on instructions from his Government, has the honour to communicate to the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Sir Edward Grey, to the French Ambassador, M. Cambon, and to the Russian Ambassador, Count Benckendorff, the following Memorandum:Article I.A military convention is to be concluded without delay between the general Staffs of France, Great Britain, Russia, and Italy to determine the minimum number of troops which Russia would have to throw against Austria-Hungary if the latter should want to concentrate all her forces For particulars of the negotiations preceding Italys entry into the war see Appendix A. (page 79). * Paragraphs marked with a star are taken from the translation published in The New Europe. In all other cases the Manchester Guardian version is followed.
against Italy. Russia should decide mainly to attack Germany. Similarly the said convention is to regulate the questions relating to armistices, in so far as such armistices form an essential part of the competence of the Supreme Army Command.9 9 The New Europe version reads: In so far as these (armistices) do not by their very nature fall within the competence of The Supreme Command. 10 Trentino is, practically speaking, that part of the valley of the Adige which runs from the Italian frontier to the town of Bozen. It includes the towns of Trent, Rovereto, Riva and Ala. Although for hundreds of years a part of the Holy Roman Empire (Trent itself was governed by a Prince-Bishop) the population is very largely Italian in race and sympathy. A correspondent of the Morning Post (April 3rd, 1915) states that whilst the towns in the valley are predominantly Italian the villages on the heights are Austrian in sympathy. The Trentino is the old historic highway into lta]y from Central Europe, through Innsbruck and over the Brenner Pass.
frontier, which is the Brenner Pass11; the city and district of Trieste12; the county of Gorizia and Gradisca13; the entire Istria14 up to Quarmer,15 including Volosca and the Istrian islands of Cherso and Lussina,15 as well as the smaller islands of Plavnika,15, Unia, Canidoli, Palazznoli,15 S. Petri dei Nembi,15 Asinello, and Gruica, with the neighbouring islets. 11 This would bring the Italian frontier to within 20 miles of Innsbruck and 30 miles of the southern limits of Bavaria. It would annex to Italy a tract of territory inhabited by the Tyrolese, a virile race of mountaineers, the descendants of Andreas Hofer and his followers, who are notorious for their loyal support of the Austrian throne. 12 Trieste has been linked to the Austrian crown for 536 years, ever since, in fact, 1382, in which year the city voluntarily joined the Empire in order to be protected against the threatened domination of Venice. It is the chief port of Austria and the natural outlet for the trade of the hinterland for as far back as Vienna, Bohemia and even further. Its inclusion in the Italian Customs Union would tend to the economic strangulation of the interior and the commercial ruin of the port. 13 According to the last census (1910) the population of the county of Gorizia and Gradisca is 249,893, of which 90,119 are ltalians, or about 36 per cent. Roughly speaking, the ltalians inhabit the strip of territory between the Italian frontier and the line of the Isonzo with the town of Gorizia. The Italian claim to the county of Gorizia and Gradisca, of course, goes far beyond this, and takes in a practically solid non-ltalian population. 14 Although there is a considerable Italian population along a thin strip of the western sea-board of Istria the interior is almost entirely non-ltalian. The population of Istria is 386,463, of which 147,417 are Italians, or roughly 38 per cent. The cession of Istria would give to Italy the great fortress and dockyard of Pola, Austrias chief naval base. Cherso and Lussina are large and important islands commanding Fiume and the coast of Croatia. 15 In The New Europe these place-names are translated: Quarnero, Lussin, Plavnik, Palazzuola and S. Pietro Nerovio.
*Note I (to Article 4).In carrying out what is said in Article 4 the frontier line shall be drawn along the following points:From the summit of Umbrile northwards to the Stelvio, then along the watershed of the Rhoetian Alps as far as the sources of the rivers Adige and Eisach, then across the Mounts Reschen and Brenner and the Etz and Ziller peaks. The frontier then turns southwards, touching Mount Toblach, in order to reach the present frontier of Carniola, which is near the Alps. Along this frontier the line will reach Mount Tarvis and will follow the watershed of the Julian Alps beyond the crests of Predil, Mangart, and Tricorno, and the passes of Podberdo, Podlansko, and Idria. From here the line will turn in a south-east direction towards the Schneeberg, in such a way as not to include the basin of the Save and its tributaries in Italian territory. From the Schneeberg the frontier will descend towards the sea coast, including Castua, Mantuglia, and Volosca as Italian districts. 16 Two small places in South-West Croatia.
beginning with Premuda, Selve, Ulbo, Skerda, Maoh, Pago, and Puntadura, and further north, and down to Melada in the south, with the inclusion of the islands of S. Andrea, Busi, Lissa, Lesina, Torcola, Curzola, Cazza, and Lagosta, with all the adjacent, rocks and islets, as well as Pelagosa, but without the islands of Zirona Grande and Zirona Piccola, Bua, Solta, and Brazza.17 17 This gives to Italy the whole of Northern Dalmatia which constitutes the greater part of that province, and includes the ports of Zara and Sebenico. The islands mentioned are many of them (in particular Lesina, Curzola, Lissa, and Melada) large and important and command the whole Dalmatian coast and the port of Spalato. The total population of Dalmatia is 684,855. Of this number 18,028 are Italians, or a little under 3 per cent. of the whole. Of these, no fewer than 8,000 are concentrated in the single town of Zara This leaves only l0,000 Italians for the whole of the rest of Dalmatia, or about 1 3/4 per cent. of the population. The Dalmatians are a hardy, sea-faring stock, and provide the bulk of the seamen of the Austrian Navy and Mercantile marine. 18 The Vojuzza or Vojussa is an Albanian river which flows into the Adriatic a few miles north of Valona.
back as April and May, 1909, remaining intact.19 Nevertheless, in view of the fact that those rights were guaranteed to Montenegro within her present frontiers, they are not to be extended to those territories and ports which may eventually be given to Montenegro. Thus, none of the ports of the littoral now belongng to Montenegro are to be neutralised, at any future time. On the other hand, the disqualifications affecting Antivari, to which Montenegro herself agreed in 1909, are to remain in force; 19 In April, 1909, following upon the crisis caused by the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina by Austria-Hungary in the previous year, Montenegro succeeded in obtaining from Austria and the Powers the abrogation of various restrictions imposed on her tenure of the port of Antivari by Article 29 of the Treaty of Berlin. It was arranged that Antivari should retain the character of a commercial port, but the administration of the maritime police on the Montenegrin coast by Austria-Hungary and the closure of Antivari to warships of all nations, and other irksome regulations, were abandoned. 20 Fiume is the chief port of Hungary. 21 Veglia and Arbe are islands of considerable size lying off the coast of Croatia.
and in the south of the Adriatic, where Serbia and Montenegro have interests, the entire coast from Planka up to the River Drin22 with the chief ports of Spalato, Ragusa, Cattaro, Antivari, Dulcigno and San Giovanni di Medua, with the islands of Zirona Grande, Zirona Piccola, Bua, Solta, Brazza,23 Jaklian and Calomotta24. 22 The Drin is an Albanian river flowing into the Adriatic close to the northern frontier of that country. 23 Brazza is a large island lying off the coast of Southern Dalmatia, just outside Spalato. 24 The effect of Articles 4 and 5, with the notes attached, is as follows:After Italy has been given Istria and Northern Dalmatia, the whole of the rest of the Austro-Hungarian coastline is to be shorn away from her and divided between a new State of Croatia and an enlarged Serbia and Montenegro. (According to M. Miliukoffs statement in the Retch in the early days of 1917: it is still a disputed question whether Jugo-Slavia (the land of the Southern Slavs) should consist of a united Croatia, Slavonia, Herzegovina, Bosnia, Serbia, and Montenegro, or whether it should form two separate States). The result of carrying out the above clauses of the Treaty of London would be to cut Austria-Hungary completely from the sea. THE NEUTRALISATION PROPOSALS: Some readers may wonder why the long stretch of coastline (which is to be allotted apparently to Serbia and Montenegro) running from the southern limit of the proposed Italian possession of Dalmatia to the northern limit of the proposed Italian possession of Valona (see Article 6), and including the ports of Spalato, Cattaro, S. Giovanni di Medua, and Durazzo, but seemingly excluding Ragusa, is to be neutralised. The reason is possibly to be found in the determination of Italy to allow the presence of no naval Power, save her own, in the Adriatic, or, in the words of the Giornale dltalia already quoted, neither a fort, nor a gun, nor a submarine that is not Italian ought to be in that sea. Thus Professor G. Salvemini writes: We cannot prevent Austria having a fleet, since she already possesses one. The Serbia of to-morrow we can prevent in its own interests
Article 6.Italy will receive in absolute property Valona, the island of Saseno and as much territory as would be required to secure their military safety-approximately between the River Vojuzza in the north and in the east, down to the borders of the Chimara district in the south.25 and ours. And we can profit by this moment, which will never recur in history, to exclude from the Adriatic Austria which has a fleet, and to substitute for her a new State which has no fleet, and which we can prevent creating one (quoted by Mr. A. H. E. Taylor, in The Future of the Southern Slavs. T. Fisher Unwin). Italy secures by this treaty the chief strategic points on the coast, Cherso and Lussin dominating Fiume, Lissa (the key of the Central Adriatic) and Lesina closing the door on Spalato, and Melada threatening Ragusa. Should a Slav State ever be formed with a seaboard on the Adriatic, such a State would only exist (under the provisions of this treaty), as far at least as its maritime activities were concerned, at the good pleasure of Italy, who would be able at any time to land troops upon the coast and to seize the towns. 25 Valona is the Albanian town situated on the Straits of Otranto and usually considered to be the key of the Adriatic. Saseno is the island at the mouth of the harbour. Valona with the surrounding districts (to the extent of about 4,000 square kilometres) has been occupied by Italy since November, 1914. 26 This contemplates the partition of the greater part of Albania. In any case, the allotment of San Giovanni di Medua to Serbia or Montenegro (under Article 5, Note
southern coast of Albania, from the frontier of the Italian territory of Valona to Cape Stilos, is to be neutralised.27 2) cuts off Scutari, with a population of 25,000 Albanians, from the sea. In 1913, the Powers created Albania as an independent State, declared it neutral, and took it under their protection. According to Miss Durham and Mr. H. W. Nevinson more than once since the beginning of the war, they (the Albanians) have been assured by our Foreign Office that they, too, are included among the small nations whose rights are to be recognised. (Letter to the Manchester Guardian, February 2, 1918.) In the House of Commons on February 18, 1918, Mr. Balfour, in reply to Mr. R. C. Lambert, said that the arrangenents come to in 1913, to which Albania was not a party, by the Great Powers with reference to Albania had ceased to have a binding force, as all the signatory Powers were engaged in the war. On November 22, 1914 (according to another secret document, see Appendix B), Russia, Britain, and France offered to Greece the southern regions of Albania, with the exception of Valona, on condition that she joined the Allies. 27 Note again the insistence upon the neutralisation of all the coast not occupied by Italy. 28 The Manchester Guardian version reads west. 29 The Dodekanese are a group of islands-Ikaria, Patmos, Leros, Kalymnos, Astypalaia, Nisyrus, Telos, Syme, Chalkaia, Karpathos, Kassos, and Kastellorizzo-lying off the south-east coast of Asia Minor. Italy occupied all these islands, with the exception of the first and the last, together with Rhodes and Kos, during
Article 9.France, Great Britain, and Russia admit in principle the fact of Italys interest in the maintenance of political balance of power in the Mediterranean and her rights, in case of a partition of Turkey, to a share, equal to theirs, in the basin of the Mediterranean-viz., in that part of it which adjoins the province of Adalia, in which Italy has already acquired special rights and interests defined in the Italo-British Convention. The zone which is to be made Italys property is to be more precisely defined in due course in conformity with the vital interests of France and Great Britain. Italys interests will likewise be taken into consideration in case the Powers should also maintain the territorial integrity of Asiatic Turkey for some future period of time, and if they should only proceed to establish among themselves spheres of influence. In case France, Great Britain and Russia should, in the course of the present war, occupy any districts of Asiatic Turkey, the entire territory adjacent to Adalia and defined more precisely below30 is to be left to Italy who reserves her right to occupy it.31 the Tripolitan War with Turkey, as a pledge for the fulfilment of the Treaty of Lausanne, which closed that war. Their population is Greek. 30 Above in The New Europe version. In any case, it appears to have no meaning so far as the present document is concerned. It may possibly refer to another document or to an appendix not yet disclosed. 31 Adalia is situated about mid-way along the southern coast of Asia Minor. (See page 43 for the terms of the territorial acquisitions to be secured by Britain, France, and Russia in Asiatic Turkey.)
rights and privileges which now belong to the Sultan in virtue of the Treaty of Lausanne. 32 See pages 23 and 46. 33 Eritrea is on the Red Sea. Such an extension of Italys possessions is only possible in the case of Eritria and Somaliland at the expense of the Sudan, French and British Somaliland, British East Africa, or of Abyssinia, a neutral State. In the case of Libya it is only possible at the expense of Egypt, Tunis or the French Sahara. 34 The New Europe version reads: France, Great Britain and Russia undertake to support Italy, in so far as she does not permit the representatives of the Holy See, etc. The word settlement in
Article 16.The present treaty is to be kept secret. As regards Italys adhesion to the declaration of September 5, 1914 35, this declaration alone will be published immediately on the declaration of war by, or against, Italy. Having taken into consideration the present Memorandum, the representatives of France, Great Britain, and Russia, being authorised thereto, agreed with the representatives of Italy, likewise authorised thereto, as follows: France, Great Britain and Russia express their complete agreement with the present Memorandum submitted to them by the Italian Government. In respect of Articles 1, 2 and 3 of the present Memorandum, regarding the coordination of the military and naval operations of all the four Powers, Italy declares that she will actively intervene at an earliest possible date, and, at any rate, not later than one month after the signature of the present document by the contracting parties. The undersigned have confirmed by hand and seal the present instrument in London in four copies. April 26, 1915.
(Signed) EDWARD GREY, JULES CAMBON, line 5 of the above article is translated regulation in this version. On December 20, 1917, in the House of Commons, Lord Robert Cecil said, in reply to Mr. McKean, that the treaty with Italy did not state that the representatives of the Holy See should not be allowed to take any diplomatic steps to bring about peace. On February 14, 1918, in the House of Commons Lord Robert Cecil in the course of a further statement, said: The only thing that this clause does is to say that if Ita1y objects to the Pope sending a representative to the Peace Conference we would support that objection. 35 This is the declaration that the Allies would make peace in common.
THE PRESENT POSITION. The present position of the treaty is recorded by the following extract from the official report of the proceedings of the House of Commons (Tuesday, January 29, 1918): The provisions of this treaty, therefore, are still valid.
III. SUMMARY.Agreement between Britain, France and Russia as to their zones of influence and territorial asquisitions in Asiatic Turkey. Britain to obtain Southern Mesopotamia, with Baghdad, and two ports in Syria. France to obtain Syria, the Adana vilayet, and Western Kurdistan. Russia to obtain Trebizond, Erzerum, Bitlis, Van, and territory in Southern Kurdistan. An Arab State or confederation of States to be formed. Palestine to be subject to a special regime. [This agreement must be considered in conjunction with the agreement with Russia concerning Constantinople and the Straits (March, 1915) and the clause in the Treaty of London dealing with Italys claims in Asia Minor (April 26, 1915).] At the beginning of the war the Allies assured Turkey that if she remained neutral we would see that in the terms of peace Turkey and Turkish territory would not suffer. The situation was completely changed by the entry of Turkey into the war . . . and all obligations on the part of the Allies towards Turkey came to an end.36 Henceforward the Allies devoted some attention to devising plans for dealing with Turkish provinces at the 36 Speech of Sir Edward Grey in the House of Commons. October 13, 1915. 43
end of the war, accompanying the efforts of their diplomatists with public denunciations of the iniquity of Turkish rule in these territories. In March, 1915, the British Government gave its consent to the annexation by Russia of Constantinople, the Straits, and other Turkish territory. In the same month the Allied Ambassadors at Athens offered the Aiden vilayet in Asiatic Turkey to Greece if she would enter the war immediately (see Appendix B). In the following April, Britain, France, and Russia admitted in principle the rights of Italy, in case of a partition of Turkey, to a share, equal to theirs, in the basin of the Mediterranean, viz., in that part of it which adjoins the province of Adalia. And in the Spring of 1916, Britain, France, and Russia came to an agreement regarding their respective zones of influence and territorial acquisitions in Asiatic Turkey. Particulars of this agreement are given in a Memorandum dated March 6, 1917, which was found by M. Trotski among the secret papers of the Russian Foreign Office. This Memorandum was published in the Isvestia on November 24, 1917, and the following is the full text as printed in the Manchester Guardian on January 19, 1918: TEXT OF THE MEMORANDUM. As a result of negotiations which took place in London and Petrograd in the Spring of 1916, the Allied British, French and Russian Governments came to an agreement as regards the future delimitation of their respective zones of influence and territorial acquisitions in Asiatic Turkey, as well as the formation in Arabia of an independent Arab State, or a federation of Arab
States. The general principles of the agreement are as follows: 37 Trebizond is an important port on the Black Sea, Erzerum is a strong fortress in Armenia, Van and Bitlis are considerable towns in Northern Kurdistan, Van being about 60 miles from the Persian frontier. This arrangement gives to Russia a large tract of territory running from the Black Sea for 300 miles in a southeasterly direction to Ibn-Omar, on the upper Tigris, and thence almost due east for another 150 miles to the Russian zone in Northern Persia, and including Eastern Armenia and Eastern Turkestan. As a very rough estimate this territory would cover not less than 45,000 square miles, and probably rather more. 38 This gives to France an enormous tract of territory. The limits inland of the coastal strip of Syria are not defined, but it would include the Lebanon, the towns of Beirut, Tripoli, Antioch and presumably Damascus and Aleppo. The vilayet of Adana is the large and fertile province in the south-east angle of Asia Minor (sometimes marked on the maps as Cilicia) and the remaining territory, which takes in Western Kurdistan, stretches far inland over rivers and mountains until it reaches the new Russian frontier on the Tigris. Its valleys are fertile, and there is also considerable mineral wealth. This territorial concession to France measures roughly, at its widest parts, from north to south, and from east to west, 500 miles either way. It would form a third Allied barrier to the Berlin-Baghdad Railway project, the other two being an enlarged Serbia and a Russian Constantinople.
3. Great Britain obtains the southern part of Mesopotamia with Baghdad,39 and stipulates for herself in Syria the ports of Haifa and Akka.40 39 A British Mesopotamia would of course constitute a fourth barrier to the Berlin-Baghdad project. Geographically speaking it would fit in with the possession of the neutral zone of Persia (see page 20) with whose frontiers it would march. The northern limits of the British conxession are not indicated. 40 Haifa and Akka are ports on the Mediterranean. 41 Alexandretta is a port on the north-eastern shores of the Meditenranean. A branch line is to link it up with the Berlin-Baghdad Railway. It is understood that British authurities regard this port as a natural outlet for Mesopotamia to the Mediterranean. 42 On November 9, 1917, a letter was published from Mr. Balfour in which the former stated that His Majestys Government view with favour the establishment of a national home for the Jewish people.
Debt such as corresponds to their respective acquisitions.43 THE PRESENT POSITION. The Russian Revolutionary Government has definitely repudiated all territrial annexations, so that the part of this agreement which concerns Russia falls to the ground. With regard to the rest of the agreement Mr. Lloyd George has said (January 5, 1918): Mesopotamia, Syria and Palestine are, in our judgment, entitled to a recognition of their separate national conditions. What the exact form of that recognition in each particular case should be need not here be discussed, beyond stating that it would be impossible to restore to their former sovereignty the territories to which I have already referred. Much has been said about the arrangements we have entered into with our Allies on this and other subjects. I can only say that, as new circumstances, like the Russian collapse and the separate Russian negotiations, have changed the conditions under which those arrangements were made, we are, and always have been, perfectly ready to discuss them with our Allies. In default of any official repudiation we must take it that the agreement (with the exception of that part of it which relates to Russia) still stands. 43 On December 3, 1917, in the House of Commons, Lord Robert Cecil stated that such understandings as had been arrived at by the Powers respecting Asia Minor did not involve annexations. What fine distinction, if any, can be drawn between annexations and territorial acquisitions it is difficult to say. Moreover, the Powers agree to take over portions of the Ottoman Debt corresponding to their respective acquisitions. Is it possible that Lord Robert Cecil has been misinformed as to the precise nature of this agreement?
A SECOND AGREEMENT WITH ITALY?In addition to the London Treaty by which
Italys rights, in case of a partition of Turkey, to that part which
adjoins the province of Adalia were recognised, it has been freely stated
that a second agreement has been made with Italy, granting her further
territorial concessions in Asia Minor.
Leading Italian newspapers state that this agreement was reached at the
Conference held in Savoy, in April, 1917, between Mr. Lloyd George, Baron
Sonnino, and M. Ribot.
The Tribuna (the leading Rome paper) of April 25, 1917, describes
The Corriere della Sera (of Milan) of April 27, says:
If the vilayets of Smyrna, Konia, and Adana have been apportioned to Italy,
that country is to receive the whole of the southern half of Asia Minor up
to the limits (on the East) of the sphere allotted to France at Adana.
The terms of this agreement, if it exists, have not of course been published.
IV.
SUMMARY.Roumania to receive Transylvanla up to the River Theiss, the
Bukovina up to the River Pruth, and the Banat.
Although for the first two years of the war Roumania remained neutral,
continuous negotiations were taking place during that period with the
object of securing Roumanias adhesion to the cause of the Allies.
This we learn from diplomatic documents published at Petrograd. The full
text of these documents is not yet available in this country, but they are
summarised in the following telegram from Mr. Philips Price printed in the
Manchester Guardian of February 8, 1918:
On August 7, 1914, M. Sazonoff proposed in a Note to offer Roumania
Transylvania and to guarantee her former acquisitions in the Dobrudja if
she would enter the war against Austria.44
49
On August 12 M. Bratiano replies that he cannot accept the proposal because of a contrary decision by the Crown Council recently taken; the question must remain open, but the proposal was attractive, and any incident might strain the relations of Austria and Roumania, giving the latter the necessary pretext. On September 1 the Russian Ambassador at Bucharest, M. Poklefsky, informs M. Sazonoff that prominent Roumanian statesman are asking the cession of Bessarabia45 as the price of Roumanian neutrality. On October 3, M. Sazonoff sends to Bucharest a copy of the secret Russo-Roumanian treaty just signed by himself and the Roumanian Ambassador at Petrograd, containing the following provisions: Russia agrees diplomatically to oppose all attempts against Roumanian integrity. [Then comes a gap of several months. In the report quoted on pages 55 and 56 the Russian General Polivanov says of this period: Our successes in Galicia and Bukovina in 1914 and early 1915, the capture of Lemberg and Przemysl, and the appearance of our 45 Bessarabia is a Russian province bordering on Roumania, and lying between the Pruth and the Dniester. Its chief town is Kishinev. The population is largely of Roumanian stock.
advance guard beyond the Carpathians, brought the question of Roumanian intervention to a head. Mr. Philips Prices telegrarn continues as below.] On March 27, 1915, M. Sazonoff informs M. Poklefsky that the Roumanian Ambassador in London had informed Sir Edward Grey that Roumania was prepared to enter the war by the side of the Allies in May. 46 Szegedin is a Hungarian town situated at the junction of the Rivers Maros and Theiss. Debreczen is a town in the north of Hungary, about 120 miles due east of Buda-Pesth. 47 Tchernovitz or Czernowitz is the chief town of Bukovina.
neutral zone in the Banat, but even this was doubtful, since the Russian retreat in Poland and Galicia was hardening Roumanian terms.
[Here comes a gap of over twelve months. What has happened during this
period? A possible explanation is to be found in the following extract from
a report signed by General Polivanov (Russian Minister of War) on November
7 (20), 1916, and published amongst the Russian diplomatic documents:
At the end of 1915 and early in 1916, after the destruction of Serbia and
Bulgarias intervention, Roumanian policy leaned very noticeably towards
the side of our enemies. At that time the Roumanian Government concluded a
whole series of very advantageous commercial agreements with
Austria-Hungary and Germany. This circumstance forced our military,
financial, and commercial authorities to show great caution in the question
of the export from Russia to Roumania of war material and various other
supplies, such as might fall into the hands of our enemies.
In consequence of the brilliant offensive of General Brusilov in the
Spring and Summer, 1916, Roumanian neutrality leaned once more to the side
of the Entente Powers, and there arose the
possibility of renewing the interrupted negotiations for Roumanian intervention. It is to be observed that, from the first, the Chief of Staff, for military reasons, held the neutrality of Roumania to be more advantageous for us than her active intervention in the war. Later on, General Alexeieff adopted the point of view of the Allies, who looked upon Roumanias entry as a decisive blow for Austria-Hungary and as the nearing of the wars end.] NEGOTIATIONS RENEWED IN 1916. Evidently new proposals were now put forward by Roumania, for Mr. Prices telegram continues as follows: On July 29, 1916, the Russian Premier, M. Stürmer, telegraphs to the Ambassadors in Paris, London, and Rome that Roumanias new terms are unacceptable to Russia, especially the obligation that the Allies should continue the war till all Roumanian desires were realised, and that the Allies should recognise Roumania on the same footing as the Great Powers. M. Stürmer proposes a firm statement to Bucharest that the Allies terms are final, and that the Serbs of the Banat must be guaranteed from Roumanisation.
an advance on the Salonika front to relieve Roumania from Bulgarian pressure if Roumania enters the war. 48 The Banat of Temesvar is a country of mixed nationality, stretching from the borders of Roumania and Transylvania on the east to the River Theiss on the west, and bounded on the south by the Danube and north by the River Moris. Its population includes Serbs, Roumanians, Magyars, Szekels, Germans, Slovaks, and other races. The western parts are mainly Serb, the northern parts mainly German and Magyar, and the eastern parts mainly Roumanian, with large Serb, German, and Magyar islands. By the census of 1910 the population of the Banat was 1,582,133, of which 592,049 were Roumanians, or about 37 1/2 per cent. Thus a large majority of the population is non-Roumanian. 49 Transylvanla to the Theiss. Transylvania is divided from Roumania by the Carpathians, and, except for a few years at the end of the sixteenth century, has always been linked to Hungary. The latter country is divided into two parts by the River Theiss, which runs from north to south. Practically the whole of the immense territory to the east of this river-a good half of Hungary-is, by this agreement, to be given to Roumania. Undoubtedly in Transylvania proper a large part of the population is of Roumanian stock-although it contains important Szekel and Saxon islands-but by making the River Theiss the boundary many districts which are overwhelmingly Magyar would be included in the ceded territory. The rich lands around Debreczen and bordering on the Theiss are, for example, the purest Magyar districts in Hungary, and Debreczen itself is the stronghold of Magyar Calvinism. The important Magyar towns of Grosswardein and Arad are also by this treaty to be handed over to Roumania. Indeed, taking this territory as a whole, the majority of its population is non-Roumanian.
M. Stürmer, in a Memorandum to the Tsar, however, raises the objection that Roumania must not be regarded as on a footing with the Great Powers, and the latter must not be bound to continue the war till all Roumanias territorial claims are realised, since this would cause serious complications over the Constantinople Straits. GENERAL POLIVANOVS REPORT. The above arrangement is confirmed by the report 50 The Bukovina (or land of the Beeches) is situated east of the Carpathians at the meeting-point of Austria, Russia, and Roumania. It is an Austrian Duchy, with a Diet of its own. Its population is roughly 800,000, of which number about 260,000 are Roumanians, or one-third of the total. 51 The conclusion of Mr. Prices telegram is given on page 57.
of General Polivanov already mentioned, written after the retreat of the Roumanian armies. He says: * In August, 1916, a military and political agreement was signed with Roumania, which assigned to her such accessions of territory (Bukovina and all Transylvania), as quite obviously did not correspond to the measure of Roumanias share of military operations, since she had undertaken only to declare war on Austria-Hungary, and had confined herself to operations in Transylvania. . . . From the standpoint of Russian interests we must be guided by the following considerations in judging the present situation in Roumania. If things had developed in such a way that the military and political agreement of 1916 with Roumania had been fully realised, then a very strong State would have arisen in the Balkans, consisting of Moldavia, Wallachia, the Dobrudja52, and of Transylvania, the Banat, and Bukovina (acquisitions under the treaty of 1916) with a population of about 13,000,000. In the future this State could hardly have been friendly disposed towards Russia, and would scarcely have abandoned the design of realising its national dreams in Bessarabia and the Balkans. Consequently, the collapse of Roumanias plans as a Great Power is not particularly opposed to Russias interests. This circumstance must be exploited by us in order to strengthen for as long as possible those compulsory ties which link Russia with Roumania. Our successes on the Roumanian front are for us of * This version appeared in The New Europe (December 27, 1917). 52 These three provinces constitute the Roumanian State as it existed before the war.
extraordinary importance, as the only possibility of deciding once for all in the sense we desire the question of Constantinople and the Straits. The events now occurring in Roumania have altered to their very foundation the conditions of the treaty of 1916. Instead of the comparatively modest military support which Russia was pledged to provide in the Dobrudja, she had to assign the defence of the Roumanian territory on all sides almost exclusively to Russian troops. This military aid on the part of Russia has now assumed such dimensions that the promise of territorial compensations to Roumania prescribed in the treaty in return for her entry into the war must undoubtedly be submitted to revision. The following is the conclusion of Mr. Prices telegram to the Manchester Guardian: On September 10 General Alexeieff, replying to the Roumanian demands through the General Staff for military assistance after the loss of Turtukai, expresses doubt of the wisdom of the whole Roumanian campaign, which widens the Russian front by 500 versts and requires 200,000 more Russian troops. Russia, he says, with 100 versts of front in Europe and over 1000 versts in Asia, can ill-afford this extension of front from a strategic point of view. 53 The new Russian Foreign Minister.
Russia has just declared her loyalty to the treaties with the Allies such a step is inadmissible. THE PRESENT POSITION. Mr. Lloyd George, in his speech of January 5, 1918, said: We also mean to press that justice be done to men of Roumanian blood and speech in their legitimate aspirations.The latest statement of the British attitude on the point was made by Lord Robert Cecil, in the House of Commons on February 15, 1918, when, in reply to Mr. King, he said that the treaty entered into by Britain on August 18, 1916, whereby the entry of Roumania into the war was secured, was still operative, and subsequent events or understandings had not altered its effect. 54 Russian Foreign Minister in the Coalition Government under Prince Lvoff, which was formed on May 16, after the resignationof M. Miliukoff.
V. SUMMARY.The two Governments to agree to take common action to prevent the political domination of China by any third Power hostile to Russia and Japan. On July 13, 1911, the Anglo-Japanese Alliance was signed. Amongst other objects this Alliance was to ensure the independence and integrity of the Chinese Empire and the principle of equal opportunity for the commerce and industry of all nations in China. On August 23, 1914 Japan declared war against Germany. On the following day a message from Count Okuma, the Japanese Premier, appeared in the Independent Magazine of New York. The message ran: As Premier of Japan, I have stated, and I now again state to the people of America and of the world that Japan has no ulterior motive, no desire to secure more territory, no thought of depriving China or othor people of anything which they now possess. My Government and my people have given their word and their pledge, which will be as honourably kept as Japan always keeps promises. On January 18, 19l5, after the fall of Kiao-Chau, Japan confronted China with a list of 21 demands. These demands were of a formidable character and practically 59
amounted to the placing of China in a position of tutelage to Japan.55 Negotiations proceeded for some time, and eventually, after certain representations had been made by the United States of America, the demands were somewhat modified. These modified demands, after the presentation of an ultimatum by Japan, were finally accepted by China on May 9, 1915. THE PUBLIC RUSSO-JAPANESE TREATY. In July, 1916, Japan and Russia entered into a public treaty, the terms of which were communicated to the British Government before signature. The terms of this agreement, as published in the Times on July 8,1916, are as follows: The Imperial Gcvernment of Japan and the Imperial Government of Russia, resolved to unite their 55 Japans demands on China were described in the Daily News and Leader (March 19, 1915) in the following words: They would convert the province of Shantung into a Japanese sphere of influence; they would make South Manchuria and Eastern Mongolia, for practical purposes, Japanese provinces; they would give Japan a monopoly of the vast mineral wealth of the Yangtse valley, incidental to which would be the power to sever Northern from Southern China; they would give Japan the control of Chinas war munitions; they would hand over the policing of important areas of China to Japan; they would set Japanese experts in control of Chinas political, military, and financial affairs; they would set up a Monroe doctrine operative against all Powers except Japan, they would open all China to the enterprise of Japanese political missionaries. A scheme of this kind, if carried through, would put all China under Japanese suzerainty. Of course it would also imperil extensive British commercial and industrial interests in China, and it would knock the bottom out of the Anglo-Japanese treaty, which guaranteed the integrity of China and equality of opportunity to all Powers.
efforts for the maintenance of lasting peace in the Far East, have agreed upon the following:Article 1.Japan will not be a party to any political arrangement or combination directed against Russia. THE SECRET RUSSO-JAPANESE TREATY. The above treaty, as already stated, was a public one. But at the very same time Russia and Japan entered into a Secret Treaty consisting of six articles. This treaty was first published in the Isvestia, and a translation appeared in the Manchester Guardian on February 1, 1918. This treaty was signed on July 3, 1916. It runs as follows: Ths Russian Imperial Government and the Japanese Imperial Government have, with a view to the greater consolidation of their close friendship, established between them by the secret agreements of July 30, 1907, July 4, 1910, and July 8, 1912, agreed to supplement the above-mentioned secret agreements by the following articles:
Article 1.The two high contracting parties acknowledge that the vital interests of both require the safeguarding of China against the political domination by any third Power entertaining hostile designs towards Russia or Japan, and therefore mutually pledge themselves, each time when circumstances demand it, to enter into frank relations based on complete mutual trust with one another with a view to talking joint measures for the prevention of the possibility of the advent of such a state of affairs (in China).
been given guarantees by its Allies that they, too, will render such assistance to it as would correspond to the seriousness of the impending conflict.In witness whereof the undersigned have confirmed the present instrument by hand and seal at Petrograd, June 20 (July 3), 1916, corresponding to the Japanese date of Thursday, seventh month and fifth year in the reign of Taise. 56 The Manchester Guardian (Dec. 24, 1917), which had previously printed a summary of this Secret Treaty, points out that there are considerable differences between the secret and the public agreements. The public treaty professes to aim at maintaining a lasting peace in the Far East, and makes no specific reference to China; the Secret Treaty is not concerned with peace, but with the interests of both contracting Powers in China.... The public treaty indicates consultation between the contracting parties as to the measures to be taken, the Secret Treaty points to military measures and is definitely a military alliance.
THE PRESENT POSITION. Russia has withdrawn from this treaty. Since then an agreement has been arrived at between Japan and the United States of America by means of an interchange of notes betweer Mr. Lansing, the U.S. Secretary of State, and Viscount Ishii, the head of the Japanese Mission to America. The text of these notes was communicated tothe British Government before signature. Mr. Lansings note, which is dated November 2, 1917, states: .... The Governments of the United States and Japan recognise that territorial propinquity creates special relations between countries, and consequently the Government of the United States recognises that Japan has special interests57 in China, particularly in that part to which her possessions are contiguous 57 See pages 87 and 88.
Viscount Ishii replied the same day confirming the agreement in identical terms.* [Further diplomatic documents have been published at Petrograd referring to the territorial aims of Japan and also to the interpretation of the term special interests in the Japanese-American agreement. These are given in Appendix C.] * A Reuter message from New York, dated November 12, 1917, says: Mr. Koo, the Chinese Minister at Washington, has lodged a formal protest with the State Department against the Japanese-American agreement regarding China. While the document has not been made public, it is understood that China objects to any agreement affecting China without reference to the wish of the Chinese people.
VI. SUMMARY.Agreement between France and Russia. Russia to support France in her demands for Alsace-Lorraine, and the Saar Valley; the rest of the German territories on the left bank of the Rhine to be constituted a neutral State. France, in return, recognises Russias complete liberty in establishing her Western frontiers. An important series of documents relates to the question of re-drawing the frontiers of the Central Powers, and, in particular, to the proposal to push back the Western frontier of Germany to the Rhine. They were printed by the Manchester Guardian on December 12, 1917. The series begins with a confidential telegram from the Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs (M. Sazonoff) to the Russian Ambassador at Paris. It is dated February 24 (March 9),1916, and is as follows: (No. 948)
67
The political agreements concluded between the Allies during the war must remain intact, and are not subject to revision. They include the agreement with France and England on Constantinople, the Straits, Syria, and Asia Minor, and also the London Treaty with Italy. All suggestions for the future delimitation of Central Europe are at present premature, but in general one must bear in mind that we are prepared to allow France and England complete freedom in drawing up the Western frontiers of Germany, in the expectation that the Allies on their part would allow us equal freedom in drawing up our frontiers with Germany and Austria. 58 It is interesting to compare this declaration of the Russian Government in February, 1916, with President Wilsons statement in his speech to the American Senate on January 22, 1917. President Wilson said: I take it for granted . . . that statesmen everywhere are agreed that there should be a united, independent, and autonomous Poland, and, speaking at Leeds on September 26, 1917, Mr. Asquith said: There is Poland, as to whom, I, and, I believe, all our people, heartily endorse the wise and generous words of President Wilson.
advantages which could induce her to take up arms, and therefore it would be perfectly futile to search for new baits in this respect.59 (Signed) SAZONOFF. At some later period the French Government approached the Russian Government with certain proposals respecting Alsace and the Rhine. This is recorded in the following confidential telegram from M. Pokrovsky (M. Sazonoffs second successor as Foreign Minister) to the Russian Ambassador at Paris. It is dated January 30 (February 12), 1917. (No. 502).
59 See pages 49-52. 60 Mr. Balfour stated (House of Commons, December 19, 1917) that London did not mean the British Foreign Office. He added: We had never heard of it at all at that time. London, therefore probably means the Russian Embassy in London. 61 The Tsar. 63 French Ambassador at Petrograd.
River Saar as well as to attain the political separation from Germany of her trans-Rhenish districts and their organisation on a separate basis in order that in future the River Rhine might form a permanent strategical frontier against a Germanic invasion. Doumergue expressed the hope that the Imperial Government would not refuse immediately to draw up its assent to these suggestions in a formal manner. 63 i.e., the west of Russia.
the war of the disqualifications resting on the Aland Islands.64 Please explain the above to Briand and wire the results. A telegram from that Russian Ambassador in Paris to M. Pokrovsky. January 31 (February 13),1917. No. 88. Copy to London. Referring to your telegram, No. 507, confidentially, I immediately communicated in writing its contents to Briand, who told me that he would not fail to give me an official reply of the French Government, but that he could at once declare, on his own behalf, that the satisfaction of the wishes contained in your telegram will meet with no difficulties. AN AGREEMENT REACHED. On February 1 (14), 1917, the Russian Foreign Minister addressed the following note to the French Ambassador at Petrograd: In your Note of to-days date your Excellency was good enough to inform the Imperial Government that the Government of the Republic was contemplating the inclusion in the terms of peace to be offered to Germany the following demands and guarantees of a territorial nature: 64 The Aland Islands are situated at the entrance of the Gulf of Bothnia, close to the Swedish coast, and less than 100 miles from Stockholm. They belong to Russia, and after the Crimean War a Convention, which was annexed to the Treaty of Paris, was made between Russia, France, and Britain that they should not be fortified and that no military or naval establishments should be maintained upon them. The population of these islands is Swedish by descent, and numbers about 19,000.
1. Alsace-Lorraine to be restored to France.65Your Excellency stated that the Government of the Republic would be happy to be able to rely upon the support of the Imperial Government for the carrying out of its plans. By order of his Imperial Majesty my 65 On January 5, 1918, Mr. Lloyd George said: We mean to stand by the French democracy to the death in the demand they make for a reconsideration of the great wrong of 1871. 66 The Saar Valley contains valuable coal-mines. Its population is predominantly German. 67 This would include Rhenish-Prussia with the cities and towns of Cologne, Aix-la-Chapelle, Coblenz, Treves, Crefeld and Bonn, a detached fragment of Oldenburg; a part of Hesse, with the towns of Mayence, Worms and Bingen; and the Palatinate with the towns of Ludwigshafen, Kaiserslautern, Zweibrucken, Neustadt, and Landau.
most august master, I have the honour, in the name of the Russian Government, to inform your excellency by the present Note that the Government of the Republic may rely upon the support of the Imperial Government for the carrying out of its plans as set out above. Finally, on February 20 (March 11),1917, the Russian Ambassador at Paris sent the following telegram to M. Pokrovsky: (No. 168). See my reply to telegram No. 167, No. 2. The Government of the French Republic, anxious, to confirm the importance of the treaties concluded with the Russian Government in 1916, for the settlement on the termination of the war of the question of Constantinople and the Straits in accordance with Russias aspirations, anxious, on the other hand, to secure for its Ally in military and industrial respects all the guarantees desirable for the safety and the economic development of the Empire, recognises Russias complete liberty in establishing her Western frontiers. On the very next day (March 12) the Russian Revolution took place and on March 15 the Tsar abdicated. THE PRESENT POSITION. Apparently the design of driving Germany back to the left bank of the Rhine has now been abandoned by the French Government, although there has been no official statement to this effect. Mr. Balfour, in the House of Commons on December 19, 1917, said of this plan: We have never expressed our approval of it, nor do I believe it represents the policy of successive French Govern-
ments who have held office during the war. Never did we desire, and never did we encourage the idea, that a bit of Germany should be cut off from the parent State and erected into some kind of . . . independent Government on the left bank of the Rhine. His Majestys Government were never aware that was seriously entertained by any French statesman. It must be noted in this connection that by the Declaration of September 5, 1914 the Allies undertook to make peace in common. Any arrangement between France and Russia, therefore, equally affects Great Britain. Conclusion Some of the arrangements outlined in the preceding pages are now, of course, obsolete. Before making a separate peace the Russian Government not only repudiated any desire to annex Constantinople but also repudiated any desire for annexations of any sort. Mr. Lloyd George himself has said that as new circumstances . . . have changed the conditions under which these arrangements were made we are . . . perfectly ready to discuss them with our Allies. Sir George Buchanan, whilst British Ambassador at Petrograd, spoke (December 9, 1917) to the Russian Press of the higher principles . . . of a democratic peace, peace which accords with the wishes of smaller and weaker nationalities, which repudiates the idea . . . of incorporating in great empires the territories of reluctant populations. These are wise words. Surely it is not too much to ask the Allied Governments to revise their war-aims in accordance with these higher principles, to repudiate publicly and collectively all designs of Imperialistic conquest-designs which, if carried out, would only breed fresh wars-and to re-state their terms in such a just, moderate, and reasonable way as might, in the words of Lord Lansdowne, give an immense stimulus . . . to the peace party in Germany, open the way to immediate peace negotiations on the basis of no annexations and no indemnities, and bring the war to a close in time to avert a world-wide catastrophe. 75
NATIONAL LABOUR PRESS LTD.
Negotiations were formally begun in London at the end of February (O.S.)
on the initiative of the Italian Ambassador, Marchese Imperiali. They were
conducted by Sir E. Grey and the Ambassadors M. Paul Cambon, of France;
Count Benckendorff, of Russia; and the above-mentioned Italian.
They became involved, however, on the one hand, by Prince Bulows
continued efforts to incline the Cabinet of Vienna to make the concessions
to Italy, and, on the other hand, by the contradictoriness of the interests
being defended by the representatives of the Great Powers in London.
France and Russia considered Italys demands to be exorbitant, the former
with regard especially to the question of the south-eastern shores of the
Adriatic, and the latter with regard to the north-east of this sea. Six
weeks were spent deciding the details of the future territorial disposition
of Albania and Dalmatia. The Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs
persistently defended the interests of the Southern Slavs, and maintained
that an outlet to the sea should be permanently assured to Serbia, step by
step repelling Italys desires for the extensions of her sea-shores and for
the neutralisation of the regions intended for Serbia. In the meanwhile the
events at the different theatres of war caused the military leaders to
consider the urgency for Italys immediate intervention on the side of the
Allies. In the beginning of April (O.S.) the Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
while not particularly intent on conforming to the desire of the Allies to
sign a convention with Italy, began to set forth new demands, namely, the
urgency for persuading that kingdom to the earliest possible active
intervention. Besides that, the Russians demanded (1) the settling of the
time for the publication of the convention, and (2) of the avowal of the
inviolability of the agreements previously concluded between the three
Great Powers of the coalition.
On April 13 (26), the convention was signed in London by Grey, Cambon,
Count Benckendorff, and Marchese Imperiali. In the days immediately
preceding this event, we succeeded in obtaining a few more concessions from
Italy on behalf of Serbia and Montenegro.
Appendix B.
THE NEGOTIATIONS WITH GREECE.
Particulars of the negotiations which took place between the Allies and
Greece are given in the following message from Mr. M. Philips Price,
printed in the Manchester Guardian on December 7, 1917:
Petrograd.
The following is an extract of a document discovered here in the Foreign
Office recently, describing the relations of the Allies and Greece:
SECTION I.
On November 22, 1914, the Allied Ambassadors at Athens offered Greece
South Albania, except Vallona,68 if Greece would immediately join the
Allies. M. Venizelos replied demanding guarantees from Roumania that
Bulgaria should not attack Greece. This was not given, and the proposal
fell through.
SECTION II.
On January 2, 1915, the British Ambassador at Athens told M. Venizelos
that if Greece enters the war the Allies will grant her territory on the
shores of Asia Minor. On January 20 M. Venizelos gave the Ambassador
details of Greeces demands in Asia Minor, but the negotiations were
interrupted by the negotiations with Bulgaria to induce her to enter, the
war on the Allies side, and in the meantime M. Venizelos resigned. On
March 9 M. Gounaris expressed the desire that Greece should continue
negotiations. On March 30 the Allied Ambassadors offered Greece the Aidin
vilayet69 (Asiatic Turkey) if Greece would enter the war immediately. On
69 Aidin is situated on the south-west of Asia Minor, not far from Smyrna.
81
April 1 M. Gounaris declared the willingness of Greece to enter if the Allies would guarantee her territorial integrity, together with North
Epirus and the islands for the period of the war and a certain period after
it, while the question of territiorial acquisitions in Asiatic Turkey was
to be a matter for later discussion. No reply was given to this, and on May
1 the Greek Minister declared that since the Allies had apparently no
intention to guarantee the territorial integrity of Greece the latter had
decided to remain neutral.
SECTION III.
On January 20, 1915, M. Venizelos informed the British Ambassador that in
agreement with the King he agreed to cede Kavalla70 to Bulgaria if the
latter would enter the war on the side of the Allies. After the resignation
of M. Venizelos the attitude of the Greek Government changed, and on May 18
the Government protested against the declaration of the Allied Ambassadors
at Sofia to Bulgaria, made on May 16, offering the latter Kavalla. On July
21 the Allied Ambassadors communicated to the Greek Minister that the
Allies offer of Kavalla to Bulgaria was connected with the offer to Greece
of large terrirorial acquisitions in Asiatic Turkey. On July 30 the Greek
Government handed to the Allies a Note protesting against ceding Kavalla to
Bulgaria.
SECTION IV.
On September 8, 1915, M. Venizelos told the Serbian Ambassador in Athens
that if Greece entered the war to assist Serbia the latter must cede the
region of Doiran-Gevgelli,71 and not oppose Greek pretensions to the valley
of the Struma. On September 11 the Serbian Government agreed to these
claims.
After the resignation of M. Venizelos and the maintenance of Greek
neutrality the question was raised in October of the occupation of the
Doiran region by Greek troops, but this was not done owing to the desire of
Greece not to interfere in the Serbo-Bulgarian war. On October 11 the Greek
King declared that Greece did not wish to occupy Doiran-Monastir, and still
considered herself the ally of Serbia.
70 A port in Macedonia greatly desired by Bulgaria. 71 A Macedonian district, in Serbian occupation, bordering on the Greek frontier in the Vardar valley, north of Salonika.
SECTION V. On October 7, 1915, the British Ambassador in Athens offered Greece the cession of Cyprus72 if Greece would immediately enter the war. On October 12 the Ambassador informed the Minister that the Cyprus offer was no longer valid since Greece had not entered. SECTION VI. On November 6. 1915, the Allied Ambassadors in Athens informed the Greek Government that the Allies would return Salonika and the occupied territories after the war and pay damages. SECTION VII. In the beginning of October, 1914, M. Venizelos asked the London Cabinet not to raise objection to the Greek occupation of North Epirus and the Italian occupation of Valona to restore order in these regions without prejudicing a future settlement. The Italian Government agreed, and the occupation was made. On February 14, 1915, the Allied Ambassadors in Athens protested against the Greek seizure of territory in Albania. The latter replied they had no such intention. On March 7, 1916, the Greek Premier Skouloudis declared in the Chamber that North Epirus was part of Greece, and the Government had appointed two prefects in these regions. On March 13 the Allied Ambassadors in Athens protested against the union of North Epirus to Greece as a breach of the undertaking given in October, 1914. On March 16 the Greek Government answered that it had in view the establishment of a system of government in Epirus more in keeping with Liberal Greek sentiment than that hitherto existing. 72 Britain formally annexed Cyprus in November, 1914. This reported offer to Greece evoked a strong protest from the Moslem inhabitants of Cyprus, who, it is said, sent a memorial to Sir Edward Grey against such a proposal. Appendix C. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS RELATING TO JAPAN. The following diplomatic documents, from the archives of the Russian Foreign Office, have appeared in the Petrograd Press. The translations were published in the Manchester Guardian on February 7 and 22, 1918. The first three relate to Japans territorial war aims, the last three to Japans relations with China and to the interpretation of the term special interests in the Japanese-American Agreement quoted on page 64:
I.
From M. Krupensky, the former Russian Ambassador at Tokyo. Dispatch dated
February 8, 1917.
I never omit an opportunity for representing to the Minister for Foreign
Affairs the desirability, in the interests of Japan herself, of Chinas
intervention in the war, and only last week I had a conversation with him
on the subject. To-day I again pointed out to him that the present moment
was particularly favourable, in view of the position taken up by the United
States and the proposal made by them to the neutral Powers to follow their
example, and more particularly, in view of the recent speeches of the
American Minister at Peking. Viscount Motono replied that he would be the
first to welcome a rupture between China and Germany, and would not
hesitate to take steps in this direction at Peking if he were sure that the
Chinese Government would go in that direction. So far, however, he had no
such assurance, and he feared lest unsuccessful representations at Peking
might do harm to the Allies. He promised me to sound the attitude of Peking
without delay, and, in case of some
hope of success, to propose to the Cabinet to take a decision in the desired direction. On the other hand, the Minister pointed out the necessity for him, in view of the attitude of Japanese public opinion on the subject, as well as with a view to safeguard Japans position at the future Peace Conference, if China should be admitted to it, of securing the support of the Allied Powers to the desires of Japan in respect of Shantung and the Pacific Islands. These desires are for the succession to all the rights and privileges hitherto possessed by Germany in the Shantung province and for the acquisition of the islands to the north of the equator which are now occupied by the Japanese. Motono plainly told me that the Japanese Government would like to receive at once the promise of the Imperial [Russian] Government to support the above desires of Japan. In order to give a push to the highly important question of a break between China and Germany I regard it as very desirable that the Japanese should be given the promise they ask-this the more as, so far as can be seen here, the relations between Great Britain and Japan have of late been such as to justify a surmise that the Japanese aspirations would not meet with any objections on the part of the London Cabinet. II. Despatch dated March 1, 1917. The Minister for Foreign Affairs asked me to-day whether I had received a reply from the Imperial [Russian] Government relating to Japans desires on the question of Shantung and the Pacific Islands, and told me that the Japanese Government would very much like to have at the earliest a promise from us on the subject. III. Despatch dated March 21, 1917. I communicated to-day to the Minister for Foreign Affairs the contents of your High Excellencys telegram, and gave him a copy. Viscount Motono confined himself to the observation that he took note of my communication, and would report it to the Council of Ministers and the Emperor. The attitude of public opinion and the Press here towards the Revolution in Russia is, on the whole, sympathetic. It is regarded as a pledge of a successful prosecution of the war until complete victory has been obtained, and the end of the
rule of the bureaucracy is welcomed. While paying due tribute to the Emperors and the Grand Duke Michael Alexandrovitchs patriotic acts of abdication, public opinion here expresses the hope that the new Government and the popular representatives to be summoned would not be inclined towards extreme decisions. The same attitude towards the events in Russia could be perceived in the few general words which I heard in this connection from the Minister of Foreign Affairs. IV. Despatch trom the Russian Ambassador at Tokyo, dated October 16,1917. In reply to my question as to the credibility of the rumours alleging that Japan is prepared to sell to the Chinese Government a considerable quantity of arms and munitions, Viscount Motono confirmed them, and added that the Peking Government had promised not to use the arms against the Southerners. It was evident from the Ministers words, however, that this promise possessed only the value of a formal justification of this sale, infringing as the latter does the principle of non-intervention in the internal Chinese feuds, proclaimed by Japan herself, and that the Japanese Government was in this instance deliberately assisting the Tuan-tse-shua Cabinet in the hope of receiving from it in return substantial advantages. It is most likely that the Japanese are aiming principally at obtaining the privilege of rearming the entire Chinese army, and at making China dependent in the future on Japanese arsenals and the supply of munitions from Japan. The arms to be supplied to China are estimated at 30,000,000 yen. At the same time, Japan intends establishing an arsenal in China for the manufacture of war material. V. Despatch dated October 22, 1917. Referring to Bakhmetyeffs [Russian Ambassador at Washington] N 598, if the United States thinks, as it appeared to our Ambassador [from conversation with Lansing], that the recognition of Japans special position in China is of no practical consequence, such a view will inevitably lead in the future to serious misunderstandings between us and Japan. The Japanese are manifesting more and more clearly a tendency to interpret the special position of
Japan in China, inter alia, in the sense that other Powers must not
undertake in China any political steps without previously exchanging views
with Japan on the subject-a condition that would to some extent establish a
Japanese control over the foreign affairs of China. On the other hand, the
Japanese Government does not attach great importance to its recognition of
the principle of the open door and the integrity of China, regarding it as
merely a repetition of the assurances repeatedly given by it earlier to
other Powers and implying no new restrictions for tha Japanese policy in
China. It is therefore quite possible that at some future time there may
arise in this connection misunderstandings between the United States and
Japan. The Minister of Foreign Affairs again confirmed to-day in
conversation with me that in the negotiations by Viscount Ishii the
question at issue is not some special concession to Japan in these or other
parts of China, but Japans special position in China as a whole.
VI.
Despatch dated November 1,1917.
The Minister for Foreign AFfairs asked me to call on him to-day, and
communicated to me confidentially, but quite officially, the text of the
Notes transmitted in my telegram N. 2, which are to be exchanged at
Washington on November 2 or 3 between the American State Secretary and
Viscount Ishii. A similar communication was made to-day to the British
Ambassador here. The French and Italian Ambassadors will receive the text
of the Notes in a day or two, privately, for their information. The
publication of the Notes will probably take place on November 7; until then
the Minister asks the Powers to keep his communication secret.
When handing me the above-mentioned text of the Notes, Viscount Motono
added that he had only received it in final form yesterday by wire from
Washington; and since Viscount Ishii was to leave [Washington] the night
after next, the signature of the Notes could not have been postponed, in
spite of the Japanese Governments desire to ascertain the views of the
Russian Government on the subject prior to it. The Minister hoped that he
would not be blamed for that at Petrograd-especially as the present
agreement between America and Japan could not arouse any objection on our
part. Viscount Motono mentioned that when concluding [gap in the original],
one of the objects was to put an end to the German
intrigues intended to sow discord between Japan and the United States, and to prove thereby to the Chinese that there was between the two Powers a complete agreement of view with regard to China, who, therefore, must not reckon on the possibility of extracting any profit from playing off one against the other. To my question whether he did not fear that in the future misunderstandings might arise from the different interpretations by Japan and the United States of the meaning of the terms: special position and special interests of Japan in China, Viscount Motono replied by saying that-[a gap in the original]. Nevertheless, I gain the impression from the words of the Minister that he is conscious of the possibility of misunderstandings also in the future, but is of the opinion that in such a case Japan would have better means at her disposal for carrying into effect her interpretation than the United States. Appendix D. CHRONOLOGICAL TABLE
89
INDEX
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