The German

 

White Paper

 

 

 

 

Full text of the Polish documents

 

issued by the Berlin Foreign Office

 

With a foreword by

 

C. HARTLEY GRATTAN

 

 

 

 

Howell, Soskin and Company, 1940, New York City

 

 

 

 

 

ALL RIGHTS RESERVED

 

 

 

COPYRIGHT, 1940, BY HOWELL, SOSKIN & CO., INC.

 

PRINTED IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Note

 

After the occupation of Warsaw, the German Foreign Office an­nounced, on March 30,1940, that important parts of the archives of the Polish Foreign Office had fallen into German hands.

 

It was stated that a study of the voluminous dossiers had been under­taken. The sixteen documents contained in this book were released as the first product of this study. They are now published in their com­plete text for the first time in the United States.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

The German White Paper

 

Foreword

 

By C. HARTLEY GRATTAN

 

 

 

WHEN war breaks out every nation involved immediately begins a campaign to put the blame for the catastrophe on the enemy. The war of the "color books" is a phase of this activity. It has been going full-blast ever since the present war began.

 

Plainly no single "color book" on the outbreak of war can be read with the feeling that one is getting the whole truth and nothing but the truth. One cannot read all the "color books" printed and be certain that one is arriving at anything better than a tentative version of the truth. All one has to do to reinforce this con­elusion is a look through the "color books" issued in 1914 and then consult the writings of Harry Elmer Barnes, Sidney Bradshaw Fay and others who have intensively studied the documents found in the archives of the various governments after the fighting was over.

 

While the "color books" should not be swallowed holus-bolus, neither should they be rejected in their entirety, no matter by which side they are issued. All of them contain some proportion of truth; and it may turn out in the long run that all of the documents printed in all of them are authentic. Even those which have been "cut" to fit a particular line of argumentation may be pieces of authentic documents. The number of complete and utter fakes among them may turn out to be few and far between. The fakery is far more apt to be in the argumentation the documents are selected or "cut" to support.

 

Objective truth is the least of the concerns of those fighting the "color book" war.

 

They are prosecutors endeavoring to convict an opponent of wrong doing. Con­spicuous among the methods of doctoring material to make a case are two: leaving out documents of crucial importance to a true understanding of what happened; and deleting passages from documents selected for printing with the idea of concealing awkward facts. The former dodge is the easiest to detect at the moment the books are published, for the "color books" can at least be checked against a chronology of known events. But the deletions, or "cuts," ordinarily remain unde­tected until the archives are explored after the war is over. What they can mean is clearly shown in a book published in New York in 1923: Falsifications of the Russian Orange Book.

 

Reviewing the current crop of "color books" in the New York Times Ferdinand Kuhn, [r., has naturally emphasized omissions rather than cuts:

 

... the British documents . . . are only a selection. They include nothing of the diplomatic interchanges between London and Paris, even in the acute phase of the crisis; nothing about the English-French-Soviet negotiations in Moscow which dragged on until the announcement of the Russo-German nonaggression pact; and tell little of the Munich crisis or of what went before.

 

The gaps in the French record are maddening; they all but destroy its value for future historians. There is nothing here, for example, about the tremendous preliminaries to Munich; the documents jump from the aftermath of the Aus­trian anschluss in the Spring of 1938 to the Munich agreement itself. The whole sordid story of the Conference of Ambassadors, which fixed Czecho-Slovakia's boundaries for a few months after Munich is neatly omitted; there is nothing about Franco-Italian negotiations, and not a scrap about the Allied negotiations with Soviet Russia which, by their failure, opened the door to the German­Russian pact and led inescapably to war.

 

The Germans ... began ... with Aug. 4, 1939. Nothing about Munich or Prague, or any of the shattering events that preceded last Summer appears in its pages. From the White Book one cannot tell how long the campaign against Poland was planned, what pledges of support Germany may have had from Italy, or what the ultimate objectives may have been if Britain and France had stood aloof. Even the story of the last two weeks preceding the war is incomplete, for it does not deal with German-Russian negotiations, although they must have played a vital part in German calculations.

 

At whom are the "color books" directed? At the citizens at home to convince: them of the righteousness of the government's cause; at the citizens of the enemy country to convince them that their government is in the wrong; and at the citi­zens of neutral countries. The purpose to be served in the latter case differs with the position of each belligerent. The new British and French "color books" are designed, as far as this country is concerned, to confirm the existing American prejudice in favor of the Allies and create a background for possible participation in the war on their side. The German books, on the other hand, are designed to keep us neutral, for American participation on the German side is out of the ques­tion. In neither instance are American interests the primary consideration. The various nations aim to serve their interests, not ours. If by any chance a belliger­ent does take up a line desirable for the American people as well, that is not because of any solicitude for us. It is because the policy which we think is desirable happens to be one which also serves the belligerent's purpose.

 

What Americans have to get straight is what policy will best serve their own interests. This cannot be done if flighty and emotional individuals guide public opinion. They are too apt to decide that it is more important that our policy help or hinder the policies of other nations than that it serves our own interests. We can­not, it should be clear, conclude that American policy is wrong because it hap­pens to fit in with what Germany would like to have us do; nor that it is right because it happens to serve the interests of Britain and France. To argue in that fashion is to use criteria which are irrelevant to the issue. What we have to decide is what line best serves American interests and stick to it.

 

The documents were released in Berlin and presented by the German Govern­ment as those found by Germans in the Polish archives after the Poles had fled. They are a war-booty of Germany and were made known to the world without the wishes or desires of the senders or addressees. They were interpreted by German commentators as evidence of the fact that certain American ambassadors acciden­tally may have involved American diplomacy in a way that might have encouraged the British-French guarantee to Poland. Such encouragement of the British-French policy was certainly out of line with the expressed American policy of non-inter­vention, and the Germans have tied the disturbing fact of the diplomatists' apparent support of American participation on the Franco-British side to the familiar argument: the ambassadors encouraged the policy of "encircling" Germany and, in their view, if "encirclement" led to war, the United States would, in the end, support the Allies with its fighting forces.

 

The publication of these documents has been sharply rebuffed by American officials, including President Roosevelt and Secretary Hull, who have called into question their authenticity. This was inevitable. They could not be ignored; it would have been highly expedient to confirm their genuineness; so the only possible tack was to cast doubts of their authenticity.

 

It should be remembered, however, that there are plenty of documents of the last war, now issued as official publications of the State Department, which if they had been released in any fashion during the course of the war, would have been repudi­ated as vehemently as these. This is true of many of the memoranda Secretary of State Lansing composed during his career in the State Department; it is true of the so-called House-Grey agreement which was, by the way, suspected to exist at the time though the government denied it; it is true of many of the documents with regard to the Lusitania; and it is true of President Wilson's knowledge of the secret treaties of which he never persuaded himself to make a clean breast in his own lifetime. The point is that from past experience we know that in wartime an "official denial" of the authenticity of facts or documents, no matter the source from which they come, is insufficient reason to dismiss them entirely from consideration.

 

The documents here presented give but a partial view of the American position.

 

To say this does not mean that we have knowledge of the secret archives of the State Department; it merely requires that we call to mind the many relevant docu­ments already released to the people by the American government which bear on this matter. By selecting a few documents which place American officials in an extremely bad light and failing to place them in anything like a full context, the Germans have made them appear to mean more than they really do. As pointed out earlier, this technique is an old one among editors of "color books." But as also pointed out, the falseness does not necessarily extend to the isolated documents themselves; it arises rather out of their arbitrary selection to reinforce an argument which is strained. In this particular case the Germans have released selected docu­ments which might alarm those Americans who are convinced that neutrality is the proper American policy and perhaps start a fire under a government which such Americans already regard with a considerable measure of suspicion.

 

In this fashion the documents are used both to clear Germany of guilt in pre­cipitating the war and to accuse American diplomatists of assisting and encouraging the Allies to precipitate it. It is not known whether a complete collection of documents would lead us to either conclusion.

 

But because they have been selected for this purpose it does not follow that the documents are false. Far from it, Our knowledge of the foreign policy of the Roosevelt administration is too extensive for us to rule them out of court. It is likely that they are authentic documents. This is the opinion of many Washington correspondents, including Sir Willmott Lewis of the London Times, who might be expected to be sceptical of them. When they are placed in the picture we have of President Roosevelt's foreign policy, they are not false notes. Could they not have been used to fill out the highly favorable, semi-official, picture of the President's policy drawn by Alsop and Kintner in "American White Paper"? Do they not fit neatly into the Roosevelt line of "action short of war" in support of Britain and France? Criticism should be directed against that policy as a whole, rather than at these stray documents which so neatly complement it. It and not these few papers will on some fateful tomorrow get the American people into really serious trouble. These papers are but straws in the wind.

 

New York City, May 10, 1940.

 

First Document

 

Telegram of the British Ambassador to Warsaw, Sir Howard Ken­nard, to London on April znd 1935, found among Polish dossiers. Obviously it is a telegram from the British Ambassador to Warsaw to the Foreign Office in London.

 

THE FOLLOWING is for Mr. Eden: I had an interview this afternoon with Marshal Pilsudski. The conversation was not carried on easily because a great part of the Marshal's remarks, all of which were spoken in French, were unintel­ligible both to myself and to two Polish Ministers who were present. A consider­able portion of his remarks consisted of reminiscences, during which he asked about my war experience and paid tribute to the British army in the war.

 

The main political theme, so far as it could be disentangled, was that he had his pact with Germany and Russia, and that the latter country's policy was always very difficult to fathom, that other nations often misunderstood it and that Mr. Lloyd George in particular was a crowning example of these errors of judg­ment. As an instance of this he referred to Mr. Lloyd George's support of Deni­kin. The Marshal had always known that Denikin never had a chance, but Mr. Lloyd George had sadly miscalculated the situation. To the Marshal it appeared that Britain should occupy herself with her colonies and not follow Lloyd George's bad example.

 

What, for instance, he asked, was the political situation in Jamaica? I retorted that if Europe were only as little important as Jamaica we should not have to worry. I asked Marshal whether it was his judgment that there was no alternative to isolation for Britain. The Marshal replied that in his opinion there was none. I told him that, for our part, we wished for nothing better than to leave Europe to her own troubles, but that our experience was that those troubles had the unhappy knack of involving our own country. The Marshal did not dissent. I had an impression of a man now very feeble physically who despite his--.

 

In any event, he was not to be drawn into a discussion of current international politics. So far as he seems to have visualized his own country's situation under present conditions, it is that of a country which clings to its pacts with each of its great neighbors and refuses to move from its position or face any events which might compel it to revise the attitude which it has taken up.

 

Second Document

 

Letter from the Polish General Staff (Department Two) in Warsaw, to the Foreign Minister in Warsaw. Dated: Warsaw, August 8th, I938.

 

CONCERNS the international situation as seen in Portugal.

 

The British military mission at present is busy in Portugal trying to outline military cooperation between Portugal and Great Britain. Admiral Wodehouse submitted the British demands to the staffs of the Portuguese army and navy, but all British projects were sabotaged by the Portuguese War Ministry and Govern­ment. In fact, the British mission did not receive a reply. Thereupon Admiral W odehouse conferred with British Ambassador Selby, who advised the Admiral to remain calm and reserved. Finally W odehouse sent a direct report to London. Concerning this direct report W odehouse himself said:

 

"I asked London whether I am to point the pistol to their heads or whether I am to wait. Anyway I shall now be more strict with them".

 

The Portuguese General Peixote E. Cunha, known as the right hand man of Salazar, who carries out reforms of the army personnel, told me that Portugal's future depended on an alliance with Great Britain, that Spain, quite independent of the outcome of the civil war, was a permanent threat to Portugal, and that Portugal would welcome the weakening of Spain even at the price of separating Catalonia from Spain.

 

Lieutenant N. Chamberlain, member of the British military mission, spoke of the danger of a European war. He said:

 

"We know that Germany and Italy are bluffing. Together with the younger officers of our staff I am of the opinion that we should start war immediately".

 

He explained that Germany could surprise nobody by new war machinery, that the Germany army was unprepared, that old German airplanes and armored material had but little practical value and that Germany was in a bad moral and economic position (possibility of overthrow of German regime). He added that Germany lacks ore, oil, rubber, and food. Germany's possible partner, Italy, was in even a worse condition, since she was without any war materials whatsoever. He assured me that under the present circumstances war seemed unavoidable and declared it would be better to start war now when there was less possibility of dan­ger. He pointed out that at present Great Britain can count on close cooperation with United States. I asked Chamberlain whether England in this event meant to introduce military conscription. He answered that he did not think so, for the fol­lowing reasons: London was convinced that the most useful weapons would be the navy, the air force and armored units, as well as participation in warfare of trade and industry. He added that it was possible of course that as a result of events of the war, general mobilization might have to be resorted to.

 

Colonel Daly, of the British military mission, appeared to be optimistic over the results of the commission's work. He hinted that Great Britain would apply methods which would guarantee success. He said that at present everything was being done here to bring about an end of purchases of German war material. He added that recent experiences with German war materials in Rumania were unsat­isfactory. Colonel Daly revealed that Germany lately had sold certain arms to Red Spain. On the British possibilities in a future war, Colonel Daly was of the same opinion as Chamberlain, and emphasized the fact that good results had already been achieved in obtaining cooperation with United States. As to the introduction of military conscription in Great Britain, Colonel Daly declared that England by general military preparations, target practice, and the establishment of strong vol­unteer corps, had created the necessary conditions for large scale extension of the British army. He added that Great Britain had organized great strategical reserves in the colonies, particularly in India.

 

In the last two years staff officers for future wars are systematically trained at acad­emies: an Academy for training high officers for leading posts in political, admin­istrative and military authorities, and an Imperial Military College for preparation of officers of lower rank. In addition, the number of preparatory courses for Gen­eral Staff Officers has been doubled. Thus, said Daly, Great Britain has created an organization for the whole Empire in preparation for the coming conflict.

 

Commander Gade, American Naval Attache said to me at the time:

 

"We are completely on the side of democracy so far as ideas are concerned. At present the possibilities for speedy aid to Great Britain and France are being studied in America. One must conclude that help shall not be sent as in the World War, only after one year when the first American soldiers intervened act­ively, but in the course of seven to ten days. As soon as the war begins 1,000 air­planes are to be sent".

 

Commander Gade furthermore drew my attention to the unpermissible methods of German penetration in South America, to which the United States could not consent. Commander Gade is a man who enjoys the confidence of Roosevelt and is a personal friend of his. He has very close relations with Belgium, and is a friend of the Belgian King. He is very unfriendly towards Germany. Per­sonally he is very wealthy.

 

From conversations with Chamberlain, Daly and Gade I derived a feeling of quiet certainty of close cooperation in case of a conflict. I talked more frequently with local Italians. They are extremely nervous, much interested in our attitude in a future conflict; with their backs to the wall they pointed to the menace to man­kind and to civilization in a future war, which, for this reason, must be avoided at all cost.

 

While the French fleet was here, Commander Darrieux, Deputy Chief of Staff of the Atlantic fleet, regarded as the coming man of the French navy and known to me, from an earlier visit to Lisbon, as leader of a destroyer unit, invited me personally to board the Admiral ship as well as to the inspection of the aircraft carrier "Bearn". I went together with Captain Stefanowicz, and accompanied by the French Minister. We were the only foreigners there.

 

"Bearn" lay in the middle of the Tejo River, far away from any possibility of closer inspection. In the course of the conversation Commander Darrieux spoke pretty calmly about the possibility of future conflict. Above all he emphasized the fact that in France the rightist circles and rightist press are unnecessarily afraid and that they judged the situation incorrectly. He regards the pacifism of the democ­racies as their biggest mistake, for by this creed one cannot be first in starting the war. In this manner one puts a most valuable trump card into the hands of the opponents-that of surprise. But he has opinions somewhat beyond this view. He believes it will be possible to come to terms with the Italians.

 

In conclusion, I should like to emphasize the calm and unanimity of view of the representatives of Britain, France and the United States.

 

Third Document

 

A letter of Doctor Grazynski, in Kattowitz, to Polish Foreign Minister in Warsaw, dated November 2nd, 1938.

 

MR. MINISTER:

 

I consider it my duty to inform you of what transpired between Mr. Kuu­lies Randa, former general director of the Trzynice factory plants, and Mr. Zieleniewski.

 

This conversation is of great importance, for Mr. Kuulies Randa is one of the most important Czech industrialists, whose name has lately been mentioned as a candidate for the presidency of the Czechoslovak Republic. Talking of the policy of Czechoslovakia, he expressed himself in the following terms:

 

"For a thousand years, the Czechs have formed a political unit of the Germanic Empire. After they acquired independence for Czechoslovakia, a group tried to formulate an independent policy. However, their efforts were frustrated, and the attempt failed. Now, in my opinion, the Czech state should return to its old role, participating in the political destiny of the German Reich."

 

Considering his position, Mr. Randa's words have great importance, and they indicate existing tendencies which have also been observed on other occasions.

 

(Signed) DR. GRAZYNSKI, WOJEWOD.

 

Fourth Document

 

Report of the Polish Ambassador, Count Jerzy Potocki, Polish Ambassador at Washington, to the Foreign Minister in Warsaw. Refers to conversation with Ambassador Bullitt. Dated : Washington, November 21,1938.

 

To FOREIGN MINISTER in Warsaw:

 

The day before yesterday I had a long conversation with Ambassador Bullitt, who is here on a vacation.

 

In the beginning he remarked that very friendly relations existed between him­self and Ambassador Lukasiewicz in Paris, whose company he greatly enjoyed.

 

Since Bullitt regularly informs Roosevelt about the international situation in Europe, and particularly about Russia, great attention is given his reports by Roose­velt and the State Department. Bullitt speaks vividly and interestingly. Nonethe­less, his reaction to events in Europe resembled the view of a journalist more than that of a politician, for in his conversation he alluded to the entire scale of very complicated European problems. From them he draws very negative conclusions.

 

Bullitt shows great pessimism in his conversation generally. He said the begin­ning of 1939 would undoubtedly be very exciting, aggravated by the continuous display of the possibility of war and by threats from Germany, as well as by the danger in the unclarified situation in Europe. He agreed with me that the centre of gravity of the European question has moved from west to east, for the capitula­tion of the Democratic States in Munich revealed their weakness compared with the German Reich.

 

Then Bullitt spoke about the complete lack of preparation for war in Britain and about the impossibility of converting English industry to a mass war produc­tion basis, particularly in the airplane industry. He expressed himself with unus­ual enthusiasm about the French army and confirmed the fact, nonetheless, that French aviation is outmoded. According to what military experts told Bullitt dur­ing the fall-crisis of 1938, the war would last at least six years and would in their opinion end in the complete destruction of Europe, and with communism reign­ing in all States. Undoubtedly, at the conclusion, the benefits would be taken by Russia.

 

He spoke of Russia with contempt. He said the last purge, particularly the removal of Bluecher, has resulted in the complete disorientation of the Red Army which is not capable of any active war exertions. In general, according to him, Russia is at present the sick man of Europe. He compared it with the pre-war Ottoman State.

 

About Germany and Chancellor Hitler he spoke vehemently and with great hatred. He said that only energy at the end of the war would put an end to a future great German expansionism. To my question asking how he visualized this future war, he replied that above all the United States, France and England must rearm tremendously in order to be in a position to cope with German power. Only then, when the moment is ripe, declared Bullitt further, will one be ready for the final decision. I asked him in what way the conflict could arise, since Germany probably would not attack England and France. I simply could not see the starting point in this entire speculation.

 

Bullitt replied that the democratic countries definitely needed another two years, until they were fully armed. Meantime, Germany would probably have advanced with its expansion in an Easterly direction. It would be the wish of the democratic countries that armed conflict would break out there, in the East between the Ger­man Reich and Russia. As the Soviet Union's potential strength was not yet known, it might happen that Germany would have moved too far away from its base, and would be condemned to wage a long and weakening war. Only then would the democratic countries attack Germany, Bullitt declared, and force her to capitulate. In reply to my question whether the United States would take part in such war, he said, "Undoubtedly yes, but only after Great Britain and France had made the first move!" Feeling in United States is so tense against Nazism and Hitlerism, he said, that there is today a psychosis among Americans similar to that before America's declaration of war on Germany in 1917.

 

Bullitt then inquired about the situation in Eastern Europe. He confirmed the fact that Poland was still a country which would resort to arms and fight if Ger­many crossed its frontiers. I well understand the question of a joint frontier with Hungary, he said. Hungarians, too, are capable of helping us. A joint line of defense with Yugoslavia would make matters easier in regard to German expansion. Then Bullitt spoke on the Ukrainian question and on German efforts in the Ukraine. He confirmed the fact that Germany had a complete Ukrainian staff which would take over the Government of the Ukraine in the future and which would create there an independent Ukrainian state, under German control. "Such an Ukraine," Bullitt continued, "would naturally be very dangerous to you, as it would exercise direct influence on Ukrainians in Eastern Congress Poland."

 

"Already," he said, "German propaganda has moved entirely in an Ukrainian nationalist direction, and Carpatho-Ruthenian Ukraine would serve as a starting point in this future undertaking in whose continued existence Germany is much interested, especially for strategic reasons." Bullitt did not give the impression of being too well informed on the situation in Eastern Europe, and he conversed in a rather superficial way.

 

(Signed) JERZY POTOCKI, Ambassador of the Polish Republic.

 

Fifth Document

 

Report of the Polish Ambassador to Paris, Jules Lukasiewicz, to the Polish Foreign Minister in Warsaw, refers to the position of France in Eastern Europe. Dated: December 17th, 1938, Paris.

 

To THE FOREIGN MINISTER in Warsaw:

 

Completing my wired information, which I had the honor to send to the Minister during the last few weeks, permit me to resume with this, my opinion on French Foreign policy after the conierence held in Munich and following the visit of Mr. von Ribbentrop.

 

The most important event of this time is naturally the Franco-German accord of December 6th, this year, reached by Minister Bonnet and von Ribbentrop. The French desire at least to balance relations with Germany after the Munich confer­ence, as was done by England in publishing the well known Chamberlain-Hitler communication, is undoubtedly clear and strong, but it appears that Chancellor Hitler took the initial concrete step during the farewell visit held with French Ambassador Francois-Poncet, France accepted this benevolent beginning and was frankly satisfied to the point of expressing a desire for immediate realization. When he left at the end of October for Warsaw, Minister Bonnet informed me that the signature and publication of the accord were imminent. But his assumption was not realized for two reasons: one was the difficulty in reaching an accord on the text; and the other reason was the assassination of an attache in the German Embassy in Paris, causing a suspension for two weeks. It appears that difficulties in agreeing on the text of the accord were due to efforts of Foreign Minister Bonnet to construct an accord which would imply recognition not only of the German­-Franco frontier, but also of the French colonial possessions. The final text of the accord takes this into consideration, or at least can so be interpreted. At the time when the text had been definitely drawn up, the German Government took the initiative by proposing that von Ribbentrop visit Paris. Bonnet immediately accepted the proposal, with due consideration of the interior political situation as it affects foreign propaganda, and because he wished to give the accord as impressive a character as possible, creating around the event an atmosphere that would result in an essential improvement of French relations with her neighbor.

 

Because of the general strike announced in France by labor unions and labor parties on November 30th, the visit of the German Foreign Minister had to be delayed. The visit occurred December 6th, in a quiet, courteous atmosphere both on the part of the French Government and of the French political moderates. Only the extreme oppositionist press commented in a very strong manner on the visit. The impression was gained that an overwhelming majority of the French populace wanted to believe in the possibility of a permanent bettering of German­-French relations. However, the distrust was too great, and finally weighed most on the spirit. This distrust has been reinforced naturally by the anti-French cam­paign of the Italian press which has not encountered any serious objection on the part of Germany. Actually it can be said that hardly a week after the departure of Ribbentrop, the resonance of the visit has disappeared. This resonance has been replaced by a new uneasiness, caused as much by the Italian anti-French campaign as by the Memel and Ukraine questions. It can be asserted with absolute assurance that the declaration tranquilizing French public opinion most is the point least necessary, that is, the German-French frontier. On the other hand, there is no new easing in regard to German-Italian expansionist tendencies, which is in reality what disturbs public opinion here. It must be conceded, however, that the accord has undoubtedly strengthened the position of the government before Parliament, in the financial market and in public opinion, and that, on the other hand, it has increased and made more profound the divergence between the Daladier govern­ment and the extreme left opposition.

 

Referring to the official attitude on the accord, it can be assumed to be one of absolute reservation and a highly cautious attitude. Regarding the interview held with Ambassador Leger, I am informed that the French Government intends to tranquilize German-French relations on a general European basis, that is, as a point of general appeasement on the continent. It appears to me more than significant that Leger gave his words a concrete meaning and thinks that for betterment of German-French relations and French-Italian relations a quadri-partite pact will have to be arrived at in some manner or other. It is difficult, naturally, to ascertain up to what point this is Bonnet's and the French Government's idea. The semi­official press which maintains close connections with the Quai d'Orsay allows one to judge that these plans are not unknown. It is evident, also, that Leger took part in all conferences held as result of Ribbentrop's visit.

 

On the other hand, however, I can say with absolute assurance, based on a long, detailed talk held with Foreign Minister Bonnet, that if the French Government tried to arrange appeasement with Germany on a wide European basis, it has suffered complete failure on this ground. The final result is, then, that the Bonnet-Ribbentrop accord can be considered entirely as a bilateral act whose sig­nificance is seen not to go beyond French-German relations. The accord brought France recognition of territorial frontiers and assurance that there existed no terri­torial questions between France and Germany. Such assurance is interpreted among French political mediums as recognition of the French Empire, excepting mandated territories. The understanding finally brought with it an improvement in neighboring relations, which is important in the light of passages in Hitler's "Mein Kampf," wherein the author designates France as Germany's prime enemy. Besides, it has been ascertained that the economic problems are extraordinarily complicated and require long negotiations, while the political atmosphere has not been improved sufficiently to simplify and quickly solve economic problems.

 

Concerning the first and third paragraphs of the accord, they are essentially "primum desiderium," perhaps including a more exclusive portion and answer to reality. It is worthy of special note that the conferences with Ribbentrop have brought about nothing new that suggests a basis for future expectations in two problems especially interesting to France: relations with Italy and the Spanish question.

 

Summing up, we may be certain that in the drawing up and signing of the accord, the French have tried, although discreetly, to give the event a major sig­nificance; while Germany has reduced its importance to that of a bilateral act.

 

Thus it is clear that the fate of the accord depends essentially on Berlin, since it is difficult to believe that French policy would undergo a serious change. From the moment that the suggestion was made for a French-German accord, the resulting von Ribbentrop visit to Paris has constituted a most important event, revealing the full extent of French policy, after the Munich defeat, especially in respect to the effect on French relations with Central and Eastern Europe.

 

First notice of the projected accord broke the silence of the French press regard­ing the French attitude on the alliance with us, and with regard to the mutual assistance pact with the USSR. The first to express themselves on this subject were the party organs "Humanite," "Populaire," "Odre" etc., including Pertinax and Madame Tabouis, all defending the Franco-Soviet pact, although not being able to put it on the same plane as the pact with us.

 

The rightist and semi-official press, on the contrary, papers such as "Temps" and "Petit Parisien," indicate that for France the essential problem is solely alliance with England, while in the present circumstances the pact with the USSR and the Polish alliance are of doubtful value. As for the rest, "Temps" has repeatedly expressed itself in editorials as urging France not to present any obstacles to the construction of a German empire in Central and Eastern Europe.

 

On the other hand, the German-French understanding has brought up again within the government the question of French international obligations, since some Russophiles, such as Mandel, desired to know if the accord were compatible with the alliance with us and with the Franco-Soviet pact. Finally, Bonnet, for this reason, has had to speak with me concerning the matter, and probably has done the same with the ambassadors of the USSR and Belgium. The first of these con­versations was held before Bonnet declared himself satisfied with the text of the accord. Bonnet read the understanding to me, remarking that the reservation regarding relations with third parties referred also to relations with ourselves. He spoke a second time on the same subject upon my presenting the French Foreign Minister with the answer of the Polish minister to his previous communique of November 28th. Bonnet held in his hand the text of the Minister's confirmation that the interpretation on the viewpoint of the French Government was entirely accurate. Finally he advised me of the conference with Ribbentrop, voluntarily stressing the fact that he had confessed to the German intermediary that he regretted both the alliance with us and with the USSR. As for the rest, the communique found in the reports of the meeting of the Corrunittee on Foreign Affairs, of the 14th inst. appears to indicate that despite Bonnet's not mentioning his explanation of our alliance nor the pact with the USSR, he answered a question on the subject and affirmed the fact that French obligations toward us or the USSR would continue as before, and were fully valid.

 

It would be premature, however, to believe that the above totally cleared up our relations with the French Government, or with Parliament and the effect of the alliance with us on public opinion. I am of the opinion that it is more than certain that the French-German understanding has made the French active in the affairs which affect its alliance with Poland and the USSR, and, therefore, that they have neither violated nor under-valued these documents. It is worthy of notice that those now concerning themselves with previous French alliances as a result of the French­German accord have been almost exclusively Sovietophiles. The alliance with Poland has been more pretext than primary necessity in order to think about the maintenance of the French-Soviet pact. If the actual situation is analyzed from a purely political viewpoint, it must unfortunately show that neither the attitude of the government represented by Bonnet nor among Parliamentary politicians nor in the press is there anything to indicate the giving of new, vital force to the alliance with us or its conversion into a French foreign political instrument. On the other hand, so many indications are lacking that it permits the conclusion that in case, for some reason or other, France should see herself forced to comply with her obli­gations to us as result of the alliance that greater efforts would be made to break away from them than to fulfill them.

 

My opinion does not appear to be in accord with the declaration of Foreign Minister Bonnet, which I had the honor to communicate to the Minister. How­ever, it is precise, and reproduces the exact situation. Bonnet is a person of weak character who is not in a situation to defend any cause, and who falls into the temptation of adapting himself to each of his interlocutors. Although I have in no case the intention of judging the sincerity of his statements toward us, I have not the least doubt that he will not adopt the same attitude expressed in his con­ference with me when confronted by his Government, Parliament and press.

 

Several times I have pointed out to Bonnet, directly and indirectly, the tremen­dous difference between our direct conversations and the statements of the semi­official press and in Parliamentary discussions. My remarks up to the present have not had any result. We shall wait to see what discussion the Chamber of Depu­ties next brings up. In any case we will hinder the continuance of this situation which can be said to find us far from having a two-faced policy in what concerns us.

 

Our position in France is not the result of a fundamental modification of atti­tude toward us. The bitterness which the Czechoslovak crisis left has also played an exact, though minor role. The decisive nucleus of the question is found, how­ever, much deeper, and is derived from the general French attitude in the face of the total complexity of the international situation. France finds herself, since the Munich conference, in the situation of a badly defeated person who cannot release himself from a enemy who continues to persecute, and thus, is not in a position to confront a series of new problems. Concerning international obligations, France is altogether too weak to break with them, but also too weak openly to articulate for the same. France therefore remains paralyzed and resignedly confined to adopting a defeatist attitude towards everything that is happening in central and eastern Europe. As things are today, France opposes the German-Italian axis in cooperation with England, to which it plays a passive role, and alongside of which nothing else interests her, whether or not the alliance with Poland or the USSR takes on special significance. This is not due to any doubt of our readiness to resist any excessive claims, but because it is not believed that such resistance could be any use. Thus the Carpatho-Russian question has not been solved in accordance with Hungarian wishes and Poland has played an important negative role. Summing up: France does not consider anything of positive value except an alliance with England, while an alliance with ourselves and the USSR is considered more of a burden, and she declares herself in their favor only in a displeased manner. This situation could be modified in case France, considering herself under English influence, started a political offensive against Germany, which is totally unlikely in the near future, or in the event that our resistance against German policy should prove efficacious and would therefore influence the attitude of other central and eastern European states. It is also possible that if Italy's attack were made in a more direct and dangerous manner and Italy finds herself protected in one form or another by Germany, France would be obliged to defend herself in a sector not supported by the English alliance, and in this case would try to profit by conti­nental alliances, although only as auxiliary factors and of inferior value to English alliance.

 

Concerning Italy, it is almost certain that Chamberlain's visit to Rome will bring about an attempt to improve French-Italian relations which could now bring positive results, tending to demonstrate that France is still inclined to maintain a defeatist attitude regarding questions of central and eastern Europe. If it took up Europe's problems, French policy would show toward efforts of German expansion not only an absolute and passive attitude, but would be incapable of assuming the position which has characterized it for the last twenty years. I have the impression that the point of view taken by Minister Bonnet when confronted by Ribbentrop on the guaranty of the Czech frontier, was similar to the opinions expressed at the time by Ambassador Leger's conversation with me. If Mr. Ribbentrop so desired, he could obtain the guarantee of the new frontier even if it were previously guaran­teed by us and Hungary. When he released this information, Minister Bonnet told me that Minister Ribbentrop received a French promise not to oppose German economic expansion in the Danube basin. Nor could Ribbentrop have received the impression that political expansion in the same region would encounter serious French resistance.

 

Concerning problems relating to European questions, particularly the Russian question, there is complete confusion in French policy and French public opinion. Confidence in Soviet Russia, that is, in its power, decreases each day more and more, and in the same manner sympathies decrease. The Soviet internal situation is judged pessimistically, rumors prevailing especially of a military uprising in Moscow which might result in a dangerous collaboration between Berlin and Moscow. The Ukrainian question is clouded by the impossibility of understand­ing the situation, which originated in turn, from the defeatist impression that Ukrainian action could start any month when Germany so desired, threatening its territorial integrity. This large number of problems keeps French public opinion in constant tension, which reflects itself in the press as well as among members of Parliament. This situation finds, on the government's part, an attitude that can be qualified as due to the lack of a strong Cabinet. One gets the impression that it is actually impossible to overcome this general psychosis with the most reasonable arguments.

 

(Signed) JULES LUKASIEWICZ, Ambassador of the Republic of Poland.

 

Sixth Document

 

Report of the Polish Ambassador in Washington, Count Jerzy Potocki to Polish Foreign Minister in Warsaw, dated Washington, January 12, 1939, concerning the domestic situation in United States.

 

THERE is a feeling now prevalent in the United States marked by growing hatred of Fascism, and above all of Chancellor Hitler and everything con­nected with National Socialism. Propaganda is mostly in the hands of the Jews who control almost 100 percent radio, film, daily and periodical press. Although this propaganda is extremely coarse and presents Germany as black as possible­ above all religious persecution and concentration camps are exploited-this propa­ganda is nevertheless extremely effective since the public here is completely ignorant and knows nothing of the situation in Europe.

 

At the present moment most Americans regard Chancellor Hitler and National Socialism as the greatest evil and greatest peril threatening the world. The situation here provides an excellent platform for public speakers of all kinds, for emigrants from Germany and Czechoslovakia who with a great many words and with most various calumnies incite the public. They praise American liberty which they con­trast with the totalitarian states.

 

It is interesting to note that in this extremely well-planned campaign which is conducted above all against National Socialism, Soviet Russia is almost completely eliminated. Soviet Russia, if mentioned at all, is mentioned in a friendly manner and things are presented in such a way that it would seem that the Soviet Union were cooperating with the bloc of democratic states. Thanks to the clever propagan­da the sympathies of the American public are completely on the side of Red Spain.

 

This propaganda, this war psychosis is being artificially created. The American people are told that peace in Europe is hanging only by a thread and that war is inevitable. At the same time the American people are unequivocally told that in case of a world war, America also must take an active part in order to defend the slogans of liberty and democracy in the world. President Roosevelt was the first one to express hatred against Fascism. In doing so he was serving a double purpose; first he wanted to divert the attention of the American people from difficult and intricate domestic problems, especially from the problem of the struggle between capital and labor. Second, by creating a war psychosis and by spreading rumors concerning dangers threatening Europe, he wanted to induce the American people to accept an enormous armament program which far exceeds United States defense requirements.

 

Regarding the first point, it must be said that the internal situation on the labor .market is growing worse constantly. The unemployed today already number twelve million. Federal and state expenditures are increasing daily. Only the huge sums, running into billions, which the treasury expends for emergency labor projects, are keeping a certain amount of peace in the country. Thus far only the usual strikes and local unrest have taken place. But how long this government aid can be kept up it is difficult to predict today. The excitement and indignation of public opinion, and the serious conflict between private enterprises and enormous trusts on the one hand, and with labor on the other, have made many enemies for Roosevelt and are causing him many sleepless nights.

 

As to point two, I can only say that President Roosevelt, as a clever player of politics and a connoisseur of American mentality, speedily steered public attention away from the domestic situation in order to fasten it on foreign policy. The way to achieve this was simple. One needed, on the one hand, to enhance the war menace overhanging the world on account of Chancellor Hitler, and, on the other hand, to create a specter by talking about the attack of the totalitarian states on the United States. The Munich pact came to President Roosevelt as a godsend. He described it as the capitulation of France and England to bellicose German militarism. As was said here: Hitler compelled Chamberlain at pistol-point. Hence, France and England had no choice and had to conclude a shameful peace.

 

The prevalent hatred against everything which is in any way connected with German National Socialism is further kindled by the brutal attitude against the Jews in Germany and by the emigre problem. In this action Jewish intellectuals participated; for instance, Bernard Baruch; the Governor of New York State, Lehman; the newly appointed judge of the Supreme Court, Felix Frankfurter; Secretary of the Treasury Morgenthau, and others who are personal friends of Roosevelt. They want the President to become the champion of human rights, freedom of religion and speech, and the man who in the future will punish trouble-mongers. These groups, people who want to pose as representatives of "Americanism" and "defenders of democracy" in the last analysis, are connected by unbreakable ties with international Jewry.

 

For this Jewish international, which above all is concerned with the interests of its race, to put the President of the United States at this "ideal" post of champion of human rights, was a clever move. In this manner they created a dangerous hot­bed for hatred and hostility in this hemisphere and divided the world into two hostile camps. The entire issue is worked out in a mysterious manner. Roosevelt has been forcing the foundation for vitalizing American foreign policy, and simul­taneously has been procuring enormous stocks for the coming war, for which the Jews are striving consciously. With regard to domestic policy, it is extremely con­venient to divert public attention from anti-semitism which is ever growing in the United States, by talking about the necessity of defending faith and individ­ualliberty against the onslaught of Fascism.

 

(Signed) JERZY POTOCKI,

 

Ambassador of the Republic of Poland.

 

Seventh Document

 

Report of the Polish Ambassador in Washington, Count Jerzy Potocki to the Polish Foreign Office in Warsaw, January tbth, 1939.

 

To THE FOREIGN MINISTER in Warsaw:

 

The day before yesterday, I had a longer discussion with Ambassador Bullitt in the Embassy where he called on me. Bullitt leaves on the z rst of this month for Paris, from where he has been absent for almost three months. He is sailing with a whole "trunk" full of instructions, conversations, directions from President Roosevelt, the State Department, and Senators who belong to the Committee on Foreign Affairs. In talking with Bullitt I had the impression that he had received from President Roosevelt a very detailed definition of the attitude taken by the United States towards the present European crisis. He will present this material at the Quai d'Orsay and will make use of it in discussions with European statesmen. The contents of these directions, as Bullitt explained them to me in the course of a conversation, lasting half an hour, were:

 

I.-The vitalizing foreign policy, under the leadership of President Roosevelt, severely and unambiguously condemns totalitarian countries.

 

2.-The United States preparation for war on sea, land and air which will be carried out at an accelerated speed and will consume the colossal sum of 1,250 million dollars.

 

3.-It is the decided opinion of the President that France and Britain must put end to any sort of compromise with the totalitarian countries. They must not let themselves in for any discussions aiming at any kind of territorial changes.

 

4.- They have the moral assurance that the United States will leave the policy of' isolation and be prepared to intervene actively on the side of Britain and France in case of war. America is ready to place its whole wealth of money and raw mate­rials at their disposal.

 

When I raised the question as to what sort of horoscope Bullitt predicts for 1939, he replied that he feared danger of conflict between France and Italy, on account of colonies, in the spring. He thinks that the victory of Nationalists in Spain would put France in a very difficult situation for it is then surrounded by Fascist states on all sides. Mussolini will then surely speak up and threaten France with war. As to my question whether Germany would help Mussolini in such an undertaking, Bullitt replied that, according to his opinion, it is very doubtful if Hitler would let himself be induced, outside of giving moral support, actually to participate in such an undertaking, for it would then be clear that world war was inevitable.

 

Bullitt asserted most definitely that France should under no circumstances enter into any sort of agreement with Mussolini. During the last few months, the situa­tion had so improved in France, that France alone could defeat the Italian army and Italian navy if Italy should launch an unprovoked attack. He branded Mussolini's actions and methods as most ordinary "gangsterism" and blackmail. During the course of the conversation, Bullitt also mentioned Eastern Europe and Germany. He said that Polish foreign policy under the excellent direction of its minister had stood the test and shown its feasiblity. Poland had come out of last years autumn crisis not only with arms in its hands, but also as a victor.

 

He questioned me immediately about relations between Poland and Soviet Russia, and about the significance of the renewal of the non-aggression pact between Poland and Russia. I replied that everything written by the press on the Russian question were mere speculations and conjectures. The renewal of the non­aggression pact with the Soviets was a necessity of the moment, since relations between Poland and the Soviets had deteriorated greatly, after the Czech crisis. The renewal of the non-aggression pact was merely a dot on the "i", no more and no less. It only aimed at renormalising relations which had been unbalanced by events.

 

In reply to his question regarding our trade agreement with the Soviets, I declared that that agreement was in consequence of our occupation of the Alsa region and the great industries there. Poland was compelled to seek new export markets which it found to some extent in Soviet Russia. Bullitt's feeling toward the Soviet Union is pronouncedly unfriendly and extremely disdainful. He declared moreover that Germany for the time being was unlikely to launch an attack on Eastern Europe since 011 the one hand Poland was too strong, while on the other hand, the situation was not yet sufficiently clarified as regards Hungary, Rumania and Yugoslavia. Certain preparations would still have to be carried out and posi­tions consolidated. He expressed conviction moreover that Germany would carry out her plan concerning Ukraine, but not before 1940. I did not enter into dis­cussion with Bullitt about such action. I merely asked whether Western Powers would become active in such event and whether they would attack the Reich allegedly in order to protect the Soviet Union. Bullitt replied that all imaginary armed interventions on behalf of some state which might become the victim of German aggression had been abandoned once and for all by democratic countries.

 

(Signed) JERZY POTOCKI, Ambassador of the Polish Republic.

 

Eighth Document

 

Report of the Polish Ambassador at Paris, [ules Lukasieioic», to the Polish Foreign Minister in Warsaw. Dated: Paris, February 1st, 1939

 

To THE FOREIGN MINISTER in Warsaw:

 

The Parliamentary debate on the question of French policy which was ter­minated here yesterday, with a vote of confidence for the Daladier Government­379 votes against 234, prompts me to submit to you, Mr. Minister, my opinion on the present status of French relations with us and about agreements connecting France with Poland.

 

As I already mentioned in my previous report of December 17th, 1938, the problem of relations with Poland became acute in French political quarters, after the September events and through the signing of the French-German nonaggression declaration. Since that date, the French press began to devote more attention and space to relations with Poland. It was also possible to note among the politicians of the right wing as well as the left wing, more lively interest in this problem or an attempt to creat~ such interest. It became obvious that the antipathy against Poland which had been caused on account of September events was beginning to disappear to be replaced by a more reasonable, a more objective and a more realistic attitude.

 

In these circumstances, as well as on account of the deterioration of the French international position, your stay of several days at Monte Carlo and your visit to Chancellor Hitler at Berchtesgaden became the starting points for the entire

 

French press and numerous politicians here to criticize Minister Bonnet's policy toward Poland and a clarification of his attitude about the alliance with Poland was demanded. An important part of the press charged Bonnet with not having utilized your visit to Southern France for meeting you and establishing direct political contacts. When news about your departure to Berchtesgaden became known, the French press not only continued its former criticism, but levelled it especially at Minister Bonnet. Later it appears he tried to parry these attacks because in conversations with several members of parliament he expressed the opinion that Poland's domestic situation was extremely difficult and that we were menaced by Germany. However my connections and those of my assistants with a great number of deputies, as well as with representatives of the press, meantime improved to such an extent, that we did not find it difficult to counteract this exceedingly naive maneuver.

 

For the rest, the results of your meeting with the Chancellor were so significant that they gave rise to increased criticism of Minister Bonnet. It was understood in France that not only were not direct Polish-German relations deteriorated, but that we were not threatened, even indirectly, either by Chancellor Hitler's so called Ukrainian action or by any coercive measures in Central Europe. This period of disquiet was succeeded by a period of fear of mixing in the question of Eastern and Central Europe, a fear which has been prevalent here since the Munich Conference and which has been increased by direct war dangers. Although the Berchtesgaden meeting led to essential relaxation of the situation in Eastern and Central Europe the menace of German expansive activity can make itself easily felt in Western Europe; and this in connection with the brutal anti-French cam­paign conducted by Italy decreases French hopes that Italy will join the so called imperial policy.

 

The results of the visits of the English ministers at Rome did not diminish this disquietude in the least. Consequently, those who demanded a clarification of relations with Poland and a reasonable policy toward Poland became even more numerous. Extremely important was the fact that the action of Minister Bonnet's critics was not prompted by anxiety about Poland's situation, but by anxiety. about the ever more deteriorating international position of France and by the insight that French disinterest in Eastern and Central Europe questions would make our position regarding Germany more difficult.

 

In this atmosphere of press attacks, chiefly on account of Polish questions and a certain awkward uneasiness on the part of Minister Bonnet, the Chamber of Deputies began the debate on French foreign policy. The sentiments of the press were almost completely reflected by parliament. With a few exceptions-E. Flandin was the most remarkable one-there was hardly a deputy, who during his speech, did not mention relations with Poland or at least did not accuse Minister Bonnet of having shortsightedly let the opportunity pass to meet you. This time it was not only the Russophiles, who in defense of relations with Poland, saw a good approach for cooperation with Moscow, which is close to their heart, but also many definite opponents of the Franco-Soviet pact.

 

Thus it may be objectively stated that the question of relations with Poland has become acute through the deputies of Chamber, and, as seen from our side, in an extremely positive form. It was clear that thanks to this, and I regret to say, prob­ably only thanks to this, the Government cannot pass over this issue in silence. Minister Bonnet, who is particularly sensitive to press and parliamentary attacks, as late as the end of last week apparently did not cease staging small maneuvers of diversion against his attackers, but nevertheless decided to make a statement concerning Franco-Polish relations. I had for example, unheard of difficulties in inducing the Paris press to republish an interview which you granted the North American Newspaper Alliance-the Quai d'Orsay was obviously working against me in this matter.

 

As you know, he (Bonnet) informed me about this in a casual conversation last Friday, the zoth of this month. In his exposition, which he read in the Chamber of Deputies on the 26th of this month, Minister Bonnet mentioned us twice. Pertinent passages of his speech were the following: First, in discussing the Franco­German declaration:

 

"Gentlemen, I need not tell you that we informed the important countries with whom we are connected in friendship, namely Poland, Belgium, England, the USSR and the United States of America of our negotiations with Germany. How did they receive this agreement? Neville Chamberlain declared in the House of Commons that the English Government learned with satisfaction that France has been in a position to conclude an agreement with Germany. In America, edi­torials in the three biggest newspapers of New York and Washington expressed full understanding of the French policy; Poland has informed us that its government is highly satisfied with the happy conclusion of Franco-German declaration."

 

Secondly, in discussing relations with Russia and Poland:

 

"Regarding relations with Soviet Russia and Poland, repeated consultations have taken place with these countries. Thus, during the September crisis I have been in close contact with Minister Litvinofl, whom I have seen repeatedly at Geneva and at Paris, and then again with the Ambassador of the USSR at Paris in order to exchange views of our two governments in accordance with the pact of 1935. France has also been maintaining its traditional friendly relations with Poland.

 

"On the occasion of the Franco-German declaration of December 6th, in accord­ance with the spirit of our agreements I informed the Polish Ambassador of our intentions. The Polish Government has thanked me and has communicated to me that it can only be glad about an action, the aims, the importance, and compass of which it highly appreciates. In the same manner, Mr. Beck, prior to his departure from Monte Carlo informed me about an invitation he received from Chancellor Hitler. I also beg the chamber not to forget that an agreement is in existence between Germany and Poland which was signed in 1934. Mr. Beck attached importance to informing our Ambassador of his conversation.

 

"In this manner, we have always been in contact with the Warsaw Government and every time it appeared opportune we have had such discussions with it as were justified by the particular relations of the two countries and by the development of events. At every opportunity too, very recently the Polish Government has given renewed assurance that French friendship is one of the important fundamentals of Polish policy.

 

"Thus, gentlemen, one ought finally to put an end to the erroneous description that our policy has destroyed the agreements which we concluded in Eastern Europe with the USSR or with Poland. These agreements are still existing and must be applied in the spirit in which they were begun."

 

The above statement of Minister Bonnet was supplemented in the speech of Premier Daladier which preceded the voting in the chamber on the vote of con­fidence. After a brief description of France's relations with its neighbors and with the United States, the Premier said the following:

 

"Is it necessary to add that it is by no means the government's intention to weaken the pacts connecting France with other peoples? Quite the contrary. We are determined to maintain them.

 

In entering into an analysis of the above mentioned statements of the French Premier and Foreign Minister, I must first say that Minister Bonnet's speech from beginning to end bore the character of a defense a