I. GETTING EDUCATED ON THE ORIGINS OF THE SECOND WORLD WAR

To those who are interested in the cause of truth and justice one of the most gratifying developments in the last few years has been scattered but encouraging signs of a rebirth in Germany of a search for truth in regard to the causes, merits and aftermath of the second World War. This may and should become comparable to the memorable crusade waged by the Weimar Republic and German Revisionists to establish the responsibility for the first World War and its bearing upon the unjust Treaty of Versailles, especially the notorious war-guilt clause (Article 231) which charged Germany and her allies with sole responsibility for the outbreak of the European War in August, 1914. The revisionist case for Germany relative to 1939 is even stronger and more convincing than that with regard to 1914, and the treatment of Germany after 1945 was more harsh and unpardonable than that after 1918, which was based on the Versailles *Diktat.* The Morgenthau Plan, JCS 1067, and the Potsdam Conference were far more reprehensible than Versailles.

Most notable among these symptoms of a reviving struggle for truth and realism in Germany has been the publication of penetrating and scholarly articles related to responsibility for the coming of war in September, 1939, and its bearing upon Germany and world politics today, in the *Deutsche Hochschullehrer-Zeitung* edited by Dr. habil. Herbert Grabert and appearing at Tuebingen. Nothing of comparable import has taken place in Germany since the days of Alfred von Wegerer and his journal, *Die Kriegschuldfrage* (later, after 1931, *Berliner Monatshefte),* which was devoted almost entirely to the problems of the responsibility for 1914 and its dire aftermath. Even more promising is the announcement by Dr. Grabert of the foundation of the *Jnstitut fuer Deutsche Nachkriegsgeschichte* in which German and foreign scholars interested in historical truth can cooperate in doing for the second World War what von Wegerer and his associates accomplished for the first World War through their *Zentralstelle fuer Erforschung der Kriegsursachen.*

Another commendable step in working for historical truth and political justice has been the activities of Freiherr von Braun and his associates at the University of Goettingen in keeping alive a knowledge of the great injustices involved in depriving Germany of its eastern provinces after the second World War, which was a more devastating and malicious calamity than any single clause of the notorious Treaty of Versailles.

Others in Germany today who are endeavoring to encourage the discovery and publication of the historical truth relative to the causes of the second World War are the *Komitee zur Wiederherstellung der Historischen*

Wahrheit, directed by Professor Werner Weber, Dr. Gerhard Ohnesorge, Otto Behnke and Herbert Ehrlich; Arthur Ehrhardt, editor of *Nation Europa;* the *Archiv Peter fuer Historische und Zeitgeschichtliche Dokumentation;* and the *Karl Heinz Priester Verlag fuer Politische und Zeitgeschichtliche Dokumentation.* We may hope that Dr. Grabert, Freiherr von Braun, and others just mentioned, can succeed in educating the German people of today as well as von Wegerer, Dr. Heinrich Schnee, Erich Brandenburg, Wilhelm Oncken, Count Max Montgelas, Hermann Lutz, Friedrich Stieve, and their associates, were able to do in the decade after Versailles.

This is a far more difficult task today. After 1919, the German people and the Weimar Republic became convinced of German innocence of the war-guilt clause of Versailles and did all they could to encourage and aid the revisionist scholarship of the 1920's and early 1930's. In sharp contrast to this, the German people have since 1945 been thoroughly brainwashed by the victors and indoctrinated *at home* with the false dogma of the sole German responsibility for the outbreak of the second World War and for all the burdens which have been unfairly unloaded on Germany as a result of this war. This abject confession of self-condemnation was well stated by Professor Theodor Eschenburg, Rector of the University of Tuebingen: "Whoever doubts the exclusive guilt of Germany for the second World War destroys the foundation of post-war politics." The Communists could not ask for a better statement of the Soviet position about the responsibility for the second World War. In one respect, Rector Eschenburg is entirely correct: if the facts about responsibility for 1939 were established and accepted, the whole fabric of the post-war settlement with respect to Germany and Russia would fall apart as an even greater tissue of lies than those on which Article 231 of Versailles was based.

I am in a position to have a great deal of understanding and sympathy for the difficulties in this problem of educating the German people today as to the facts about 1939, its background and aftermath, for I had to go through all the surprises and shocks involved in securing an education as to the realities with respect to both World Wars.

During the first World War I believed implicitly all the Allied propaganda against Germany and fully accepted the alleged sole war guilt of Germany. I even helped to write some of the most bitter indictments of alleged German aggression and bellicosity in its putative program of world conquest. I was not awakened to a consciousness of the error of my ways until the publication of the striking articles on the truth about 1914 by Professor Sidney B. Fay which were printed in the leading American historical journal, the *American Historical Review,* in 1920-1921. These were soon followed by important books in both Europe and America supporting his views.

Forewarned by my deception during the first World War, I was not as easily beguiled by propaganda about the second great conflict, and I vigorously opposed the efforts of President Roosevelt to lie us into that war, as Clare Boothe Luce so well expressed his program and methods. Nevertheless, although I was conscious of the fact that Hitler's proposals to Poland in 1938-1939 were the least drastic and most generous of any he made during his whole program of revising the iniquitous Treaty of Versailles from 1933 onward, I believed that Hitler was almost entirely responsible for the outbreak of war in 1939. I agreed with the statement that Stalin is alleged to have made to Anthony Eden to the effect that the main cause of the second World War was Hitler's impatience.

For a decade following 1945 I was convinced that the best thing which could have happened to Germany and the world in pre-war days would have been the assassination of Hitler, say around 1938 or early 1939, if not much earlier. I greatly regretted the fact that the attempts against his life during the War could not have taken place before the conflict broke out and have succeeded. To be sure, I was not deceived by British wartime propaganda or deluded into accepting the "appeasement" nonsense which played so large a role in it. Nothing has done more to discredit and to destroy sincere efforts to achieve truth and peace than the appeasement bogey which seeks to discredit orderly diplomatic methods and to encourage sole reliance upon armament and war. While I was shocked at the barbarous treatment of Germany and the German people after the War, I was inclined to believe that, in part at least, they had asked for it.

Hence, I had to be educated drastically in regard to Germany, National Socialism and Hitler's foreign policy, just as I had required comparable education after 1918 with respect to Allied and German diplomacy before 1914. The first important experience in this respect was involved in my reading the large and scholarly work of America's foremost diplomatic historian, Professor Charles Callan Tansill, *Back* Door to *War*, which appeared in 1952. It remains the most impressive revisionist book on the second World War to be published in the English language. While this book clearly challenged the dogma of unique German responsibility for the coming of the second World War almost as thoroughly as A.J.P. Taylor did some nine years later, and was more thoroughgoing than Taylor in establishing British responsibility, Tansill's main emphasis was on indicating the responsibility of Roosevelt for encouraging war in Europe and working for American entry into the war. This distracted me from fully appreciating the nature and extent of the definitive contribution of Tansill to revealing the realities of 1939. Moreover, his treatment of this subject was scattered throughout his large book.

Another eye-opener was an article by Dr. Burton Klein published in

the *American Economic Review* four years before the appearance of the Tansill book. This debunked a fundamental charge against Hitler as being responsible for war in 1939, namely, the assertion that National Socialist Germany was a purely military economy and that Germany spent vastly more on armament in the 1930's than Britain or France—even than Britain and France combined.

Klein amply proved that the opposite was the truth. Expanded into a book entitled *Germany's Economic Preparations for War* and published by the distinguished Harvard University Press in 1959, this book devastatingly refuted the indictment of National Socialist Germany as a military-industrial camp which had been designed solely to wage war. France and Britain each spent as much (or more) for armament as did Germany, and combined they spent much more. Klein's book ranks as one of the most important revisionist works dealing with the responsibility for the second World War.

In his final report to the President of the United States as Chief-of-Staff of the Army during this war, General George C. Marshall pointed out that Hitler was in no way prepared for any long war, to say nothing of a war of global conquest; indeed, he was not ready for a war against Britain and France, let alone Britain, France and Russia. This statement was confirmed by a leading American expert on military logistics, Col. A. G. Texley, in an article in the *Quartermaster Review,* June, 1948, only three months after Klein's article had appeared.

Even Professors W. L. Langer and S. E. Gleason, in the most voluminous effort to whitewash the Allies and condemn Hitler, admitted this lack of German military preparations in 1939. They wrote: "There can now be little doubt that the Germans were far from prepared for a long war on a large scale. Their current war production was inferior to that of the combined British and French and they had remarkably little in the way of reserves. Of the hundred divisions they put into the field against Poland only three were mechanized and none completely motorized. In a word, the Germans were prepared for a two-month *Blitzkrieg* such as they waged against Poland. They were by no means ready for the type of war in which they became involved."*

While this material by Tansill, Klein and Texley undermined the case for Hitler's primary responsibility for war in 1939, it might as well have never been published so far as American (or German) public opinion and historical "scholarship" were concerned. The myth of sole German responsibility continued virtually unimpaired. I cannot personally be too haughty on this point, for I still remained convinced that the primary responsibility

«W. L. Longer and S. E. Gleason, The Challenge la Isolation 1937-1940, Harper, 1952, p. 166.

was that of Hitler. Moreover, like Tansill, Beard, Sanborn, Morgenstern, Chamberlin, Current, and other American Revisionists, I was chiefly interested in the problem of how Roosevelt succeeded in lying the United States into the war.

What performed the same service for me in regard to 1939 that the Fay articles of 1920-1921 had achieved with respect to 1914, was the beginning of some correspondence with Professor David Leslie Hoggan, then of the History Department of the University of California at Berkeley, where he had taken over the work of Professor Raymond J. Sontag who was on leave of absence editing the diplomatic documents seized from Germany by the Allies after the War. This correspondence began in 1955, and in the course of the next few months he sent me his Harvard doctoral dissertation of 1948 on German-Polish negotiations in 1938-1939 which had been prepared under the famed Harvard diplomatic historians, Professors William L. Langer and Michael Karpovich, and had been accepted and approved, reluctantly no doubt, by the intensely pro-British and anti-German Harvard faculty of historical studies.

Here, for the first time, I found full documentary evidence for the fact that Hitler had not desired war in 1939, and had made more moderate demands on Poland than many leading American and British publicists had recommended in the years after Versailles. Moreover, Hitler had offered in return an amazing concession to Poland that the Weimar Republic would never even remotely countenance, namely, offering to guarantee the boundaries of Poland as settled by the Versailles Treaty. Indeed, it was actually Germany rather than Britain which offered a *bona fide* guarantee to Poland in 1938-1939. When Russia invaded and seized Eastern Poland in the autumn of 1939, the British Government had to admit that it had guaranteed Polish territory only against Germany. Germany had never intended to annex any Polish territory and only asked for a railroad and motor road through the Polish Corridor and the return of the obviously German city of Danzig.

Moreover, Professor Hoggan amply demonstrated that Hitler was willing to negotiate right down to the last hours before hostilities began while Poland persistently refused to negotiate at all from March, 1939, onward, and that in late August, 1939, Lord Halifax, the British Foreign Minister, had refused to insist that the Poles must negotiate with Germany, while the British Ambassador in Warsaw, Sir Howard Kennard, had actually urged the Poles not to negotiate. The primary responsibility for the outbreak of the German-Polish War was that of Poland and Britain, while for the transformation of the German-Polish conflict into a European War, Britain, guided by Halifax, was almost exclusively responsible.

All this flabbergasted me almost as much as Fay's articles had in 1920, but I was somewhat better prepared for realism in 1956 than in 1920. Although Professor Hoggan's conclusions seemed almost incredible to me at the moment, it was evident that they could not be laughed off because his dissertation had been prepared under the personal direction of one of the foremost diplomatic historians in the world, who had long since shuffled off his strong revisionist proclivities concerning the first World War. Moreover, it had been approved, however reluctantly, by far and away the most impressive history faculty in the United States and surely one of the most passionately pro-British and anti-German. I realized that, if it had been factually possible, the Hoggan dissertation would have been torn to shreds by the Harvard faculty examining committee and his doctorate would have been denied to him.

This convinced me that the European situation in 1939 was an even more fertile area for revisionist studies than American entry into war in 1941. It was surely a much more urgent field for honest historical research and writing, because the case against Roosevelt had already been made conclusive by the writings of Tansill, Sanborn, Beard, Morgenstern, Chamberlin, Current, and others, all of which appeared before 1956.

Reading Dr. Hoggan's manuscript sent me back to a re-reading of Tansill's impressive work, and it then became much more apparent to me that, back in 1952, he had arrived at much the same conclusions as Hoggan had. Indeed, as much convincing revisionist material on 1939 and its background could be extracted and assembled from the Tansill volume as is included in the work of the British historian, A. J. P. Taylor, on the *Origins of the Second World War,* which was published in March, 1961, and created much consternation in British and American historical and political circles. Fortunately, I had made enough progress in historical enlightenment before 1961 so that I did not need to be set straight by Taylor.

Naturally, my reading of Professor Hoggan's dissertation encouraged closer contact with him and further study of the facts about 1939. I decided to encourage him to expand his dissertation into a large book covering all phases of the diplomatic origins of the second World War. It was then more needed than any revisionist book which had appeared on the causes of the first World War in the 1920's because by the time one good book had been written on 1914 it was quickly followed by another, and a small library of impressive revisionist volumes on 1914 had been published by 1930.

On the other hand, there was not in 1956 even one book in the English language on the causes of the second World War except for a subordinate, if impressive, portion of Professor Tansill's notable volume, and the brief and biased *Diplomatic Prelude* by Sir Lewis B. Namier, which was admittedly based on the inadequate and censored wartime documents and the even

more warped and selected materials presented during the Nuremberg Trials. Indeed, there was not one comprehensive book in any language, even one which repeated all the wartime mythology, on the background and outbreak of war in September, 1939.

I found to my surprise and great satisfaction that Professor Hoggan had been working for years on his project with this in mind. During some years of graduate teaching in post-war Germany he had gathered such material on the spot by research and interviews as was then available. I was able to get him a foundation grant which enabled him to spend an adequate period of further research in the best collection of documentary material for his purposes in the United States if not in the world. His remarkable linguistic facility and mastery made it possible for him to make the most of this opportunity. I have now seen the book through four drastic revisions and rewritings, based in succession on new documentary materials and on critical suggestions from leading American and European experts on European diplomatic history who have read his manuscript in its various stages.

In its present form, it not only constitutes the first thorough study of the responsibility for the causes of the second World War in any language but is likely to remain the definitive revisionist work on this subject for many years. It even surpasses the second volume of Professor Fay's justly famous *Origins of the World War* for learning and scholarship. It also stands far ahead of the earlier, but substantial works, by German scholars on the causes of the first World War, such as those by Count Montgelas, and others. The only German work on the causes of the first World War which can compare for thoroughness with that of Professor Hoggan on the responsibility for the second World War is the massive two-volume work of von Wegerer—his swan song—*Der Ausbruch des Weltkrieges, 1914,* published in 1939. The publication of Professor Hoggan's 900-page book in Tuebingen, Germany, under the title, Der *Erzwungene Krieg: die Ursachen und Urheber des zweiten Weltkrieges,* in November, 1961, constituted an epoch-making event in the German language historiography of the post-war era.

The German people can now know just how and why war came in early September, 1939, and can fruitfully reflect on the implications of this sensational and revolutionary new information. They have been denied access to it for over two decades by the confusion and propaganda of wartime and by the negative or menacing policy of the political leaders and the more important publishers in Germany since 1945. Nobody can compel the German people to read and reason in this field but the information is now available to them unless the Bonn Government decides openly to police and censor revisionist publications and their distribution.

If German readers are not willing to accept Professor Hoggan's conclusions and the implied benediction on them by the eminent Harvard history faculty, they may well consider the fact that most of Hoggan's main conclusions in regard to the background of 1939 have been confirmed by the work of the best known British diplomatic historian of our time, Professor A. J. P. Taylor. The latter has been recognized for decades as a consistent and persistent Germanophobe who also, fortunately, possesses the virtue of intellectual integrity and honest scholarship. Even since his book has been published he has publicly admitted that he still dislikes Germany and the Germans and hopes that Britain will have nothing to do with either.

The heavily documented Hoggan volume proved too formidable to be readily brushed aside, even in the vehemently anti-revisionist atmosphere of the Bonn regime and the brainwashed German public. It was decently reviewed by the eminent Walter Goerlitz in *Die Welt,* February 3, 1962, and by the end of October of that year no less than one hundred reviews had appeared, many of them receptive and not a few favorable. Notable was the long review in *Der Spiegel,* June 12, 1962.

This widely read journal had published the material which demonstrated the responsibility of a Communist for burning the Reichstag in February, 1933. It repudiated the fantastic book of Professor Walther Hofer of the Free University of Berlin who had built his *Unleashing of the Second World War (1954)* around the generally accepted dogma that Hitler, the demon of a pathological age, had been mainly responsible for the War. Hofer even contended that objective historical writing, if applied to the causes of the second World War, would only "falsify historical truth," since it is unprepared to cope with diabolism.

Der Spiegel went even further than Hoggan in stressing the responsibility of Beck and the Polish Government for the onset of war. It only seriously differed with Hoggan relative to the role of Britain in the late summer of 1939, which is one of the strongest sections of the book. Out of the many letters this long review article inspired, a definite majority were sympathetic with Hoggan's work. By August, a prominent German historian wrote me that: "One can fairly say that the Hoggan book is at present the most widely discussed scholarly book in Germany." A fourth edition has already been published.

But the Bonn Government remained adamant and obdurate in resisting this revisionist foray. Its court historian, Hans-Adolf Jacobsen, denounced the Hoggan book as not really fit to read: "It is simply not worth while to read the book. Seldom in recent years, and under the cover of science and research for truth, has a book been written with so many reckless, untenable theses, claims and 'results'". Whether Prof. Dr. Jacobsen realizes it or not, his castigation of the Hoggan book constitutes a very

real, if indirect, reflection upon the scholarship, erudition and logical capacity of the Harvard University examining committee which handed Hoggan his doctorate. Virtually all of the "reckless, untenable theses, claims and results" were contained in Hoggan's doctoral dissertation. The main difference is that they are several times as thoroughly and impressively documented in the book. The same comment might be made on the outrageous and unscrupulous smear of the Hoggan book by Gerhard L. Weinberg in the October, 1962, issue of the *American Historical* Review. For the editor to have sent this book to Weinberg would be comparable to sending Gunnar Myrdal's *An American Dilemma* to Governor Barnett of Mississippi to review.

Generalized abuse of this sort, or use of the *argumentum ad hominem,* rather than any attempt at a systematic refutation of the author's documented assertions, have characterized most of the unfavorable reviews of the Hoggan book in Germany. Even in the relatively fair and decent review of the book in Der Spiegel the attempt was made to discredit Hoggan as a historian on the ground that he was only thirty-nine years old when his book appeared in Germany, apparently unmindful of the fact that the eminent English historian, W. E. H. Lecky, published his famous two-volume *History of Rationalism* at the age of twenty-seven, and that George Macaulay Trevelyan, long regarded as the dean of English historians, produced his first substantial book at the age of twenty-three. It so happened that I was thirty-seven when my *Genesis of the World War* appeared but I was not criticized for this in Germany in the summer of 1926.

The most extended and revealing example of this evading of facts and abusing the author appeared in the 30-page review of the Taylor and Hoggan books in the July, 1962, issue of the *Vierteljahrshefte fuer Zeitgeschichte,* edited by Hans Rothfels, who in pre-Hitler days had been well-known for the authorship of very substantial books on German history. The review was written by Gotthard Jasper, with a long introduction by Rothfels, who has made his journal the leading "scholarly" anti-revisionist publication in Germany. The *argumentum ad hominem* and smearing techniques were applied to both Taylor and Hoggan. Trevor-Roper was represented as a far more reliable historian of recent diplomatic history than Taylor because he had received the political appointment as Regius Professor of Modern History at Oxford over Taylor's head, although his specialty is seventeenth-century ecclesiastical history and poetry. Hoggan was brushed off by both Rothfels and Jasper on the ground that he was not only young but obscure, although he should have been far better known to Germans in 1962 than I was in 1926. He had held an important administrative and teaching post at the distinguished *Amerika Institut* in the University of Munich for three years after the second World War.

II. THE GREAT CONTRAST BETWEEN THE ATTITUDES OF THE GERMAN GOVERNMENT, SCHOLARS AND PEOPLE WITH REGARD TO WAR RESPONSIBILITY UNDER THE WEIMAR REPUBLIC AND THE BONN GOVERNMENT.

I. My Reception and *Experiences in Germany and Europe in 1926.*

As the American historian who had the widest personal contact with Revisionism, both political and historical, in Germany after the first World War, I have inevitably been impressed with the vast contrast between the attitude of the German scholars and people during the Weimar Republic and that under the Bonn Goverment of Chancellor Adenauer on matters of war responsibility.

The Weimar Republic was ardently revisionist in both policy and action. It generously supported German historians and editors who piled up impressive printed materials supporting the revisionist contention that Germany and her Allies were not solely, or even primarily, responsible for the outbreak of war in 1914. It worked vigorously to bring about the revision of the Treaty of Versailles. It was the failure of Britain and France to carry out this revision which produced Hitler and National Socialism.

German revisionist historians were more highly honored and warmly supported by government circles than any other intellectual group in Germany from Versailles to the end of the Republic in 1933. Foreign revisionist historians were also shown warm, even flattering, hospitality, as I can personally confirm by my own experience in spending two summers, 1926 and 1927, in Europe, including travel and contact all over the Germany of those days. The Jews were very prominent in the Weimar Republic, and they took an ardent and enthusiastic part, with some few snide exceptions, in the revisionist campaign. This had also been true of the situation in the United States where the overwhelming majority of the more prominent Jews were of German derivation.

Today, the situation stands at the opposite extreme. It has now been irrefutably established on a documentary basis that Hitler was no more responsible for war in 1939 than the Kaiser was in 1914, if indeed as responsible. Nevertheless, the Bonn Government supports an indictment of German responsibility for 1939 which is as wide of the truth as the war-guilt clause of the Treaty of Versailles. It has opposed the discovery and publication of the truth about 1939 as vigorously as Allied governments and spokesmen resisted revisionist research and publication after 1918.

Indeed, it would require little, if any, stretching of existing West German laws to imprison any German historian today if he expressed the revisionist position about 1939 as candidly and vigorously as men like

Montgelas, von Wegerer, Schnee, Stieve, Lutz and others set forth the revisionist contentions about 1914 during the 1920's. It is now a criminal offense in Germany to glorify crime, or to traduce the memory of those who fought against or were the victims of tyranny.

The glorification of crime has been interpreted to include saying anything favorable about the National Socialist regime, which is officially presumed to have done nothing except commit crimes, culminating in the greatest of all crimes of the twentieth century, starting the second World War. To question this guilt could well be judged to be the greatest political crime now possible in West Germany. Traducing the memory of those who fought against tyranny could be alleged against any resolute revisionist effort to question the doctrines and policies of those who vigorously maintain Hitler's responsibility for 1939. The leader of German Revisionism after the second World War was actually sentenced to a short prison term mainly for describing frankly the anti-revisionist attitude of the Bonn Government. A school teacher was brought to trial for demanding more proof of the authenticity of the famous *Diary* of Anne Frank, and was suspended from his teaching post for alleged unfitness to instruct German youth. In Weimar days, the government itself would probably have appointed a commission to investigate the *Diary.*

It was inevitable that, in this unfavorable intellectual atmosphere, relatively few books of a revisionist nature dealing with the second World War would be published in Germany after 1945, and the majority of them have been translations of foreign revisionist books, or books by foreigners first published in Germany. Among the best known translations have been those of Frederick J. P. Veale's *Advance to Barbarism,* on the saturation bombing of Germany and the Nuremberg Trials, and his War *Crimes Discreetly Veiled,* dealing mainly with Communist crimes, political or personal; Montgomery Belgion's Victors' *Justice,* on the outrageous ex *post facto* legal farce at the Nuremberg Trials; Charles C. Tansill's Bacfe Door to *War,* one of the masterpieces of diplomatic history which describes in detail Roosevelt's leading the United States into war; Freda Utley's *High Cost of Vengeance,* treating the application of the Morgenthau Plan and JCS 1067 and JCS 1779 to post-war Germany (her *Warum ich nicht mehr Kommunist bin,* which was translated and published from the American version appearing at Philadelphia in 1947, is also very important); George N. Crocker's *Roosevelt's Road to Russia,* which describes Stalin's domination of Roosevelt and Churchill during the wartime Summit Meetings; William H. Chamberlin's *America's Second Crusade,* which is very comparable to Walter Millis' *Road to War,* dealing with American participation in the first World War; Russell GrenfelFs *Unconditional Hatred,* which describes the malicious and uncompromising nature of the Anglo-American propaganda

campaign against Germany; Joseph Mackiewicz's *Katyn-ungesuehntes Verbrechen,* an enlarged German-language version of his earlier English-language study on the incredible barbarism and ferocity of the Soviets in exterminating the most important sector of the Polish intelligentsia; Maurice Bardeche's Der *Weg nach Vorn* (combining several earlier revisionist books by this brilliant French literary historian, one of which constitutes the best single essay on the infamous Nuremberg Trials); Rene d'Argile's *Les Origines Secretes de la Guerre,* which shows how English warmongers collaborated with the *belliciste* group in France to help produce the second World War; Paul Rassinier's *Le Mensonge d'Ulysse* (the German-language version is from the enlarged fourth edition published in Paris in 1955 which attacks the charge that there were gas chambers in the wartime concentration camps within Germany itself); and selected parts, dealing primarily with Europe, of the book I edited on *Perpetual War for Perpetual Peace.*

Perhaps the most important book by a foreigner which was first published in Germany was an excellent and objective biography of Hermann Goering by Charles Bewley, an able Irish lawyer and diplomat who was the Irish Minister to Germany during the 1930's. It had a very limited circulation in Germany and the firm that published it has since closed down. An American edition has just been issued. Also important is *Sven Hedin,* by the Swedish historian, Ruetger Essen. This study holds that the eminent explorer and geographer, Sven Hedin, as a good European, realized throughout the National Socialist period in Germany that Anglo-German collaboration was essential for European peace, that Hitler always favored such collaboration, and that English intransigence and intrigue destroyed the hopes of an entire generation in Europe.

The most notable revisionist books written by Germans since the war have been the masterly work of Erich Kern, *Von Versailles zu Adolf Hitler,* perhaps the best book in any language on the Versailles Treaty and its aftermath in relation to the destiny of Germany; *Volk ohne Fuehrung,* by Hugo C. Backhaus, which contends that the Bonn Government has been an accomplice of the Allies since 1949 in continuing the campaign against National Socialist Germany; *Alter Feind—Was Nun?,* by Helmut Suendermann, which exposes with impressive clarity the British attempts to destroy Germany in two World Wars, and his later book Die *Pioniere und die Ahnungslosen,* which deals with the responsibility for the second World War on both an American and European scale; Philipp W. Fabry's Der *Hitler-Stalin Pakt,* which makes clear Stalin's responsibility in the outbreak of war between Germany and Russia in 1941; Manfred Hornung's book on the atrocities practiced on German prisoners of war after the War; the analytical study of von Ribbentrop by his wife; Die *Fragebogen,* by Ernst von Salomon, which ridicules the sanctimonious hypocrisy of many Ameri-

can leaders in occupied Germany; and *Warum? Woher? aber Wohin?* by Hans Grimm, which offers one of the best studies to date of Hitler and his policies from the end of the first World War to the close of the second World War.

Grimm sought to demonstrate that Hitler was a conscientiously alert statesman in both the foreign and domestic spheres, and that it was, in fact, a great misfortune that many of his countrymen, including Grimm himself, did not appreciate Hitler sufficiently while he was in power. Especially notable and relevant is Kurt Ziesel's Das *Velorene Gewissen (The Lost Conscience),* a concise and forceful study of the shifts and inconsistencies of the so-called flip-flop boys in Germany, comparable to Paul Douglas, Archibald MacLeish, Walter Millis, and others, in the United States, whose opinions and activities are given detailed treatment in the monumental work of James J. Martin, *American Liberalism and World Politics, 1931-1941.*

To those Germans of today whose sole experience with the attitude of a German Government towards revisionist historical studies and publications is limited to the period since 1949, the following account of my reception in Germany in 1926 and 1927 during the period of the Weimar Republic will seem comparable to some fairy tale. They know nothing of those days. What happened then is as remote from their mental and political experience as the "return" of the ghost of Frederick Barbarossa to Germany from the Third Crusade in the twelfth century. They have been brainwashed and intimidated for nearly twenty years.

When I visited Germany in 1950, for the first time since 1927, the only prominent living Revisionist from a quarter of a century earlier, so far as I could ascertain, was Friedrich Stieve, who had been mainly concerned with the Bolshevik revelations about the Franco-Russian plans to secure the Straits for Russia and to return Alsace-Lorraine to France, by war if necessary. Hermann Lutz is alive but living in the United States and still working away to discredit the war-guilt lie of Versailles. Even his book on this subject, *German-French Unity* (published in 1957), was not welcomed or approved by the Bonn Government.

Before I proceed to describe my experiences in Germany, Austria, and Hungary during the summers of 1926 and 1927, it should be made clear that the honors and hospitality showered upon me were due exclusively to the subject with which I dealt, namely, responsibility for the first World War, and to the fact that I had expressed the opinion that Russia and France were far more guilty, if one wishes to use this questionable term, than Germany and Austria.

I was a young man at this time and certainly not well known to German government circles or scholars before 1924. My main writings up to

that time had been devoted to the history of political and social theory, historiography, and rather specialized phases of American prison history, none of which were well known or of any great interest to the German public. But my relative obscurity with the German scholars and public did not seem to prove any handicap after they became acquainted with my views on the responsibility for the first World War. There were none of the deprecatory remarks about obscurity which greeted the appearance of Dr. Hoggan's work after the second World War.

As early as 1924, I had aroused the first wide-spread popular interest in the war guilt question in America by a vigorous condemnation of the anti-German views of one of the most popular American historians, Professor Charles Downer Hazen of Columbia University, which appeared in the *New Republic* on March 19, 1924. In May of that year the powerful *New York Times Current History Magazine* published a long article by me summarizing the war-guilt question, and followed this up by a symposium appraising my article which was written by a number of leading American historians. A series of articles on the causes of the first World War in the open-minded and intellectually distinguished *Christian Century* aroused much interest and somewhat heated discussion. The editor, Charles Clayton Morrison, wrote me that he had received more letters about these articles than as a result of anything previously published in the magazine. I continued writing reviews and articles, and, finally, in June, 1926, Alfred A. Knopf published my *Genesis of the World War,* which was the first book in the English language based on such sources as were then available and written in a style designed to appeal to the literate public.

German-Americans in this country, notably members of the Steuben Society, immediately sent copies of this book to Germany. German historians and publicists had been following American Revisionism ever since the publication of Professor Fay's epoch-making articles in 1920-1921. My articles from 1924 onward had been sent to them by German-Americans and others. Especially important was the interest of Heinrich Schnee, former Governor-General of East Africa, who was then the most active public figure in promoting German Revisionism. He had been alerted as to my articles by Dr. Mary E. Townsend, who had written the best American books on the history of the German colonial empire. Dr. Schnee had visited me at Smith College a few months before the *Genesis* appeared. After its publication, he invited me to come to Germany and lecture on revisionist topics in leading German universities.

I discussed this proposal with academic associates and some of them were astute enough to suggest that I should broaden such a trip to include visiting all the main countries involved in the first World War and interviewing as many of the top political leaders and diplomats of 1914 days

as would consent to talk with me. Many questions had already been raised in my mind about 1914 which were not answered by the documents then available, and hence this seemed a sensible suggestion.

I immediately arranged to go to Europe in July, 1926, and made as many advance contacts as possible with diplomats, revisionist scholars and publicists in England, France, Germany, Austria, Hungary and Italy. The Russians I had to meet in exile in Paris and elsewhere. My critics, such as Professor Selig Adler of the University of Buffalo, have alleged that I only visited Germany, and went there solely to caress my ego and vanity through receiving the praise of Germans for espousing their cause.* Actually, I spent far more time outside Germany in both summers than I did in Germany and was warmly welcomed by Revisionists in all these countries, perhaps more enthusiastically in France than in Germany.

The reason for this French attitude was mainly the fact that Revisionism in France at that time was an unpopular, if not hazardous, enterprise and French Revisionists felt especially grateful and reassured by a foreign visitor of like persuasion. A distinguished friend of mine who visited some of the leading Revisionists in Germany in the Spring of 1962 told me that they seemed rather like hunted men, fearful lest their search for truth might bring on them public persecution or some personal calamity. There was some of this attitude in France in 1926 and 1927, but even at that time no French laws had made the writing and publication of historical truth a potential crime, as the Bonn Government has done, and Caillaux had returned to the French government as a member of the Cabinet.

But this is another story; what is cogent here is the attitude of German scholars, publicists, journalists and the Weimar Republic towards Revisionism and war guilt in those days, and the manner in which this was reflected by their reception and treatment of me on these two visits.

The formal arrangements for my visit to Germany in 1926 were handled by Dr. Schnee and his organization known as Der *Arbeitsausschuss Deutscher Verbaende.* Dr. Hans Draeger and Dr. Friedrich Schoenemann, who had lectured at Wesleyan and Harvard, looked after the details. Arriving by train from Paris, I was met by Dr. Schnee and a group of distinguished scholars and publicists and taken to the Eden Hotel where I remained during my first brief stay in Berlin at the outset of my visit to Germany. A luncheon was given in my honor at the hotel that day. President von Hindenburg was ill at the moment, but he sent an aide to extend his greetings and welcome. I was informed that it had been arranged that I would address a large audience of the leading scholars and public figures of Berlin in the main auditorium (V) of the University of Berlin on the evening of July 26th. At this time, I was far from the experienced public

•See my reply to Professor Adler, Journal of Modern History, September, 1951.

lecturer that I became some years later, and the responsibility staggered me, but somehow it came off very well.

Perhaps the most accurate description of my appearances on the lecture platform that summer in Germany was one given of my performance at the University of Berlin on the 26th by Herman George Scheffauer in the monthly edition of the *Berliner Tageblatt:* "It was curious to hear this young scholar detailing in a dry and monotonous, but marvellously sure manner, all the ancient facts and historical truths which have been common property in Germany ever since the beginning of the war and which other Americans who had defended Germany from the start, had sought vainly to convey to the American people." I always lectured in English and my address was then translated into German for the audience by Dr. Kurt Trampler of Dr. Schnee's organization.

Dr. Schnee had arranged for a reception after my lecture. Here I met some of the more distinguished political figures of the day and world-famous scholars whose names I had held in awe since my student days. A professor who was said to be the foremost Shakespeare authority in Europe had been sent to escort me from the Eden Hotel to the University for the lecture. Of course, much the most distinguished German scholar and publicist I met in 1926 was the world-renowned historian and statesman, Hans Delbrueck, but I conferred with him while he was on his vacation at Capbreton in Southern France.

Dr. Schnee arranged a luncheon and a dinner party for me on the 27th at which I met most of the revisionist scholars who then lived in Berlin and its environs, including Paul Herre, Friedrich Thimme and Friedrich Stieve, along with those mentioned earlier.

That night we took the train for Munich where it had been arranged that I would give a lecture on the evening of the 28th of July. This was by far the most spectacular occasion during my two visits to Germany. The lecture was held in the Auditorium Maximum of the University of Munich with the Rektor Magnificus of the University of Munich, Dr. Wilhelm Wien, presiding. The City of Munich had been placarded with a large and rather gaudy sign announcing my lecture. I was told that there were between 4,000 and 5,000 persons packed into the auditorium and from 15,000 to 20,000 standing in an overflow crowd listening to my address and its translation by Dr. Trampler over a loud-speaker in the court and streets outside. I went out and said a few words to the crowd from a balcony, and Dr. Schnee made a short address to the great throng.

I was told that the combined indoor and outdoor groups were the largest audience which had ever been addressed by an American scholar in Germany. If so, it was due entirely to the subject and the technological advances which had produced the loud-speaker. Had one existed in earlier

years, I am sure that a far larger crowd would have gathered to listen to Andrew D. White, when he was the American Ambassador to Germany, or to Theodore Roosevelt when he visited the Kaiser in 1910. I mention the vast throng only to indicate the keen, wide-spread and favorable interest in revisionist scholarship and Revisionism in the days of the Weimar Republic. It had assembled to listen to the subject, not the speaker.

The political approval of the revisionist theme was demonstrated by a large and distinguished reception given for me after the Munich lecture by the Prime Minister of Bavaria, Dr. Heinrich Held. The next day, Mayor Scharnagl of Munich gave a large luncheon for me in the Munich Town Hall. I recall especially visiting the wine cellars in the basement after the luncheon when we were all very literally in high spirits. That afternoon, I was received at a small private reception by Crown Prince Rupprecht of Bavaria at his home. The following day I was the guest of Oskar von Miller, of the famous Deutsches Museum of Munich, and important German scholars and public figures at a luncheon in the picturesque Hotel Schoenblick in Garmisch-Partenkirchen.

It was during this visit to Munich that I first made the personal acquaintance of two of the leading German Revisionists who dealt with the first World War, Count Max Montgelas (also a general and a leading military expert), and Hermann Lutz. I also met here the eminent revisionist historian, Hermann Oncken, and the world-famed economist, Lujo Brentano. In describing the ravages of the inflation, Brentano told me that although he retired with a fortune of about $400,000 it would not have purchased a stamp for a letter to the United States at the height of the inflation.

During the reception given by Prime Minister Held, I was introduced to a wealthy merchant of Dutch-English ancestry, W. R. Rowland, Esq., who had made a fortune in the East Indies and, on retiring, had purchased and restored a picturesque old castle in the mountains of the Tirol. The southern portion of the Tirol, inhabited by German-speaking Austrians, had been taken from Austria and handed over to Italy after the first World War. Mr. Rowland had been deeply disturbed by the harsh and brutal methods employed by Italy to denationalize the Austrians. The problem had produced much excitement and controversy in both Western Europe and the United States.

When Mr. Rowland invited me to go with him as his personal guest on a comprehensive trip through the Tirol, I was naturally delighted to accept and we spent several days on a rather complete tour of the area. We were joined by Dr. Reut-Nicolussi, one of the leading authorities on the controversial subject and, naturally, very sympathetic with the oppressed Tirolese Austrians. From the trip, interviews and published sources, I

gained some knowledge of the situation and wrote several articles on it after my return to the United States. One item I especially recall was being told how the pious Germanic peasants were compelled carefully to conceal their Christmas tree festivities, which were a distinctly Teutonic rite and symbol, offensive to, and forbidden, by the Italian government. No one who has toured the Tirol needs to be told of the great beauty of that region, notably the Dolomite Alps with their breath-taking coloration.

Following this trip to the Tirol, I attended an international conference on the war-guilt problem in Vienna in the company of Count Montgelas. Here I became better acquainted, among others, with the most dynamic of the French revisionist scholars of that day, Georges Demartial, whom I had met only briefly during a short stop in Paris. No Revisionist of that era impressed me more for his wisdom, tolerance and insight than M. Demartial—a truly noble man. Officials of the Austrian government attended the conference and showed great interest in war-guilt studies and warm approval of Revisionism—quite equal to that of the Weimar Republic. It was here that I first became fully aware of the literally amazing grasp of the documents on 1914 possessed by Count Montgelas. We had no copies of the documents in our conference room, but Montgelas rarely failed to provide precise and detailed information on virtually every question raised.

In Vienna, I also had a long conference with Dr. Friedrich von Wiesner, who had investigated the situation in Serbia for Count Leopold von Berchtold after the assassination of the Archduke Franz Ferdinand. He made it clear that his official report was far too brief to include all the important information about Serbian guilt which he had gathered on his visit, and he filled in many details for me.

From Vienna, I proceeded to Budapest where I was the guest of the Hungarian Government and addressed a large dinner meeting given by the Foreign Secretary and attended by a select group of invited members of the Royal Hungarian Society for Foreign Affairs. The eminent Hungarian statesman, Count Albert Apponyi, was prevented by a temporary illness from being present, but he sent a warm message of greeting, expressed the wish that I would return the following year, and invited me to visit him at his home. I found that the interest in the war-guilt question was very keen in Hungary, and I was invited back to give another and more formal lecture the following summer. It was hoped that revisionist historical studies would help the Hungarians recover some lost territory.

This takes me somewhat afield from my visit to Germany. On my return there I proceeded to visit the exiled Emperor William II at Haus Doom and spent two pleasant and informing days talking with him about the background of the first World War. I repeated this visit to Doom in 1927. Interestingly enough, while the Kaiser was happy to know that I

did not blame him for starting war in 1914, he disagreed with my view that Russia and France were chiefly responsible. He held that the villains of 1914 were the international Jews and Free Masons, who, he alleged, desired to destroy national states and the Christian religion. He held that they used as their catspaws, first Edward VII and then Sir Edward Grey.

2. Further Experiences and Interviews in 1927.

On my return to Germany in the summer of 1927, while I lectured to large audiences at a number of German universities on the war-guilt question, I devoted myself primarily to conferences with leading public figures who had taken part in the stirring days of the summer of 1914 and its antecedents.

Before leaving Berlin for my lectures and interviews, I had two meetings with members of the former German royal family. The Kaiser and the Empress Hermine were, quite naturally, much concerned about the prospect of restoring the Empire and being called back to Berlin. The Kaiser had discreetly inquired about the opinions with respect to this that I had picked up during the earlier part of my trip in 1926, prior to visiting Haus Doom. Knowing that I had been in contact with many Germans of high station in the year that had passed, the Empress Hermine made a special trip to Berlin for the joint purpose of welcoming me back and also discovering if I had encountered any more important information concerning the restoration of the Empire. She gave a pleasant tea for me at Frederick the Great's old palace, and after that we had a private chat about the outlook for a restoration. I was as politely encouraging as my conscience would permit, but from all I had discovered in Germany and other European countries there seemed little hope for any return of the Kaiser, whether it would have been an advantage to Germany or not.

That evening I was invited to have dinner with the former Crown Prince, Friedrich Wilhelm, at his palace in Potsdam. The family was present at the dinner, two of the children later having much contact with the United States. One of the sons was employed for a time at the Ford Motor Company, and one of the daughters married an American.

After the dinner and a brief visit, the Crown Prince drove me back to Berlin where we had a private talk, along with Dr. Schoenemann, over "schnapps." Contrary to much gossip, and notably to wartime propaganda, it was my opinion from brief observation that the Crown Prince was rather sharper mentally than his father, and surely was much more realistic about the future of the Hohenzollerns in 1927. He had few illusions about any re-establishment of the Empire, and laughingly observed to me that he would settle for the presidency of the Weimar Republic. Later on, it seems that this became more than a laughing matter and that he seriously entertained

such an ambition. Whether he could have saved the Republic from the Hitler regime is one of the imponderables of politics.

Proceeding from Berlin, I visited in Germany in 1927, among others, Gottlieb von Jagow, the German Foreign Secretary in 1914; Baron Wilhelm von Schoen, the German Ambassador to France; Count Friedrich von Pourtales, the German Ambassador to Russia; and Grand Admiral Alfred von Tirpitz, commander of the German naval forces in the first World War.

Von Jagow was living modestly in a small castle at Zingst near Nebra. He was a somewhat melancholy personality when I visited him. He had ardently wished to avoid war in 1914, and the harsh treatment of Germany after the War had depressed him deeply. But he was a gracious host and freely answered all the questions I put to him. I was much impressed by his obvious sincerity. Von Schoen entertained me at his charming villa in Berchtesgaden. He was a genial and affable host, bearing out the reports of his personality and habits as the German Ambassador to Paris in 1914. Among other things, he showed me the signature of Izvolski in his guest book. Izvolski had visited him after the famous Buchlau Conference of September, 1908, on his way to London in very high spirits, feeling that Russia could now get access through the Straits leading into the Black Sea. His hopes were dashed by the stubborn opposition of Sir Edward Grey, another of Grey's many acts of short-sighted folly that helped to bring on war in 1914.

Of all the ambassadors of 1914 days whom I visited in Germany or elsewhere, I was most impressed by the intelligence and keen insight of Count Pourtales, a truly courteous and urbane gentleman. I have been saddened to reflect that his magnificent estate at Glumbowitz in Silesia has now been lost to Germany and the country taken over by a foreign nation in defiance of justice and national self-determination. Pourtales especially stressed the fact that Sazonov was not a party to the Serbian plot to assassinate Franz Ferdinand. Sazonov was having tea with Pourtales when the news of the assassination came to him. He was visibly surprised and shocked. But he was hot tempered and became a passionate war-monger when Austria threatened to attack Serbia.

It was my opinion at the time, and I have had no reason to change it since, that of all the German public figures I met in 1926 and 1927, only Admiral von Tirpitz, whom I visited at St. Blasien in the Black Forest, was of Bismarckian stature, whatever one may think of his political views as expressed during the first World War. Professor Fay agreed with me in this appraisal.

The most interesting bit of information imparted to me by Von Tirpitz related to the competence and physical condition of Helmuth von Moltke, Chief of the German General Staff. Von Moltke possessed little of the mili-

tary genius of his famous uncle of the Franco-Prussian War. But the name had magic and it was for this reason that the Kaiser unwisely appointed him to the very important post of Chief of Staff in 1906. To his general incompetence was added the fact that he was a very sick man in July, 1914. Von Tirpitz said that Von Moltke had to be helped to his feet and assisted to walk at staff meetings in that critical month. Germany lost the war when Von Moltke, with incredible folly, sent out an inexperienced staff-officer, Lieutenant Colonel Hentsch, with absolute power to decide whether to order the German armies in the West to advance or retreat. In his confusion, shock at bloodshed, and incompetence, Hentsch ordered the latter.

This expert comment of Von Tirpitz raises some question about the accuracy of the widely-read and brilliantly written Guns *of August* by Barbara W. Tuchman, a granddaughter of Henry Morgenthau Sr., author of the high tale about the Berlin Crown Conference of July 5, 1914. One able historian of the subject has remarked that this means that we have now had three generations of Morgenthaus to muddy the waters of twentieth century German history, even if we overlook her earlier work on the Zimmermann Note.

In Austria, I had a candid and illuminating conference with Count Leopold von Berchtold, the Austrian Foreign Secretary in 1914, at the almost incredibly beautiful and picturesque town of Bad Gastein. He appeared to me to be much more shrewd and capable than Professor Fay and others have pictured him. The publication of his memoirs and Austrian state papers since that time have confirmed my judgment of him in 1927.

Berchtold made no effort to provide any alibi for his action in the summer of 1914. He said that, under the circumstances which existed at that moment, he would once more do exactly as he did in July, 1914. He believed that a war of Germany and Austria against Russia and France was less dangerous than failing to discipline Serbia and check its intrigues. His great mistake was believing that Sir Maurice De Bunsen, the British Ambassador in Vienna, was correct in assuring him that Britain would not enter the war. By the time he learned that De Bunsen had been misinformed, it was too late to stop hostilities.

While in Austria I also visited Count Alexander Hoyos at his country estate. He had been sent by Berchtold to visit the Kaiser on July 5, 1914, to obtain approval for possible Austro-Hungarian action against Serbia. He was able to add convincing evidence that the alleged German Crown Council of that date was a fiction spread by Henry Morgenthau, Sr. It had been alleged that it was at this fictitious Crown Council that the Kaiser had plotted the first World War and had then run off on a vacation in northern waters to throw other countries off their guard. It was later revealed that the story grew out of a fantastic yarn told to Morgenthau by the German

Ambassador at Constantinople to cover up a secret visit he had recently made to his mistress in Berlin. He duped Mr. Morgenthau by inventing the Crown Council myth to protect himself.

The most spectacular episode of my 1927 visit to Europe was addressing a large audience of Hungarian notables and scholars in the Gold Room of the Hungarian Parliament Buildings on August 7th at a meeting sponsored by the Royal Hungarian Society for Foreign Affairs. It was the closest approximation to my Munich experience of the preceding year.

On my return from Hungary to Germany, I stopped at Salzburg for a long conference with Milosh Bogitschevich, the Serbian historian and diplomat, who was the chief authority on the Black Hand plot to assassinate Franz Ferdinand. While I was in Vienna during the previous summer, he had taken me and Edith Durham, a leading English authority on the plot, to the Vienna underworld to meet some members of the Black Hand. One of them proudly showed us a watch given him by Crown Prince Alexander of Serbia.

In 1927 Bogitschevich was chiefly interested in ascertaining the extent of Russian pre-knowledge and encouragement of the assassination plot. Bogitschevich was convinced that Von Hartwig, the Russian Minister to Serbia in 1914, and at least Grand Duke Nicholas in St. Petersburg, had advance knowledge of the plot and encouraged its completion and execution. We arranged for an American emissary to go to the Balkans to collect the most important batch of documents bearing on this matter, but before the American could start on the trip the custodian of the documents was mysteriously murdered. So far as I know, they have never been recovered.

Bogitschevich himself died some years later in Berlin, also under mysterious circumstances just as he was about to come to the United States, marry a lady professor here, and publish in English his vast collection of materials on the assassination plot that started the first World War. His death was a calamity to Revisionism, for the Serbian plot was the key to war responsibility in 1914.

When I returned to Germany I spent a few days as a guest of the able German revisionist writer, Hermann Lutz, at his pleasant home in Munich, during which we discussed at length the material I had gathered in my interviews and contacts. I profited much by his mature wisdom in these matters. I then proceeded to Haus Doom in response to an invitation to visit the Kaiser a second time. We also discussed what I had learned in the year that had passed since my last visit. The most important bit of information the Kaiser imparted to me at this time was that his Berlin-to-Baghdad project had been suggested to him by Cecil Rhodes as a means of restraining German ambitions in Africa. I sought to press the Kaiser a bit

on what Von Tirpitz.and others, notably General Montgelas, had told me about Von Moltke and Hentsch, but he was evasive on this and sought to lay the main responsibility for the failure to knock out the French and British to confusion on the part of Field Marshal Karl von Buelow.

The most striking social event of either summer occurred on this second visit to the Kaiser. The wealthy Dutch landed noble, Count Godard Bentick, at whose estate, Amerongen, the Kaiser had taken refuge before he acquired Haus Doom, had invited as many of the German royalty and nobility as would or could come to a ceremonial reunion with the Kaiser on August 17, 1927. His home was an ornament of early modern Dutch architecture, elaborately furnished in the best expensive taste. The Kaiser invited me to attend as his personal guest. It was a glamorous and nostalgic occasion for the Kaiser and his guests, but a trifle pathetic from my viewpoint. The Kaiser and many of the guests from Germany really believed that the Empire would be restored and the Kaiser recalled to Berlin. But it was evident to me from my contacts of the last two summers that the outlook for this was hopeless.

One of my most interesting conferences that summer outside of Germany was an interview with John Bums in London. Bums had been one of the two members of the British Cabinet who resigned in 1914 rather than vote for war. He told me very definitely that the British Cabinet had decided upon war with Germany before the Belgian question had even been mentioned in Cabinet deliberations. This striking revelation was later confirmed by Lord Morley, the other Cabinet member who joined Bums in resigning from the Cabinet in 1914 as a protest against the war party. Morley's account appeared in his posthumous *Memorandum on Resignation.*

While in London I spent a pleasant evening with the brilliant English lawyer and writer, Irene Cooper Willis. She had written three small books which told the story of how British Liberals like A. G. Gardiner of the London Daily *News,* H. G. Wells, and others, had vigorously opposed Britain's entry into the War. But, as soon as Britain entered the War, they portrayed the conflict as a pure and limpid crusade for high moral ideals, the sanctity of treaties, and the rights of small nations against the powers of darkness and evil. I induced Alfred Knopf to combine these into a substantial volume entitled *England's Holy War.* It remains one of the best works on British war propaganda in the first World War and greatly annoyed Mr. Wells.

I had an interesting visit with Wells but did not bring up Miss Willis or her book. She told me of a discussion she had with James Bryce concerning the notorious Bryce Report on alleged German atrocities, especially in Belgium, which by 1927 had been entirely discredited. Bryce could do no more than shrug his shoulders and observe that: "Well, you know how

things are in wartime!" Nikolas Japikse, a distinguished Dutch historian, historical tutor to now Queen Juliana, and author of a standard work on Bismarck, was carrying on researches at the British Museum that summer. We had several discussions of the war-guilt problem in which he revealed himself to be a convinced and unabashed Revisionist.

Back in Paris, my most interesting and important conference was with the distinguished French statesman, Joseph Caillaux, whose intelligence and candor greatly impressed me. He made no effort to deny the complicity of the French leaders in the outbreak of war in August, 1914, and outlined the procedure which he would have followed, if he had been Premier, to avert war. He would have refused to approve Russian military measures leading to war unless he had an unconditional promise from Britain to join in the conflict. This, the British would not have given. I endeavored to see Raymond Poincare, agreeing in advance merely to listen and ask no questions, but his secretary informed me that he was out of the city. A mutual acquaintance told me, however, that he had seen Poincare on the street and greeted him on the very day I had suggested making a brief call. I had published a long and forthright critique of Poincare's defense of his policies in the *American Monthly* and the *Nation.*

Although he was in Paris at the time, Sazonov would not see me, but I did have a conference with Baron Moritz F. Shilling, Chief of Chancellery in the Russian Foreign Office in 1914. He spoke very frankly about the events that led to war and was in general agreement with the revisionist position. The eminent English historian, Sir Raymond Beazley, the most forthright of English Revisionists dealing with the first World War, was in France on vacation at the time and we had dinner and a long discussion of revisionist problems at Versailles. Among others I met in France in 1927 were Alcide Ebray, whose book, *A Frenchman Looks at Peace,* was one of the best critical appraisals of the Treaty of Versailles, and the former Italian premier, Francesco Nitti, a refugee from Fascist Italy and an ardent Revisionist.

There are many other details which I could recount that have an important bearing on the increase of my knowledge of the facts about 1914 which I gained from conferences with important figures from that era, but they are all aside from the main object of these recollections, which is to emphasize the great interest and energy of the German officials and scholars during the heyday of the Weimar Republic in seeking to clear Germany of the dishonor and fraud of the war-guilt clause of the Treaty of Versailles and in endeavoring to secure a revision of that nefarious document in keeping With the historical facts.

One item which I should report is perhaps the best demonstration of the interest of the German Government and people in Revisionism and

war-guilt studies in the 1920's. Dr. Schnee's organization made a careful study of the newspaper lineage devoted to the visit of ex-President Theodore Roosevelt to the Kaiser in 1910 and that which I received in the summers of 1926 and 1927. It was found that I received far greater lineage, each summer, than Roosevelt had in 1910. This was the clearest and most decisive proof of the great popular and friendly interest in the war-guilt question under the Weimar Republic. The wide newspaper coverage of my visits was due entirely to the fact that I dealt with this matter. Had I been merely a wandering scholar visiting Germany for the first time, it is doubtful if I would have received even one line in any German newspaper in either summer.

All this stands out in sharp contrast to the anti-revisionist attitude of the Bonn Government of today with respect to the facts of 1939, despite the far more harsh treatment of Germany after the second World War, which has been based upon a much greater historical fraud and swindle than the war-guilt clause of the Versailles Treaty, namely, the myth and travesty that Germany was solely responsible for the outbreak of war in September, 1939.

The attitude of the Bonn Government is not only a cause for great surprise in the light of German attitudes and policies in the 1920's, but it also provides one of the major political paradoxes of modern history. The Bonn Government apparently assumes that extremely harsh treatment and cruel slanders growing out of the second war-guilt lie—that related to 1939—can be redressed and righted by perpetuating this very lie and menacing those who seek to expose and refute it on a factual and non-partisan historical basis.

The Weimar Republic and its scholars worked hard to establish historical truth, in the effort to free Germany from the burdens and evils of Versailles. The government gave every possible encouragement and support to its scholars and intellectuals who sought to discover and proclaim historical truth about 1914. The Bonn Government, on the other hand, appears, even to many friendly outsiders, almost to vie with its former enemies in opposing the search for truth about the responsibility for the second World War and in refusing to accept the facts already established by scholars who have no national, personal, or party axes to grind.

There is no doubt in my mind about the formal desire of the Adenauer Government to promote the unification of Germany and get some redress for the wrongs which Germany has suffered as a result of historical frauds relative to 1939. Granting this, it is strange that the official German attitude today is almost precisely the same as that of its Communist enemies to the East with regard to the causes and merits of the second World War, even though the Allied and Communist swindle in this matter is the main

cause of German disunity, degradation and deprivations.

If there is any difference of opinion on the *Kriegschuldfrage* of 1939 as between Adenauer and Khrushchev, it has not to my knowledge ever been made public. The zoning of Germany which brought East Germany into existence as a Communist satellite, the wresting of the eastern provinces from Germany and handing them over to Poland, the current jeopardy of West Berlin, the enormous reparations payments by West Germany, and other disabilities and punishments of West Germany, were all based on the Allied and Communist charge that Hitler was solely responsible for the second World War and its ravages. This historical fraud Adenauer accepts; indeed, appears to defend.

The Weimar Republic understood that there could be no redress of wrongs until the sources of these wrongs were repudiated on the basis of the facts. Although the government of the Weimar Republic was frequently humiliated and forced to capitulate on particular issues by threats, *ultimata,* and the naked use of force by France and other Western nations, it did, by and large, manage to stand as a truly independent German government. It never became a puppet organization manipulated freely by foreign military occupiers. Furthermore, the Constitution of the Weimar Republic was drafted exclusively by German citizens, and not, as in the case of the so-called Bonn Constitution or Fundamental Law, primarily by foreigners. It is generally believed to have been written mainly by Carl Joachim Friedrich of Harvard University.

It may be hoped that the revival of revisionist historical studies in West Germany will hasten the day when the valiant and dynamic German nation will be freed from the cloud of dishonor which its enemies have forced upon it through historical frauds, will have its territories restored, and will become a reunited country. But it will be futile to battle Communist ideology and politics so long as West Germany embraces precisely the same historical myths which the Kremlin espouses about 1939 and 1941. The German revisionist case relative to war-guilt in 1939 and 1941 is stronger than it was during the Weimar Republic against the war-guilt clause which rested on the myths concerning 1914.

The truth about 1939 in no way involves or necessitates any approval of Hitler, National Socialism, or the National Socialist regime. It is strictly a matter of historical integrity, irrespective of race, ideology, or party. As a strong defender of individual liberty during all my adult life, I can hardly be suspected of fondness for any kind of authoritarianism, whether of the Right or the Left. I certainly have much less than any personal reason for being delighted over historical researches which tend to clear Hitler and National Socialism of any charges. In the light of what I have set down in the preceding pages, it should not be difficult to credit my statement

that I probably lost more in the way of status, prestige and important personal contacts in Germany from the rise of Hitler and National Socialism than any other American intellectual of the 1930's. Nothing that I have ever written or ever shall write is even remotely designed to "rehabilitate Hitler." I do hope that it may in some modest degree help to rehabilitate historical truth and integrity.

III. OPEN LETTER TO A FREIBURG PROFESSOR OF HISTORY

Some months ago I received the following letter from an able German instructor in history at the University at Freiburg. I originally intended to answer it promptly and personally but decided upon further thought to save it and use it as an open letter to the German scholarly world on the question of responsibility for the two World Wars—the so-called *Kriegschuldfrage* problem. Since it is a personal letter I am not giving the name of my correspondent, but I will send him at once a copy of my reply as given here.

Freiburg i.Br.

Dear Professor Barnes:

Let me tell you that to me, as a historian who is aware of the valuable work you did after the First World War, it was a somewhat unpleasant surprise to find your name in the *Deutsche Hochschullerhrer-Zeitung,* IX, 4, 1961, in connection with Dr. Grabert's attempts at rewriting our history.

I have not read Prof. Hoggan's book on the origins of the Second World War, and, therefore, cannot say anything as to the conclusions the author draws in it.

I have very much to object, however, to the Foreword which the author apparently allowed to be added to his work. Dr. Grabert, the editor, refers in this Foreword to "the form of leadership" developed in "a millennium" by the German people that has been "destroyed" twice in our recent history, i.e. in 1918 and 1945.

It is just this myth which contends that Hitler was the apex of German history which we are working against as historians, because it is not true, as well as for political reasons. We cannot be silent as to this legend, whether we are confronted with it by Mr. Shirer or by Dr. Grabert.

You feel disappointed that you found so little echo in this country after the last War, as compared to the postwar years after 1918. This is not because we are "demoralized", but because the simple fact must have escaped your attention that Hitler was not as innocent—in the widest sense—as the Kaiser had been, and that we are hot the same people as you met some thirty-five years ago. We are trying to establish a form of government that keeps

a clear distance from Hitler's revolutionary dictatorship but still seeks its traditions in German history, which is not a history of dictatorships, after all.

The attempt to identify Hitler, and only him, with German history has as its sole objective to discredit our own aims and our present form of government, *nota bene:* not only the administration! I am, therefore, afraid that Dr. Grabert's Foreword, with its rather distinct political and ideological implications, can only weaken Prof. Hoggan's claim to have done nothing except search for the historical truth.

Frankly speaking, I must tell you that I think that, in supporting Dr. Grabert's whole enterprise, you render a rather poor service to our country and to your own, if it is America's policy to promote the stabilization of the present-day political order of this country.

Sincerely yours,

My professor correspondent states that he is shocked to find that I am giving encouragement to Dr. Grabert's "attempt at rewriting our (German) history." I have no such intention. So far as I know, Dr. Grabert is not engaged upon the large and ambitious problem of re-writing all of German history. I am only acquainted with his efforts to encourage the writing of the truth with respect to the causes of the second World War and to make it possible to publish this material in such fashion that it can be read by the German scholarly world and public.

I would certainly wish to encourage him to every possible degree in this constructive and desirable activity. I regard his program as of the greatest importance because this type of work is the only serious attempt of which I am aware to inform the German world as to the facts with respect to one of the most critical events of modern history, if not of all world history.

In the preceding pages I have shown the remarkable contrast between the situation in Germany following 1918 and that which has prevailed after 1949. The Weimar Republic immediately took up the question of war-guilt and strongly supported every effort to establish the truth about the responsibility for 1914. Important German experts on the causes of the first World War, like General Montgelas, accompanied the German Delegation to Versailles. During the next two decades the German governments generously supported and warmly encouraged the efforts of German scholars to set forth the truth about the responsibility for the first World War.

In marked contrast, as I pointed out in the preceding material, the Bonn Government has sought to discourage any such patriotic effort or

intellectual venture. Whereas the Weimar Republic would have certainly given a medal to any man performing the work that Dr. Grabert is now attempting to do, or at least granted him warm support for his patriotic and scholarly efforts, the Bonn Government gave Dr. Grabert a jail sentence for his courageous activities. Within a few years after 1918 there were a number of highly creditable German books setting forth the truth with regard to 1914. Sixteen years after 1945, it required an American scholar to provide German readers with the first systematic, thorough, and completely documented volume on this vital subject.

It would certainly be hard to estimate the value or validity of Dr. Hoggan's book without reading it. It so happens, however, that my preceding account did not depend at all upon the soundness of Dr. Hoggan's scholarship or conclusions. It is sufficient that his writings aroused me to contemplate the sharp contrast between the reaction of German scholars, the German government, and the German public to the question of war responsibility in the 1920's and at the present time. This contrast is **a** fundamental and all-important fact, whether a single line of Hoggan's book is valid or not. The long review of the book in *Der Spiegel* on June 12, 1962, paid a remarkable tribute to Dr. Hoggan's scholarship, especially the documentation on German and Polish matters, and only seriously questioned his views about British responsibility in the months before the outbreak of war. I provided an adequate answer to the criticism of this particular sector of Dr. Hoggan's impressive monograph.

I have read very carefully the Foreword that Dr. Grabert wrote to the Hoggan book and I was unable to see anything in it which was unpatriotic or in any way attempted to whitewash Hitler or National Socialism with respect to the system of government and society which it established. As I understand it, the main point in Dr. Grabert's Foreword, aside from dealing with the nature and import of the Hoggan book, is his laudable hope that Germany will soon emancipate itself from the foreign and domestic brainwashing to Which it has been subjected for nearly two decades in regard to the causes of the second World War and throw off the disabilities imposed on the Germans as a result. I certainly did not get the impression that he regarded the National Socialist system as the finest flower of German evolution over a thousand years. Nor did I draw the conclusion that he believed that Hitler and his system represented the apex of German political, economic and social development.

It is certainly true that Germany in August, 1939, was a more powerful and impressive political unit than had ever been known before in this area in the history of Europe. Germany reached at that time the "apex" of its power, whether the system was a desirable one or not. The National Socialist regime was assuredly not one for which I had either public or

personal affection. As I pointed out in the preceding material, I probably lost more in the way of professional prestige and personal following in Germany as a result of the rise of Hitler and National Socialism than any other American intellectual..

As an American liberal, I could hardly be regarded as admiring any form of conservative totalitarianism. Any idea that National Socialism was perfect and benign is certainly a "legend," but not as dangerous a legend for Germany as that which is accepted by the present German government and people, to the effect that Hitler and National Socialism were solely responsible for the German-Polish War and the European War which followed in September, 1939. That is my sole concern here, and that is the only reason why I have been associated in any way with Dr. Grabert or have rendered him any assistance through my own writings or put him in touch with the writings of others who are engaged in establishing the truth with regard to the responsibility of the second World War.

In my writings on the responsibility for the first World War I never regarded the Kaiser as completely innocent. He made many mistakes from the time he dismissed the Iron Chancellor, although I am certain that at no time did he wish to precipitate a world war. I recall the statement made by President Taft that the Kaiser gave him more assistance in working for world peace than any other head of a state during his administration. Indeed, Mr. Taft stated specifically: "The German Emperor has been for the last quarter of a century the greatest single individual force in the practical maintenance of the peace of the world." Theodore Roosevelt also stated that the Kaiser had given him more assistance than anybody else in bringing an end to the Russo-Japanese War in 1905.

When it comes to the problem of the immediate outbreak of war in 1914, the Kaiser made a number of mistakes, as for example in giving a blank check to Austria in the program of the latter to suppress the dangerous Serbian intrigue directed at the disintegration of the Dual Monarchy. But certainly his responsibility for the coming of war in 1914 was nowhere as great as that of Poincare, Sazonov, or Sir Edward Grey.

It is my opinion that, so far as the outbreak of war in 1939 is concerned, Hitler was surely as innocent, if one wishes to use that doubtful word, as the Kaiser was in 1914. Of course, neither of them was innocent nor was any major leader in either 1914 or 1939. But surely Hitler's responsibility in 1939 was far less than that of Beck in Poland, Halifax in England, or even Daladier in France. Hitler's demands on Poland in 1938 and 1939 were certainly as reasonable as those Austria made upon Serbia in 1914, which the Kaiser backed up to his disaster. Moreover, Hitler accompanied his very reasonable proposals to Poland—the most moderate of his whole series of efforts to revise Versailles—by the offer to guarantee, in return, the

Polish boundaries as established at Versailles in 1919. This was something that the Weimar Republic would never even remotely consider.

The question of whether the aristocratic German Empire under Kaiser William II was better or worse than the system of National Socialism under Hitler is one which could be widely debated, but I have no intention of entering into that complicated subject at the present time. My personal preference and sympathies would be with the Empire, but this would have little or no significance in establishing the fact of which was superior or to be preferred, given the two quite different periods in which they dominated German life. I am here, and have been in the preceding material, only concerned with the responsibility for the two World Wars and the bearing of this upon the future welfare of Germany and the world.

My correspondent states that "We are not the same people as you met some thirty-five years ago." This is precisely the crux of the preceding material and my reply to the Freiburg professor. It is obvious that the German people are racially much the same today as they were in the mid-1920's when I knew them more thoroughly. Actually, most of the people that I met in Germany in 1926 and 1927 were as far from the Kaiser, politically, as the people of Germany today are from Hitler and National Socialism. Yet, the fact that the socialistic Weimar Republic was far removed in political beliefs from the German Empire of the Kaiser did not prevent the government of the Republic from vigorously supporting the effort of scholars to discredit the war-guilt lie and assisting and rewarding those who worked towards that end. Those in Germany today who support the fiction that Hitler was completely responsible for the outbreak of war in 1939 cannot, therefore, justify their anti-historical attitude by contending that they have departed widely from the social and political system of National Socialism. It is the honor and welfare of the German people which is at stake, not the validity of some previous political regime.

No informed or sensible person would endeavor to identify Hitler with the totality of German history. Hitler and National Socialism represented only a brief, if highly dramatic and perhaps tragic, episode in a historical record running over nearly two thousand years. Hitler only played a very dynamic role for about a decade, for better or worse. There has been no thorough and accurate German appraisal of Hitler and the National Socialist regime. About the only serious effort to do so in Germany is the work of Hans Grimm. Obviously, this is not the final word on the subject. It has not yet been provided in any country. The antagonism and hostility was so increased by the War that no post-war treatment of Hitler has equalled those of Stephen Roberts, Henri Lichtenberger, C. W. Guillebaud, Konrad Heiden, C. B. Hoover and J. B. Holt written prior to 1939.

No attempt to explain the Hitler regime on the basis of the theory of

personal diabolism can convince any reasonable person. This was admitted by Der *Spiegel* in refuting the theses of the emigre Swiss historian, Walther Hofer, concerning the personality of Hitler and the causes of the second World War. One only needs to recall that in the mid-1930's Churchill paid Hitler what Francis Neilson has called the most glowing tribute ever given by an Englishman to the head of another state. Even later on he contended that, if Britain ever got into the same sorry condition that Germany was in during 1932 and 1933, he hoped England would find "her Hitler." At the same time, Lloyd George, after a visit to Germany, paid Hitler and the National Socialist regime another warm tribute in a long article published in Lord Beaverbrook's Daiiy *Express,* September 17, 1936.

Hitler and National Socialism were not without prominent supporters in the United States. Adolph S. Ochs, owner and publisher of the New *York Times,* in a frank interview with the eminent historian, Charles Austin Beard, during the early days of the regime, agreed with the conservative English position that Hitler was valuable as a bulwark against Communism. Charles M. Schwab, the great steelmaster, praised Hitler and his achievements even more strongly than Churchill or Lloyd George. Senator Edward R. Burke, later co-author of the Burke-Wadsworth draft law, declared that Hitler had done more for Germany than Bismarck. The distinguished conservative lawyer, E. Parmalee Prentice, held that we needed somebody like Hitler to curb John L. Lewis.

It is well to remember that these statements by Churchill, Lloyd George, and others similar to them by Englishmen and Americans who had become acquainted with the real nature of the National Socialist regime, were all set forth *after* all of the worst aspects of the Hitler regime had been in operation for some years. The Nuremberg laws, the persecution of the Jews, the wiping out of direct democratic government, the centralization of the political regime, the economic system of National Socialism, and the like, had been introduced and operating long before this time, and the Rhineland was reoccupied in March, 1936. In fact, the most rigorous period of National Socialism, so far as persecution and oppression are concerned, was past by the time that Churchill and Lloyd George contributed their eulogies of Hitler and his system. By and large, National Socialism leveled off and became more moderate and less oppressive from 1936 until the outbreak of the war, with the exception of the fanatical violence of the SA in the autumn of 1938 following the assassination of a member of the German embassy in Paris.

It is obvious that there is something wrong in the picture. Hitler could hardly have been a constructive genius in 1935-1936 and a pathological demon in 1939. He was probably neither at any time. Another towering inconsistency has been the tendency of the critics of Hitler to contend that

his chief trait was instability, capriciousness, unpredictability, vacillation, or the like. Yet, when Dr. A. J. P. Taylor showed clearly that the documents proved that Hitler did not wish to provoke war in 1939, his critics contended that Hitler's plans for war could not be found in the documents of 1939 but in *Mein Kampf,* written fifteen years earlier. They thus contradicted themselves by implying that Hitler was the only leading figure of the period whose plans and convictions remained steadfast and unchangeable over the years.

It is desirable to keep in mind, however, that the question of the nature of Hitler's government and the National Socialist regime is not in any way at issue in what I have been discussing or in Dr. Hoggan's book. The latter neither condemns nor defends Hitler or National Socialism. It sticks deliberately to diplomatic history throughout, which is the only practical method unless the author was going to write several volumes. As an almost passionate disciple of the eminent American Progressive leader, Robert Marion La Follette Sr., Hoggan has no more love for National Socialism than I have.

While the theory of Hitler's diabolism is generally accepted, there are very well informed persons who contend that he brought himself and Germany to ruin by being too soft, generous and honorable rather than too tough and ruthless. They point to the following considerations: he made a genuine and liberal peace offer to Britain on August 25, 1939; he permitted the British to escape at Dunkirk to encourage Britain to make peace, which later on cost him the war in North Africa; he failed to occupy all of France, take North Africa at once, and split the British Empire; he lost the Battle of Britain by failing to approve the savagery of saturation bombing of civilians and to build armed bombers to carry on this type of military barbarism which played so large a role in the Allied victory; he delayed his attack on Russia and offered Molotov lavish concessions in November, 1940, to keep peace between Germany and Russia; he lost the war with Russia by delaying the invasion in order to bail Mussolini out of his idiotic attack on Greece; and he declared war on the United States to keep his pledged word with Japan which had long before made it clear that it deserved no such consideration and loyalty from Hitler.

I have not in any way attempted to support "Grabert's whole enterprise," whatever that may be. I only support his brave and patriotic work in attempting to make it possible for the German people to know the facts about 1939. They have been politically crucified on the basis of the myths which the Bonn Government still supports, threatening those who publish the facts about 1939 with penal servitude. Until the German people get these facts there is no prospect of any political readjustment in harmony with justice for post-war Germany. In the 1920's, the German people work-

ed against the crushing Versailles *diktat.* Today, they stagger along under the penalties of a second war-guilt clause, which is now in large part self-inflicted, and they menace those who would emancipate them. The direct and crucial bearing of the war-guilt question of 1939 on the readjustment of the German problem and the rehabilitation of German honor and prestige has been well summarized by the able British lawyer and revisionist writer, Frederick J. P. Veale:

"If the second World War was the outcome of the crazy ambition of the meglomaniac Hitler to conquer the world, Great Britain, France and Poland were merely defending themselves from an unprovoked and possibly mortal attack. In such Circumstances, they were clearly justified in using any means for their self-protection. This view would also render every act committed by Germany after the outbreak of war a culpable effort to promote and achieve the criminal intentions of Hitler. If the Germans wantonly plunged Europe into war in 1939, it is fitting that they should pay a harsh penalty. If, on the other hand, as Dr. A. J. P. Taylor maintains, the first shots fired near Danzig in September, 1939, were fired through diplomatic blunders on both sides, then the subsequent course of the conflict appears in a new and totally different light. Seen thus, the German people were only fellow-sufferers with the British, French and Polish peoples, helpless victims of the blundering recklessness of their rulers."

As I pointed out earlier, it is very difficult to understand how the German people and the Bonn Government can logically hope to oppose Soviet Russia successfully when they espouse and support the same dogmas as the Russians do with respect to German responsibility for World War II. This is the alleged basis for all the disabilities from which Germany has suffered and still suffers, including the Berlin Wall. Under the Weimar Republic, neither the German government nor the German people had any desire whatever to restore the old Empire of the Hohenzollerns. Any effort of the Bonn Government and the German people to get at the truth today in regard to the responsibility for 1939 would not need to imply in the slightest any attempt to restore National Socialism. But the truth would furnish them with the basis for a sound ideology which can logically and honestly oppose the pretensions and the oppressions of the government of Soviet Russia.

So long as the German government and people admit, certainly by direct implication, that they deserved everything Which happened to them as a result of military defeat, there is little solid foundation for any effort to emancipate themselves from these burdens, unite Germany, and restore the country to its proper position of unity, power and respect among the nations of the world. It is little wonder that the Communist propaganda

program of "Peace through the Soviets" is making some headway among discouraged and disillusioned non-Communists in West Germany.

I have never had the personal privilege of visiting Dr. Grabert at his home or in his publishing activity, but I have had reports from friends of mine who have done so. One is a very able professor of modern European history from the United States who called on Dr. Grabert at the close of a series of lectures he had been giving in one of the most distinguished German universities. He reported that Dr. Grabert appeared to him to be a highly conscientious and courteous man, thoroughly devoted to his effort to instruct the German people, and inspired by the highest patriotic motives. This impression was also confirmed by the visit of another friend of mine, one of the leading American intellectuals and a very distinguished artist, who called upon Dr. Grabert some six months later.

Several friends of mine interested in Revisionism and historical scholarship have travelled widely in West Germany during the last two years and have visited most of the German scholars and journalists who are promoting the effort to establish and disseminate the truth relative to the causes of the second World War. They have reported to me that many of these German Revisionists tend to exude an air of apprehensiveness, if not of fear, although they seem fully convinced of the accuracy of their facts and the soundness of their convictions. They are conscious of working in opposition to popular opinion and with the disapproval of public authorities.

This I find shocking because, when in Germany in 1926 and 1927, I Observed that the men who were working hard to overthrow the Versailles war-guilt lie were full of assurance, pride and self-confidence, and felt certain that they had the warm support and encouragement of both the government and the German people. There was then no fear whatever that if a man endeavored to tell the Germans the truth with respect to their past history, and to their own benefit, he was in danger of being thrown into jail. An equal contrast is that between the reported sense of collective guilt, shame, and self-pity on the part of the majority of Germans today*, and the attitude of pride, self-assurance and innocence of unique guilt for 1914 which dominated the citizens of the Weimar Republic.

If one opposes the system of National Socialism there are certainly an impressive number of substantial arguments which can be brought to bear against it and used to block any possibility of restoring such a system in Germany in the future. No supporter of the National Socialist regime could possibly ask for anything better than an admission on the part of the enemies of National Socialism in Germany that they have no case

*See Eugene Davidson, The Death and Life of Germany, Knopf, 1959, pp. 402-403; and Alfred Werner, "Germany's New Flagellants," in American Scholar, Spring, 1958, pp. 169-178.

against Hitler except the myth that he was solely responsible for the onset of the second World War.

The difficulty of promoting revisionist scholarship in regard to the causes of the second World War anywhere on the planet can hardly be comprehended within the realms of fact and reason. It is unlikely that there has been any vested interest in dogma, opinion and politics since the birth, death and resurrection of Jesus Christ equal in intensity to that built up around the allegation that Hitler was solely responsible for the outbreak of war in 1939.

The image of Hitler presented in pre-war propaganda and wartime hysteria must be sustained at all costs, and in the face of any contrary evidence. To question this is not unlike challenging the basic Catholic dogmas in the period of Pope Innocent III. Revisionists are in about as pathetic a minority as the Albigensian heretics of that era. Although the hostile popular conception of Hitler and the National Socialist system before 1939 remains fixed and firm all over the civilized world, even that is secondary and rather fragile compared to the dogma of Hitler's sole responsibility for the outbreak of war in September, 1939.

This is not too difficult to understand. There were just too many eulogies of Hitler and National Socialism by prominent Englishmen, Frenchmen and Americans, especially the English, after all the worst aspects of the National Socialist regime had been fully established, to make it plausible to build up the thesis of Hitlerian diabolism around the pre-war period. The praise of Hitler by Churchill and Lloyd George was characteristic of many prominent conservatives even though the majority opinion in Britain, France and the United States was strongly hostile to Germany. Something different and dramatic was essential to make the thesis of diabolism sink in and stick. Otherwise, the eminent eulogists of Hitler during the pre-war period would look like silly dupes.

The dogma that Hitler wilfully and without provocation started the most terrible war of all human history met the need perfectly. The whole intellectual, institutional and emotional set-up of the post-war world has been built up around this assertion. Rector Eschenburg of the University of Tuebingen was not exaggerating when he stated that the post-war world system stands or falls with the preservation of this dogma, intact and immaculate. This is the one matter on which the Free World and the Soviet Communists are in complete agreement. The Communists justify the seizure of central Europe and the retention of East Germany on the assumption that Hitler not only started the War, but also attacked Russia in 1941 without provocation or justification.

The assumption of Hitler's sole and unique guilt in 1939 was needed to justify the entry of Britain into a war which she started but resulted in

the liquidation of the British Empire and the steady decline of British power, prestige, security, prosperity and solvency since the destruction of National Socialist power. It furnished the justification for accepting the Communist-inspired doctrine of "collective security" and the related Popular Front diplomatic policy, both required to meet the threat of Hitler's preparation for the war of world conquest that he was said to have launched in September, 1939. It provided vindication of the wisdom of Roosevelt's lying the United States into war, and his moral obligation to manipulate an attack so as to bring this program to success at Pearl Harbor, after the attempt at provocation had failed on the Atlantic. Only the urgency of the Hitler menace and the magnitude of his guilt could justify the enormous losses of the war: 50 million lives, an ultimate financial cost of 25 trillion dollars or more, the vast monetary outlay by all Allied countries and particularly the astronomical American expenditures in arming the anti-Hitler forces, the vast increase in the debt structure, the wholesale destruction of buildings, homes, plants, historic sites and treasures, and the like.

It required the acceptance of Hitler's diabolism in unleashing war on a peace-loving Europe to justify the horrible atrocities of the war, such as the saturation bombing of civilians, although the British frankly admitted that they started such operations against the protests of Hitler and the almost complete lack of German preparations for this kind of aerial warfare, and Churchill declared with emphasis that there was no form of violence or terrorism in which the Allies would not indulge to destroy National Socialist Germany. He kept his word. Hitler's setting off the war was also deemed responsible for the wholesale extermination of Jews, for it was admitted that this did not begin until a considerable time after war broke out. Moreover, the size of the German reparations to Israel has been based on the theory that vast numbers of Jews were exterminated at the express order of Hitler, some six millions being the most usually accepted number.

The incredible error of handing over central and eastern Europe to Russia and its satellites could only be justified on the dubious grounds that Britain and America had to succumb to the wartime demands of Stalin, whose hordes were required to assure German defeat. It was the dogma that Hitler and his associates were solely responsible for starting an "aggressive war" in 1939 which furnished the basis for the notorious Nuremberg Trials, which so undermined the foundations of sound jurisprudence that A. J. P. Taylor felt impelled to write in the London *Observer* that: "It is strange that an English judge should have been found to preside over the macabre farce of the Nuremberg Tribunal; and strange that English lawyers, including the present Lord Chancellor, should have pleaded before it."

Devastating as the War itself may have been, the post-war heritage of the attempt to check "the Nazi madman" was in some ways even more ominous. It cost the United States 100 billion dollars to rebuild and arm western Europe to meet the Soviet challenge that they had created. The war produced the threat of atomic and nuclear warfare, which potentially became ever more destructive and menacing to the future of the whole human race. A focal-point for the launching of a nuclear war was provided through the division of Germany—a completely needless concession to the Russians after victory over Germany had been won and the Russians could have been kept or pushed out of Germany, Czechoslovakia, and western Poland. Destroying the Japanese bastion against Communism in the Far East opened the way to the communization of China, added 600 million Chinese to the Communist fold, and provided a second focal-point for a terminal nuclear war in Formosa.

At the present time, even the so-called Free Nations are more adjusted to the prospect of devastating warfare and more consecrated to producing, ever more profusely, increasingly destructive armament than was National Socialist Germany at any time before 1939. The United Nations has become so large and unwieldy and so cluttered up with conflicting ideologies and very backward member states that even so pacifically minded a statesman as Herbert Hoover has felt compelled to repudiate it.

This brief and very incomplete survey of what it cost to wage a war ostensibly needed to crush the war-mongering Hitler should make clear the magnitude or audacity of any attempt to question Hitler's unique guilt. Unless this basic dogma can be sustained, the second World War becomes the greatest crime of all history, equal to denying the historicity of Christ within Christendom—a crime resting chiefly on Britain, France and the United States. As the horrors and evil results of the second World War become ever more apparent, it becomes all the more necessary to retain Hitler as the scapegoat.

It would require naive and almost uncontrolled optimism to imagine that this vast complex of myths, dogmas and emotions could be readily dissipated by any number of disconcerting and contrary historical documents of the most assured authenticity. This is especially true when one reflects that historical writing itself was one of the first and most complete casualties of the War, and has since remained a docile servant of those who desire to perpetuate the distortions of wartime. Few groups in the entire populace have been more completely brainwashed than the historical guild. For example, in the United States, instead of being instructed in the historical field by a Fay, Tansill or Millis, as we were after the first World War, we now find the American public pleasantly and docilely—almost enthusiastically—accepting arrogant brainwashing by a Shirer, Kohn or

Snyder. In Germany, great scholars like Hans Delbrueck, Hermann Oncken and Erich Brandenburg have been replaced by anti-revisionist zealots, such as Walther Hofer, Hans-Adolf Jacobsen, Hans Rothfels, Gotthard Jasper, Golo Mann and others, who resist the truth and appear to wish to demean the record and honor of their own country.

Dark as the outlook for facing reality concerning 1939, 1941, and their aftermath, may be, it is also true that unless this is done there is little hope for world peace and the survival of civilization. The failure to revise the first war-guilt myth, that related to 1914, led to a second more devastating and disastrous world war. Stubborn adherence to the myths surrounding the responsibility for the second World War will inevitably lead to a third world war which will make the first and second world conflicts appear like a Quaker picnic. This truism has been recognized even by sagacious non-revisionist historians, such as Professor D. F. Fleming, who wisely observed: "The case of the Revisionists deserves to be heard. They may help us to avoid the 'one more war' after which there will be nothing left worth arguing about."

IV. DOES WEST GERMANY FEAR A THIRD PUNIC WAR?

The extreme contrast between the attitudes of the present West German Government and that of the Weimar Republic in regard to German War guilt, the failure of the Adenauer regime to work for the restoration of German honor and freedom through revisionist scholarship, the attempt to penalize forthright Revisionism, the lethargy or downright disinclination to seek to refute the most outrageous charges of cruelty and barbarism levelled against Germany by conscienceless atrocity-mongers, the continuation to this very day of not-so-little Nuremberg Trials by the West Germans themselves, and the needless self-flagellation of the German people, which seems to continue unabated, deeply puzzled me. Hence, I sent the proofs of this brochure to a learned historian, sympathetic with Revisionism, long resident in Germany since the War, and currently in close personal contact with German intellectuals and publicists, both those sympathetic with revisionist ideas and those highly hostile to them. I asked him if he could supply me with any reasonable explanation of this perplexing situation.

His realistic reply certainly furnishes food for thought, is at least a fresh point of view, and provides a logical and historical explanation of much that is otherwise all but inexplicable. He points out at the beginning that when we talk about Germans today, as I have in this brochure, we mean West Germans. East Germany has been swallowed up in the Soviet system. Even if Germany were free and united today, relatively unarmed as it would be without the weapons of thermonuclear warfare, it could be

easily and quickly crushed between Western Europe, aided by the United States, and the Communist hordes to the East. Any attempt to provide a united, or even Western, Germany with thermonuclear weapons would immediately incite Russia to war. If the Germans achieved freedom and unity, they would only be inviting something like the Third Punic War of 146 B.C., which resulted in the final destruction of what remained of Carthage.

Hatred of Germany and Germans has increased rather than subsided in the last decade, mainly as a result of partly fanciful and entirely malicious atrocity tales that the Bonn regime has not challenged, despite their crescendo in volume, mendacity, viciousness, and audacity. This has all but destroyed whatever sympathy *might* have been developing in the West to support any German struggle for rehabilitation, freedom and unity. The West Germans desire neither extermination nor the obvious and bald enslavement which is the lot of their oppressed countrymen to the East. Passive subserviency to the NATO powers is the only practical alternative. Bold espousal of Revisionism would encourage a movement for freedom and unity; hence, it must be suppressed to assure survival.

My correspondent's reaction to the material and point of view that I have set down in the preceeding pages is far too long and factual to be quoted in full, but I can reproduce a few representative sections to elucidate and develop the epitome I have given above:

> A return to freedom and independence on the part of (West) Germany is the last thing that the West German "Establishment" and the majority of German intellectuals desire. A recovery of freedom would expose the remaining fragments of Germany to a "Third Punic War," the final annihilation of both the country and the people. This must be avoided at all costs. Realizing the intense hatred which has been built up against Germany by war propaganda and the subsequent torrent of malicious atrocity tales, the only protective coloration that offers any assurance of survival is indefinite political, intellectual and moral subserviency. So long as the assumption of the utter depravity and criminality of the German past, especially in the present century, appears to be accepted and cherished by the Germans there is no danger that they will be free again. Writers like Suendermann are regarded as dangerous Don Quixotes who do not see that Germany can no longer afford freedom and independence.
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> Personally, I cannot blame them. The dominant feeling towards Germany in America today, and also in Great Britain and the Soviet Union, is one of unconditional hatred. The atrocity literature has seen to that. As a free and independent country,

West Germany would not have any reasonable chance of survival. No matter how intelligent their leadership, they would face total annihilation. The Carthaginians might have escaped some of the effects of 146 B.C. had they asked permission to join Rome as a province after the defeat of Hannibal. Even this avenue of protection is no longer possible for a divided Germany, with the eastern portion already swallowed up in the Soviet system. The present West European Economic Community is controlled largely by France. Politically, West Germany is our ward, its constitution having been written by an American professor.

The West Germans welcome this servitude, for as long as it exists the last remnants of their people will not be annihilated. As Oswald Spengler once asked: "Freedom for what?" The West Germans do not want to be slaughtered any more. They know that American Revisionists have absolutely no public influence here in United States, since nothing is more anathema to the American Establishment than Revisionism. Revisionism cannot be of any practical value to West Germany until it is triumphant in American scholarship and public policy, of which there is no prospect in any foreseeable future. The few American Revisionists are regarded by the West German Establishment as peculiar and erratic misanthropes. The Establishment and its supporters oppose freedom and independence as too great a risk to be borne. For the West Germans publicly to resent their treatment since the War would invite the destruction of the remnants of the German people. I must say that I can appreciate their way of looking at it in the light of their experience since 1945.

My own view, of course, remains unchanged. The truth must be served, first and foremost, regardless of the cost. But I do think that it is important for us to understand, privately, that our opponents among the West German anti-Revisionists have at least an intelligible position, and are not simply behaving like incomprehensible lunatics, as one might properly infer from what you have written. I do think, however, that the point of view and procedure taken in your treatment is justifiable. Since they smear us, why should we admit publicly that their position is intelligible, and even expedient and wise, in view of existing world realities? I trust and hope that American Revisionists will never have to advocate an end of truth on behalf of mere survival. An understanding of the actual attitude and policy of West German anti-Revisionists should help and encourage us in our own work.

Personally, I do not as yet take any dogmatic stand as to the correctness, in whole or in part, of this stimulating reaction to my presentation of the contrast in the attitudes of the Weimar Republic and the West German Establishment relative to the war-guilt problem and its relation to German politics at home and abroad. I can only say that, on the face of it at least, it does offer a reasonable explanation of policies and behavior that otherwise do appear to be sheer lunacy.

Such are: the comprehensive opposition of the Bonn regime to Revisionism, in general, at the cost of perpetuating Germanophobia and extensive moral and political disabilities imposed on Germany; the penalizing of all efforts to ascertain the truth about Hitler and National Socialism, even though the results would redound to the service of Germany so far as the war-guilt question is concerned; the lack of any serious opposition or concerted challenge to the atrocity stories and other modes of defamation of German national character and conduct—even the colossal Shirer slander was bought in great quantities in Germany and only sporadically attacked and exposed for what it really is; the failure to point out that the atrocities of the Allies were more brutal, painful, mortal and numerous than most extreme allegations made against the Germans; the payment of extensive reparations based on the atrocity stories; the discouragement and smearing of outsiders like the distinguished French historian, Paul Rassinier, who have sought to expose the exaggerations of the atrocities stories; the assertion of Rector Eschenburg that the dogma of exclusive German War guilt could not be undermined without destroying the whole political structure of the Western world; and the implication of the Freiburg professor that both German and foreign Revisionists aim to upset the Bonn Government and its basic political policies.

This interpretation also gains some claim to authenticity from the fact that one of the outstanding and ostensibly most bitter of the German anti-Revisionists told a friend of mine recently that he personally fully accepts the views of Revisionists like Tansill, Taylor and Hoggan, but circumstances compel him, in his published writings, to brand them as false and misleading. There is no evidence that his case is unique; indeed, I have evidence that it is not unusual.

Evidence of the assumption of German subserviency by foreign countries was well illustrated by the long delay and ultimate refusal, in the autumn of 1962, by the United States to return the hundreds of millions of dollars worth of German property seized during the War, while approving the payment of extensive reparations by Germany to minorities and others who alleged property losses caused by German action during the War.

Psychological encouragement of the German spirit of collective guilt and servility is supplied abroad by a host of anti-German writers. This is

taken for granted in the books and articles of professional Germanophobes, but it also appears in the works of writers who are otherwise known for urbanity, restraint and probity.

For example, Eugene Davidson is a highly reputable writer, at least mildly sympathetic with Revisionism, as proved by his act of courage in publishing the two revisionist volumes of Charles Austin Beard, and unusually familiar with post-war Germany. Yet, he closes his in many ways masterly book on *The Death and Life of Germany* with a strong assertion as to the collective guilt of the Germans for, in part at least, unproved atrocities and horrors and the desirability of having the Germans remain conscious of this collective guilt for an indefinite period. Further, his treatment of the Nuremberg Trials is more critical of the mechanics and legal weaknesses of the procedure than the falsity of the fundamental assumptions which produced the Trials. It exhibits less wisdom, understanding and instruotiveness than the work of the English lawyer, Frederick J. P. Veale, and gives no intellectual or moral asylum to the verdict of A. J. P. Taylor that the whole performance was a "macabre farce," which disgraced any British lawyer who participated in the prosecution.

The furor created by the articles and editorials *in Der Spiegel* in the autumn of 1962 would appear to give considerable validity to the theme set forth in this section of my brochure. Certainly, the behavior of the Adenauer Government in its handling of the case demonstrated obvious inconsistency. The official line has been to smear revisionist publishers and authors as "Neo-Nazi," but there seemed no hesitancy in employing Neo-Nazi methods in handling the case of Der *Spiegel.* Further evidence of West-German subserviency was provided by the almost incredible grovelling of President Eugene Gerstenmaier of the West German *Bundestag* in an address in Israel on November 21, 1962, and the sending of a penitential West German work corps to Israel.

We may leave the matter here, quite content if it stimulates some serious consideration of the evidence presented, whether it produces any substantial agreement or not. It deals with facts and problems which are bound to have an increasing relation to the security of the human race.

Before I leave the subject of opposition to revisionist ideas in Germany today it may be desirable to say a word on the matter of the German publishing situation since the War, in so far as it bears on this topic. I sent the manuscript of this brochure to a leading English publicist and scholar who had just returned from a considerable visit to Germany where he had given special attention to this very question. While he agrees heartily with my critical remarks in relation to the attitude of the Bonn Government and anti-revisionist writers, he feels that I should be a little more charitable to the German public at large with respect to their apathy or allergy in regard to revisionist history and its bearing on the war guilt problem:

> You must recognize the unique and unfortunate position of the reading public in Germany. After 1945, nothing could be published there without a license issued by the military governments of the victors. This meant that the editors and publishers who had flourished under Hitler went into retirement—generally into concentration camps. Following in the wake of the Allied armies came most of the pre-1933 publishers who had fled when Hitler came into power. They were the only ones who could obtain licenses to publish. They took over and firmly entrenched themselves in every publishing and newspaper establishment. Hence, when the military government was finally terminated, the publishing houses and newspapers were all staffed by the "Remigrants," as they are called. Most of them were violently anti-National Socialist and anti-revisionist when the latter issue arose. The only way to combat their bias was to launch new publishing houses and newspapers, but very few of their opponents had the resources or courage to do this.
>
> The result has been that the German people, for the most part, have heard only the endless repetition of propaganda myths. It is easy to condemn the apathy of the German public today — especially of the younger generation — as compared with the attitude of those living in the 1920's, but you must remember that for nearly twenty years they have heard only one point of view — that officially approved. The only challenge and contradiction has come from small and obscure publishers with very restricted financial resources, a weak organization, and very little support. Few Germans have heard of them or read what they turn out. Suppose you were a young man and had never heard any challenge or opposition to the statement that the earth is flat; would you feel impelled to take the trouble to search out obscure publishers and books — unadvertised and not reviewed — in order to ascertain the facts for yourself?

Of course, the situation as to public ignorance and apathy on revisionist matters is much the same in the United States. The American people still know little beyond what Charles Austin Beard used to call "the story for babes". The large publishing houses of pre-War times still dominate the American scene, but they have changed their attitude towards the freedom of writing and publishing and now hew closely to the official and propaganda line, much as do the larger German publishers today. There has been only one forthright revisionist book published in the United States by a large commercial publisher since 1945. This book was in the field of military Revisionism, a much less "touchy" theme. It was brought out solely

because the head of the firm wished to get personally acquainted with one of the most distinguished and respected American citizens who was a warm friend of the author. The publishing houses that have brought out any dissenting and revisionist materials have also been, as in Germany, new, small and indigent, with little popular influence or support.

V. ANTI-REVISIONISM IN THE UNITED STATES

The essentials of my preceding material that dealt with the contrasting attitudes toward Revisionism and revisionist studies under the Weimar Republic and the Bonn Government were published in Dr. Grabert's *German Journal of University Instructors* (1961,9.Jahrgang, Heft 4). Several German historians and publicists who had read this article, and much earlier my brochure on "The Struggle against the Historical Blackout" and other criticisms of American historical writings on the responsibility for the second World War, have upbraided me for presuming to criticize the Germans.

They have asserted that, by my own admission, the main body of the American historical guild and the Government of the United States have been just as anti-Revisionist as the Bonn Government and the rank-and-file German historians have been since the War. They further suggested that for an American historian to attack German anti-Revisionism is no less than the pot calling the kettle black. This would surely be true if I were one of the anti-revisionist historians in the United States. I have, however, called attention to the domination of anti-Revisionism in American historical writing ever since the end of the War in numerous articles and brochures, and in the first chapter of *Perpetual War for Perpetual Peace,* and shall not take the space needed to repeat it here.

But there are several very timely items of special significance and relevance which may be profitably commented upon briefly here, notably one that ties in German and American anti-Revisionism. This is the discovery that in the October, 1962, issue of the *American Historical* Review there appeared a review of Dr. Hoggan's book, *The Imposed War* (in the German edition), which I described at some length at the outset of the brochure. The review was written by Professor Gerhard L. Weinberg of the University of Michigan.

Professor Weinberg is the chief American confederate of Hans Rothfels, the outstanding academic anti-Revisionist in Germany, and he has published much of his material in Rothfels' journal. He and Rothfels have collaborated in "fathering" the highly controversial and much disputed *Hitler's Second Book,* allegedly written by Hitler in 1928. Hence, it would be evident in advance that Weinberg could not be expected to approach

the Hoggan book with any remote semblance of objectivity or sincerity, and the editor of the *American Historical Review* must have known this when he sent Weinberg the book to review, or acceded to his request to review it, whatever the case may have been.

The contrast in the attitudes of the *American Historical Review,* the outstanding historical journal in the United States, toward Revisionism over the last forty years is both startling and instructive. It is as extreme as the contrast between those of the Weimar Republic and the Bonn establishment. In 1920, under the editorship of J. Franklin Jameson, this distinguished periodical began the publication of the epoch-making articles of Sidney B. Fay dealing with the responsibility for the first World War, less than two years after the Armistice of November, 1918. Professor Fay's articles very literally launched revisionist studies about the responsibility for 1914 in the United States and, aside from undue harshness relative to Austria, they still stand up well after forty years.

During the more than seventeen years since the second World War, this same journal has not published one forthright revisionist article, nor has it published one sympathetic review of any revisionist book dealing with the outbreak of the second World War in 1939 or American entry in 1941, and a number of important ones were totally ignored. Indeed, its hostility to any fair and honest treatment of revisionist material appears to be growing in intensity and determination. The first two books to appear on the causes of the second World War which are in any way comparable to Fay's masterly work on 1914 are A. J. P. Taylor's *The Origins of the Second World War,* and the above-mentioned book by Dr. Hoggan. Both commit the historical "sin against the Holy Ghost" by denying the sole, or even primary, responsibility of Hitler for the outbreak of war in 1939. They were reviewed in the July and October (1962) issues of the *American Historical* Review in a manner which can only with considerable charity be described as even honest in intent, to say nothing of being fair, competent and actually descriptive of the nature and contents of the books reviewed.

Professor Raymond J. Sontag of the University of California reviewed the Taylor book in the July issue. He had been a frank Revisionist with respect to the first World War, and had written to me pleasantly, even flatteringly, concerning my *Genesis of the World War.* It was well known that he had undergone a great change in attitude in approaching the background of 1939 but few could have been prepared for his review of the Taylor book. It was a smear from beginning to end and made no attempt whatever to indicate the nature, significance and contributions of the book as the first revisionist treatment of the causes of the second World War to appear in any language. There was no real excuse for such an exhibition

because Sontag had been one of the principal editors of the documents on 1939 seized from the Germans at the end of the War.

Sontag attacked Taylor vigorously for condensing slightly some of the cited documentary material although this did not seem to have made any real difference in Taylor's interpretation of the essentials of his case. He then proceeded to offer some largely irrelevant and casuistic criticism of details, such as Taylor's not regarding Hitler's *Mein Kampf* and other early statements as valid evidence of his plans in 1938-1939. All this could be overlooked, even though much better use could have been made of the space taken up by giving readers of the review some slight idea of the character, originality, merits and contributions of the book. What cannot be regarded so complacently is that Sontag then completely misrepresented the basic thesis of Taylor's book by contending that Taylor asserts that, after the autumn of 1938, British diplomacy was mainly responsible for the coming of war in September, 1939—that it was "foolish, blindly foolish" and dragged Europe into the tragedy of war.

The fact is that Taylor declares several times that no country wanted war in 1939 and that it was the product of blunders by all. The main weakness and defect of the Taylor book is actually the palpable failure adequately to reveal the responsibility of Britain for the onset of the War. In a brochure on Taylor's book, entitled "Blasting the Historical Blackout," I devoted some twenty-one pages to a careful analysis of the content and contentions of the volume. I found it necessary to devote no less than eight of these pages to a summary of the evidence indicating that Taylor actually absolved Britain of any direct or major responsibility for the onset of War during the critical period from the end of March to early September, 1939. Apparently, Sontag regards it as highly reprehensible to juggle the text of a few documents, even if this does not materially affect the author's narrative or generalizations, but quite permissible, even commendable, to juggle a whole book and totally misrepresent its main argument and conclusions.

Astonishing as was Professor Sontag's distortion of the fundamental theme of the Taylor book, his review was almost a model of fairness, integrity and forthrightness as compared to the review of the German edition of the Hoggan book by Professor Weinberg in the October issue of the same journal. This is understandable in the light of the fact that the Hoggan book is far more comprehensive, heavily documented, inclusive and well-rounded than the Taylor volume, and it does properly emphasize the responsibility of Britain. If its conclusions were accepted it would mean the surrender of the main vested interest of both historians and post-war politicians: the dogma of Hitler's sole responsibility for the second World War. It is the only book which has appeared anywhere in the world on the

responsibility for the second World War that is comparable to the work of Fay on the first world conflict, and it is based upon an impressively greater body of relevant documentation than Fay's classic book. It is, therefore, *the* book which *must* be smeared or ignored into oblivion if the anti-revisionist dogmas of the overwhelming majority of American historians are to be sustained. Weinberg and the editor adopted the smearing technique.

The present editor of the *American Historical* Review, Dr. Boyd C. Shafer, adroitly picked or accepted the perfect reviewer to apply this smear method, provided that it could be safely assumed that few or nobody would actually read the book in German and discover what the author had really written. The stratagem appears to be so thoroughly and irresponsibly to smear the book in the German edition that when and if the American edition appeared and could be read by *any* interested parties, it would already be so discredited that few would regard it as even worth reading. It must be killed before its birth in a form easily accessible to American readers, academic or others.

Weinberg ill-advisedly started off his review by a paragraph more suitable to appraising a book on theology or political philosophy than one dealing exclusively with diplomatic history. This very first paragraph revealed the reviewer's malice or ignorance so clearly that the defense of the Hoggan book could readily rest at this point. He smeared Dr. Grabert, the editor and publisher of the book, as "a leading anti-Christian publicist of the 1930's" and the author and publisher of numerous "Neo-Nazi works since World War II".

It turns out that Grabert has been a devout Lutheran since boyhood and one of the most prolific authors of strongly Christian theological books in Germany from the late 1920's right through the National Socialist period, one appearing in 1939. Nor is there the slightest evidence in his books or articles that Grabert wishes a restoration of National Socialism in Germany in any of its manifestations. His non-theological works have centered around the plea for greater academic and political freedom in Germany and for a bold political program and leadership in that country which goes beyond idle boasting about the German "economic miracle" that was put on its feet by American money through the Marshall Plan and other benefits. If Weinberg exhibits this degree of malice and either ignorance or mendacity concerning the publisher of the book, what confidence can be placed in his treatment of the author, against whom he would obviously have far greater animus?

Weinberg then rashly hurls the most serious charges with the same levity against the Hoggan book: Hoggan naively and uncritically takes Hitler's public statements at their face value; he overlooks or discards

Hitler's more important secret utterances; he transposes the sequence of events to suit his purposes; and he either twists or fabricates evidence. Although Weinberg states that there are "innumerable possible examples" of the latter, the most serious charge of all, it is remarkable that he could not come up with even one convincing sample. The one he cites demonstrates that either he has not carefully read the book or is irresponsible and unscrupulous in his castigation of the volume — and the example he produces is a non *sequitur* in the bargain. Moreover, the charge of fabricating footnotes comes with especially bad taste and impropriety from Weinberg until he has more effectively and adequately cleared up the scepticism and controversy over his *Hitler's Second Book* (See *American Historical Review,* October, 1962, p. 218).

Since I have warmly praised the Hoggan book I had more than a normal reason for wishing to make it as free as possible from all defects of scholarship and documentation. Hence, I had the manuscript read by a number of leading experts in European diplomatic history and international relations. It is unlikely that any volume on diplomatic history ever published in the United States has had the benefit of more critical readings and suggestions. The great majority of the readers were picked for a combination of their well-known competence and their honest scepticism as to Hoggan's conclusions. I was able to supply all the praise needed for the moment, and sceptical but honest and competent critics were the most likely to detect ignorance or errors.

Not one reader has reported the discovery of any of the horrendous deficiencies alleged by Weinberg. The most vigorous critic of them all, a leading Polish-American authority on the diplomacy related to the second World War, stated that nobody could fail to be impressed by the vast learning and the remarkably full and diversified documentation (of which Weinberg fails to offer even a hint), and Hoggan's honest effort to arrive at the truth. Weinberg, of course, makes no reference to the long history and careful preparation of the Hoggan book which I recounted at the outset of this brochure, beginning with the acceptance of its main theses by the two leading historical experts in the field in the United States and by the doctoral examining committee in the most distinguished historical department in America — and also the most pro-British and anti-German.

One might fairly say, in conclusion, that, just as Sontag seemed to find it worse to juggle a few words in an occasional document than to juggle the intent and import of a whole book, so Weinberg appears to regard it as more reprehensible to invent a footnote than to invent a book.

In discussing the Sontag and Weinberg reviews with an outstanding authority on contemporary European diplomacy, the latter suggested to me that the most probable explanation of such performances is that the forthright revisionist revelations and synthesis are so distasteful and un-

pleasant to people of their convictions that persons like Sontag and Weinberg just cannot bring themselves to read such books carefully, or in some cases even casually. This is understandable, but those who are so completely allergic to revisionist books should not be entrusted to review them, least of all in periodicals that pretend to utilize the highest professional talent available in their fields of interest. It should, of course, he pointed out in passing that to write the kind of reviews they produced, neither Sontag nor Weinberg needed to read the books they treated. Sontag could have written his simply by recourse to such passionate attacks on Taylor as those by Hugh Trevor-Roper and A. L. Rowse, and Weinberg required only the smears of the Hoggan book by Rothfels and Gotthard Jasper. They were both as much "engaged" in advance as Taylor observes about Herbert Feis and others.

Some of my German anti-revisionist correspondents have also charged that official history in the United States is as deliberately manhandled and distorted as in West Germany. There is some basis for this allegation, notably in the case of the State Department documents on the Wartime Conferences prepared under the supervision of Dr. G. Bernard Noble, longtime Director of the Historical Division of the State Department. There is evidence that much important material was withheld or destroyed and that publication was scandalously and needlessly delayed. These abuses have been bi-partisan, being apparent under both the Truman and Eisenhower administrations.

When the documents on the disputed and controversial Yalta Conference were published, two of the leading State Department historical editors, Bryton Barron and Donald M. Dozer, openly protested against the omissions and distortions. Barron had edited the Yalta documents and was shocked at what he finally saw in print. Both of these men were promptly ousted and there was no apparent improvement in editorial objectivity and integrity. I have been informed by the man who originally edited the Tehran documents that he was unable to prevent Noble from arbitrarily selecting his materials and suppressing important documents, and that this process went on from 1955 to 1961 when the Tehran documents were finally published.

Nevertheless, when these documents were published and were reviewed in the July, 1962, issue of the *American Historical* Review by Professor Norman A. Graebner of the University of Illinois, he stated that "the editors have eliminated nothing of significance from this official record." And in the same issue of this magazine, it was stated that the Advisory Committee on these publications, representing the American Historical Association, Dexter Perkins, Fred H. Harrington, and Richard W. Leopold, "expressed its deep appreciation of the scholarly work and achievements of the Chief of the Historical Division, Bernard Noble."

Commenting on a book by Herbert Feis, one of the leading officially-favored American historians, A. J. P. Taylor contended that it was "a State Department brief, translated into terms of historical scholarship . . . Dr. Feis' conclusions were not derived from the evidence; they were assumed as self-evident before the book was begun . . . The academic historians of the West may assert their scholarly independence even when they are employed by a government department; but they are as much 'engaged' as though they wore the handsome uniforms designed for German professors by Dr. Goebbels."

ADDENDUM

Readers unacquainted with the anti-revisionist bias in German academic life and historical writing may profit by representative examples.

Professor Walther Hofer, who declared that sound historical methods must not be applied to studying the causes of the second World War, is regarded as the "spiritual rector" of West Germany. In historical attitudes, he works hand-in-hand with the Communist-dominated Humboldt University in East Berlin. Their interpretation of recent German history is identical. The Spandau prison is the symbol of the continuing intellectual anti-Hitler coalition.

Professor Besson of Erlangen and G«lo Mann in Stuttgart have derided "Anglo-Saxon historians," obviously meaning scholars like Beard, Tansill, Taylor and Hoggan, as unreliable, if not half-witted. Mann declared them to be "sophists and half-fools — people beyond any help." Professor Moltmann of Hamburg University stated that "Tansill's Bacfe Door *to War* is of no use for historical purposes. This man is obsessed by complexes." Professor Rothfels, who actually vouches for the fantastic book of Walther Hofer, stated from the platform of the German Historical Convention in Duisb|rg on October 26, 1962: "Hoggan is a forgery. I warn you." Rothfels is Weinberg's "father confessor." Professor von Albertini of Heidelberg admitted that he had bitterly attacked the Hoggan book without having read a word of it, and went on to say: "Thank God, England declared war on Germany in 1939," sentiment seconded by Gdlo Mann.

A directive to university faculties was recently sent out, warning historians that: "There must be nothing favorable said about the Third Reich, and there must be nothing unfavorable said about the Allies." There was no apparent protest.

The effect that the brainwashing has had on the younger generation was shown by the historical creed agreed upon by the coalition of German university students leagues, to the effect that "German history, in the pattern of Al Capone, began with Martin Luther, and followed its logical course via Frederick the Great to the gas chambers of Auschwitz and Treblinka." According to Professor W. Jens, true German history begins with 1945.